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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses British and US government intervention in the Venezuelan oil 
industry between the years 1941 and 1948 as a case study of Anglo-US relations. During 
the Second World War, Britain was entirely reliant on imports for its oil needs and 
Venezuela became a vital source of supply. Concurrently, US government officials were 
concerned that their domestic oil reserves would soon be exhausted and they perceived 
Venezuela as an important future supplier. As such, British and US policy-makers were 
inclined to intervene when it seemed as though their access to Venezuelan oil was 
threatened. Such a threat materialised as, during the 1940s, Venezuelan politics became 
characterised by popular demand for economic reform and dramatic regime change. 
However, British and US officials came into conflict as they sought to further their 
independent and often conflicting policies in Venezuela. Indeed, the Anglo-US wartime 
and Cold War alliance did not preclude disputes from arising between the two 
governments in matters relating to oil and Latin America.  
In order to defend their interests in Venezuelan oil, Whitehall and Washington 
developed intimate ties with privately-owned companies operating in the country. This 
thesis elucidates the role of state-private sector interaction within foreign relations and the 
effect of this dynamic on British and US policy towards Venezuela. It argues that 
multinational oil companies had the capacity to significantly influence events and their 
relationships with national governments played an important role within international 
politics. Indeed, the ability of Whitehall and Washington to gain the support of oil 
company officials was, in many instances, a pre-requisite for their ability to exercise 
power in Venezuela. 
 
  
 
v 
 
Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements vii 
Abbreviations ix 
  
Introduction 1 
  
1. The Formation of British and US Policy towards Venezuelan Oil, 1938-1942 33 
  
2. British and US Intervention in Venezuelan Tax Negotiations, 1941-1943 91 
  
3. Applying the Atlantic Charter to the Venezuelan Oil Industry, 1943-1944 137 
  
4. Asymmetries of Influence, 1944-1945 186 
  
5. Venezuelan Oil and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1948 221 
  
Conclusion 288 
  
Bibliography 299 
  
 
vii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I never viewed my PhD as a means to an end and I feel enormously fortunate to have had 
the opportunity to spend years of my life contemplating how the world around me came 
into being. The last six years have left me with cherished memories and I especially value 
the relationships I have forged and developed during this formative time. My friends and 
family have been a constant source of love, support and encouragement, which I prize 
above all else. 
 It’s been a great pleasure to work alongside and befriend the postgraduate students 
of the University of Sheffield’s Department of History. Throughout my PhD, the 
camaraderie of these smart and decent people provided me with the caffeine, beer and 
moral support necessary to fuel my progress. I hope that we can drink in The Bath until 
we get wrinkly. I would have been unable to complete this thesis without the assistance 
and patience of Professor Bob Moore, Professor Holger Nehring and Dr Abdel Razzaq 
Takriti whose advice and guidance have been invaluable.  
I am also grateful to the Department of History for awarding me a fee-waiver to 
undertake this project and to all the department staff for their help over the years. I am 
indebted to everyone who supplied feedback on my work, the archivists who aided my 
research and the friends who provided me with a free place to stay during my transatlantic 
trips to the archive. I wish to thank the University of Sheffield, the Society for Latin 
American Studies, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the 
Business History Conference for providing me with the funding necessary to undertake 
my research and to attend conferences.  
Thank you to all of those who have, throughout my life, encouraged my interest in 
history and inspired my curiosity. 
  
 
ix 
 
Abbreviations 
 
In the text: 
AD Acción Democrática 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CPAD Commercial Policy and Agreements Division of the State Department 
FO Foreign Office 
ID Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army 
MFP Ministry of Fuel and Power 
PAW Petroleum Administration for War 
PD Petroleum Department / Petroleum Division after June 1942 
PRC Petroleum Reserves Corporation 
RTAA Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act 
SoCal Standard Oil Company of California 
SOCNJ Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
  
In source references: 
FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library 
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States 
HSTL Harry S. Truman Presidential Library 
LC Library of Congress 
NA The National Archives of the United Kingdom 
NARA United States National Archives and Records Administration 
RAC Rockefeller Archive Center 
RFA Rockefeller Family Archive 
PSF President’s Secretary’s Files 
RG Record Group 
SLA Shell Group Archives, London 
UDL University of Delaware Library 
UNA United Nations Archive 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis analyses British and US government intervention in the Venezuelan oil 
industry between the years 1941 and 1948 as a case study of Anglo-US relations. During 
this period, the Second World War and Cold War greatly increased the international 
importance of Venezuelan crude. The outbreak of the Second World War underlined 
modern armed forces’ dependence on oil but, lacking an indigenous supply, Britain was 
forced to rely on imports for its needs. Venezuelan crude took on particular significance 
within the British war effort as oil from the Middle East became less accessible following 
the closure of the Mediterranean in 1940.
1
 In 1939, forty per cent of Britain’s total oil 
imports were of Venezuelan origin and this had risen to around eighty per cent by 1942.
2
 
Concurrently, Washington officials, concerned that the USA’s domestic oil reserves 
would soon be exhausted, sought to secure access to overseas sources of supply. Thus, in 
the early 1940s, the US government began to formulate, and carry out, a more cohesive 
foreign oil policy within which Venezuela played a significant role.
3
 In order to defend 
these vital interests, British and US policy-makers independently developed intimate ties 
with privately-owned oil companies operating in Venezuela.  
Yet British and US interests appeared to be under threat when, during the 1940s, 
Venezuelan domestic politics became characterised by popular demand for economic 
reform and dramatic regime change. In 1941, the Venezuelan government began making 
overtures to the foreign-owned oil companies that new tax laws would have to be 
                                                 
1
 Charles More, Black Gold: Britain and Oil in the Twentieth Century (London, 2009), p. 72. 
2
 The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew [hereafter NA], FO 371/22851/A5540, F. C. Starling, 
head of the Petroleum Department, to John Balfour, head of the FO American Department, 8 August 1939; 
NA, CAB 77/5, OCB (41) 131, ‘Security Measures at Curacao and Aruba’ memorandum by Geoffrey 
William Geoffrey-Lloyd, Oil Control Board Chairman, 17 December 1941; NA, FO 371/30748/A1220, FO 
memorandum, 2 February 1942. 
3
 Max Weston Thornburg Papers, in the custody of the author, [hereafter Max Thornburg Papers] ‘Notes on 
the Development of our National Foreign Oil Policy in Preparation for Senate Inquiry’ by Max Weston 
Thornburg, 14 March 1944; David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. 
Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954 (Baltimore, MD, 1986), pp. 199-210. 
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negotiated in order to guarantee a greater state share of industry profits. Furthermore, the 
government began placing pressure on the companies to increase the amount of oil 
refining done in Venezuelan territory.
4
 These developments must also be placed within 
the context of the Second World War as the threat of Axis aggression led to British and 
French occupation of the Dutch West Indies, where the vast majority of Venezuelan oil 
was refined.
5
 In addition, the period of 1941 to 1948 saw political upheaval in Venezuela 
as a 1945 leftist overthrow of the government was followed in 1948 by a military coup 
d'état.
6
 While all these developments are significant in themselves, they also revealed and 
exacerbated tensions within the Anglo-US wartime and post-war alliance. A principal 
objective of this thesis is to contextualise British and US intervention within the two 
governments’ wider foreign policies amid the rapidly changing geopolitical climate of the 
1940s. By overtly placing British and US policy towards Venezuela within this broader 
perspective, this thesis aims to make the study of oil diplomacy more relevant to a range 
of historical inquiry. 
During the Second World War, British officials were aware that their country 
would emerge from the conflict in a position of comparative weakness to the USA and 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the British government sought to maintain its international 
standing and viewed the Second World War as an opportunity to expand, as well as 
defend, its interests. Total war on a global scale emphasised Britain’s reliance on its links 
with overseas territories and, throughout the 1940s, the government endeavoured to 
extend its influence into areas beyond the formal Empire.
7
 Whitehall’s intervention in the 
                                                 
4
 John Knape, ‘British Foreign Policy in the Caribbean Basin 1938-1945: Oil, Nationalism and Relations 
with the United States’, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (November 1987), pp. 279-294. 
5
 Bob Moore, ‘Anglo‐American Security Policy and its Threats to Dutch Colonial Rule in the West Indies, 
1940–42’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1995), pp. 453-478. 
6
 Steve Ellner, ‘Venezuela’, in Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds), Latin America Between the Second 
World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 147. 
7
 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, 
2009), p. 514-527; John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49 (London, 
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Venezuelan oil industry was, therefore, representative of its broader aim of safeguarding 
Britain’s position at the centre of world affairs. In particular, the British government 
aimed to ensure that its global interests were not undermined by Washington’s foreign 
policy and US efforts to shape post-war international organisation. Yet Whitehall’s ability 
to exercise power within the Venezuelan oil industry was often impeded by the US 
government which had its own independent aims and policies. 
Throughout this period, the US government attempted to consolidate and increase 
its dominance of the Western Hemisphere by taking a leading role in pan-American 
organisation. The Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor policy was designed to 
improve relations with Latin America while, concurrently, US officials propagated free 
trade throughout the region.
8
 Subsequently, the outbreak of the Second World War led 
Washington to prioritise pan-American solidarity as a means of securing hemispheric 
defence against Axis aggression.
9
 US policy towards the Venezuelan oil industry was 
intended to ensure that the independent actions of multinational oil companies did not 
undermine these vital interests. This intervention into private enterprise built on the US 
government’s earlier participation in domestic business affairs during the Great 
Depression and mobilisation for the Second World War.
10
  
As such, the Venezuelan oil industry became a testing ground for the 
internationalisation of the New Deal and the state-private sector collaboration that 
                                                                                                                                                  
1993), pp. 1-2; David Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second 
World War (London, 2011), pp. 47-85. 
8
 David Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good 
Neighbor Policy (Chicago, IL, 1971), pp. 18-23; Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy 
(New York, NY, 1961), pp. 3-10; Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in 
Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore, MD, 1979); pp. 10-17. 
9
 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 233-
236; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, NY, 1951), pp. 95-96. 
10
 Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 
1941-1947 (New Haven, CT, 1980), pp. 10-22; Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 
1941-1945 (Westport, CT, 1972), pp. 35-36; Alan Brinkley, ‘The New Deal and the Idea of the State’, in 
Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (eds), The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, NJ, 
1989), pp. 85-121. 
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historians have argued characterised US post-war foreign policy.
11
 In particular, 
Washington officials perceived Whitehall policy, which had successfully secured 
Britain’s access to foreign oil, as a model to which the US government could, and should, 
aspire.
12
 Such interventionism characterised the US government’s foreign policy during 
the Second World War as the Roosevelt administration abandoned isolationism, seeking 
instead to shape post-war international organisation.
13
 In particular, US officials 
endeavoured to universalise their hemispheric free trade programme but this created 
conflict with both the British and Venezuelan governments. 
 By 1946, the Cold War had created a new context for international relations in 
which British and US officials feared Soviet-inspired communist influence and sabotage 
in Latin America.
14
 This thesis examines the levels of change and continuity in British 
and US policies towards Venezuela as the two governments responded to this changing 
international environment. It contextualises events in Venezuela within a broad 
geopolitical perspective while also providing a detailed case study of the Cold War’s 
effect on British and US foreign policy. As such, an objective of this thesis is to develop 
our understanding of the connection between the local and global in international 
                                                 
11
 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA, 
2005), pp. 70-78; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of 
Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 1-25; Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American 
Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York, NY, 1999), pp. 93-106. 
12
 Library of Congress (LC), Harold L. Ickes Papers, Box 221, File: Secretary of Interior File, Oil Octane 
(100) 1941-1946, Ickes to Roosevelt, 15 October 1941; Ickes to Roosevelt, 1 December 1941. 
13
 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt As Wartime Statesman (Princeton, NJ, 1991), pp. 
185-200. 
14
 Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO [hereafter HSTL] President’s Secretary’s Files 
[hereafter PSF], Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946-1953, Box 215, CIA Report ORE 16: Soviet 
Objectives in Latin America, 10 April 1947; Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in 
the Cold War (2nd edn, Chicago, Il, 2011), pp. 7-9; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, ‘The Impact of the 
Cold War on Latin America’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An 
International History (2nd edn, New York, NY, 2005), p. 311-313; Roger R. Trask, ‘The Impact of the 
Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July 
1978), pp. 279-283; NA, FO 371/52209/AS6356, minute by E. P. Lecours, Press Attaché in Caracas, 27 
September 1946; NA, FO 371/61391/AS1345, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Ambassador to Venezuela, to 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, 7 February 1947; NA, FO 371/74887/AS1091, J. H. Magowan, 
Ambassador to Venezuela, to A. Stanley Fordham, head of FO South American Department, 11 February 
1949; NA, FO 371/74887/AS1091, minute by Margaret Joan Anstee, FO South American Department,  28 
February 1949. 
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relations by examining how British and US officials integrated their specific interests in 
Venezuelan oil within broad geopolitical concerns.  
A further ambition of this thesis is to elucidate the role of state-private sector 
interaction within foreign relations and the effect of this dynamic on British and US 
policies towards Venezuela. In so doing, it furthers our understanding of the relationship 
between national governments and the private sector. Rather than viewing these as 
distinct entities that work independently, this analysis focuses on the intimate working 
relationship between national governments and multinational oil companies, revealing 
that such distinctions can become blurred. Indeed, British and US officials would 
collaborate and cooperate with oil company executives to formulate and carry out their 
foreign policy objectives. By analysing this dynamic in detail, this thesis reveals how the 
mechanics of foreign relations themselves influenced the British and US ability to 
exercise power.  
Therefore, in addition to contributing to an understanding of Anglo-US relations, 
this thesis expands our understanding of international relations more generally. Crucial to 
this is an assessment of state-private sector interaction and the triangular relationship 
between British, US and oil company officials. Analysing this dynamic in Venezuela 
reveals the means by which British and US policy-makers combined traditional 
diplomacy with links with the private sector in order to exercise power around the word. 
Thus, this thesis makes use of oil company correspondence to gauge the views of their 
officials and better understand their relationship with state bureaucracy. This approach 
makes it possible to judge the importance of these relationships to the British and US 
governments’ ability to influence events in Venezuela while appreciating the oil 
companies’ own independent motivations, aims and power.  
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Historiographical Significance 
This thesis engages with a range of secondary literature on the international politics of oil, 
British and US foreign relations, the Cold War, and the role of state-private networks in 
international relations. Using this diverse historiography, it takes what are traditionally 
considered to be disparate topics and links them to reinterpret events. Despite the 
importance of oil in British and US foreign policy, literature on the subject is limited and 
in great need of further development. Oil diplomacy can be seen as emblematic of the 
broader perceptions held by British and US policy-makers yet currently it is treated as a 
distinct, and niche, subject area. This thesis highlights the historical significance of oil 
diplomacy by placing it within a wider geopolitical context. 
The term ‘multinational corporation’ was originally coined by David E. Lilienthal 
as covering: ‘Such corporations – which have their home in one country but which 
operate and live under the laws and customs of other countries as well’. 15  This 
characterised the day-to-day running of the major multinational oil companies throughout 
the 1940s, when oil companies maintained remarkably close ties with multiple 
governments. These corporations required close working relationships with the 
governments of oil-producing countries (the host country) in order to acquire concessions 
and to prevent prohibitive legislation from being enacted. It was also to the benefit of oil 
companies to maintain close ties with the government of the country within which they 
were headquartered (the home country) in order to gain a potential ally in their dealings 
with oil-exporting countries.
16
 These private institutions have the potential to work 
alongside, and influence, the highest levels of government. At the same time governments 
may make use of private institutions as a means of exercising state power. These 
                                                 
15
 D. K. Fieldhouse, ‘The Multinational: A Critique of a Concept’, in Alice Teichova, Maurice Lévy-
Leboyer and Helga Nussbaum (eds), Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1986), 
p. 10. 
16
 Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century 
(Oxford, 2005), pp. 231-285. 
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connections between government and private enterprise can be described as a state-
private network. 
This thesis uses various case studies to analyse, and compare, both the British and 
US relationships with multinational oil companies in Venezuela. In so doing, it elucidates 
the effect of this state-private network on the British and US ability to exercise power in 
the country. In his study of the role of the state-private network within US politics Scott 
Lucas has suggested that ‘private individuals and groups could work with those 
government officials, not necessarily because they shared that same vision of power and 
ideology, but because their own complex conceptions and interests were furthered by the 
relationship.’17 While British and US officials’ interest in the Venezuelan oil industry was 
principally motivated by national security concerns, multinational oil companies operated 
in the country for financial profit. Nevertheless, these differing motives often led to 
shared interests and aims. For example, British officials consistently believed that 
safeguarding Shell’s operations in Venezuela would help to secure British oil supplies. 
Thus, at times, British and US officials worked in coordination with privately-owned oil 
companies in order to achieve shared goals. This thesis builds on and develops the 
analysis of Scott Lucas by not assuming unified decision-makers and state interests. 
Instead it seeks to bring ideas of agency and contingency back to these networks. At times 
British, US and oil company policies towards Venezuela would diverge, creating conflict 
between officials. Moreover, British and US diplomatic intervention had the potential to 
hinder, as well as aid, the multinational oil companies operating in Venezuela.  
                                                 
17
 Scott Lucas, ‘Introduction: Negotiating Freedom’, in Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (eds), The US 
Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network (New York, NY, 2006), p. 11. 
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Various oil corporations have commissioned their own company histories but 
these are extremely narrow in their perspective and lack impartiality.
18
 Fortunately, more 
thorough studies have revealed the strong ties Whitehall has traditionally held with the 
international oil industry though studies of British oil diplomacy in Latin America are 
conspicuous by their absence. While Brian McBeth emphasises Britain’s relationship to 
Venezuela in his broad study of British interwar oil policy, historians have 
overwhelmingly focused their analysis on the Middle East and particularly Iran.
19
 The 
significance of oil within British foreign policy is exposed by the historiography 
surrounding the Iranian nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, but 
there are no in-depth studies of the British response to Venezuelan nationalism.
20
 
Moreover, taken as a whole, studies of British oil diplomacy have so far tended to lack 
geopolitical context, examination of state-private networks, or both. Nevertheless, this 
existing historiography provides context and lineage with which this study can engage.  
Such limitations can also be found in the existing historiography of US foreign oil 
policy. David S. Painter, Stephen J. Randall and Michael B. Stoff have all produced 
studies that, together, provide a thorough overview of the US government’s increasing 
intervention in the international oil industry during the 1940s.
21
 Complementing this, 
Stephen G. Rabe has analysed US involvement in the Venezuelan oil industry throughout 
                                                 
18
 Most recently: James Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of 
Nationalism (Cambridge, 2000); Jan Luiten van Zanden, Joost Jonker, Stephen Howarth, and Keetie 
Sluyterman,  A History of Royal Dutch Shell, Vol. I-IV (Oxford, 2007). 
19
 Steven G. Galpern, Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-
71 (Cambridge, 2009); Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London, 
1981); Marion Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900-1920 (London, 1976); 
Marion Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism, and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy, 
1900-1940 (London, 1993); B. S. McBeth, British Oil Policy, 1919-1939 (London, 1985); More, Black 
Gold; D. J. Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and Administration (London, 1971). 
20
 Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954 
(New York, NY, 1997); Steve Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil: Crisis in Iran (New 
York, NY, 2003); Ivan L. G. Pearson, In the Name of Oil: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 
1950–1958 (Eastbourne, 2010). 
21
 Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy, 1919-1948: For Profits and Security (Montreal, 
1985); Painter, Oil and the American Century; Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security. 
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the twentieth century.
22
 Yet the existing historiography could do more to contextualise 
and conceptualise developments within the international oil industry. Painter characterises 
the US government’s relationship with multinational oil companies as ‘corporatist’ but 
his analysis is almost exclusively based on primary sources written by US government 
officials and, consequently, focuses on their perspective of events.
23
  While Rabe and 
Painter make use of some of the same case studies as this thesis, their analysis fails to 
sufficiently account for the actions and views of British and oil industry officials. As such, 
they give an incomplete picture of events in Venezuela and the competition that existed 
between British and US interests in the country. In contrast, this thesis combines US, 
British and oil company perspectives which leads to a more nuanced and thorough 
analysis of the inner workings of the oil industry. This is representative of its general aim 
of closely analysing the level of interaction that existed between the oil corporations and 
the state. 
Fiona Venn has provided the most authoritative scholarly monograph dedicated to 
international oil diplomacy in the twentieth century which provides an excellent basis for 
further analysis of the importance of oil diplomacy within British and US foreign 
policy.
24
 Venn’s work reveals how rivalry over control of oil fields took on a central role 
in Anglo-US relations during the twentieth century, a dynamic she has fittingly 
characterised as both a ‘struggle for supremacy’ and an ‘oil war’.25  Throughout her 
analysis, she highlights the complex nature of the oil trade and the varying degrees of 
cooperation that existed between British, US and oil company officials. Venn argues that 
government and private organisations would cooperate when it was mutually beneficial to 
                                                 
22
 Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin, TX, 
1982). 
23
 Painter, Oil and the American Century, pp. 199-210. 
24
 Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1986). 
25
 Ibid., pp. 54-74; Fiona Venn, ‘A Struggle for Supremacy? Great Britain, the United States and Kuwaiti 
Oil in the 1930s’, Working Paper Series, No. 2 (Colchester, University of Essex, Department of History, 
2000), http://www.essex.ac.uk/history/documents/research/RP2_Venn_2012.pdf [accessed 11 June 2014]. 
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do so but at other times their interests, and therefore policies, would diverge. Moreover, 
her research has revealed that these government officials would consider broad foreign 
policy goals when conducting oil diplomacy and not only those directly related to the oil 
trade. Taking this insight as its point of departure, this thesis expands upon Venn’s work 
in two ways. First, it places an increased emphasis on the role of state-private sector 
interaction and views this as an indicator of a government’s ability to exercise 
international power. Second, it also uses events in Venezuela as a case study of the links 
between British and US experiences in the Second World War and later attitudes to the 
Cold War.  
The edited collection Oil Producing Countries and Oil Companies reveals the 
potential for a range of different dynamics and outcomes to emerge from relationships 
between oil companies and national governments.
26
 This highlights the need for historians 
to incorporate unique local factors into their analysis of the oil industry, thereby avoiding 
inaccurate generalisations. Taken together, the various chapters undermine attempts to 
provide a universal conceptualisation of the power dynamics that exist between states and 
the private sector. The rivalry that existed between various oil companies, as well as the 
British and US governments, is vital to understanding the nature of cooperation, 
collaboration and conflict within the Venezuelan oil industry. Ultimately, incorporating 
multiple perspectives into my analysis allows for a greater understanding of the interplay 
between the principal international stake-holders in the Venezuelan oil industry. 
 Painter’s effort to integrate oil diplomacy within the context of the Cold War have 
so far centred on the US government’s containment policy and attempts to limit Soviet 
access to Middle East oil.
27
 However, this approach focuses almost exclusively on US-
                                                 
26
 Alain Beltran (ed.), Oil Producing Countries and Oil Companies: From the Nineteenth Century to the 
Twenty-First Century (Brussels, 2011). 
27
 David S. Painter, ‘Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945-1962’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: Origins (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 485-508. 
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Soviet rivalry and omits discussion of Anglo-US competition. It is possible to connect oil 
diplomacy and the Cold War beyond discussion of superpower rivalry by expanding the 
number of actors studied. This methodology has been taken up by Steve Marsh and Ivan 
L. G. Pearson who have produced monographs dedicated to the impact of the Cold War 
on British and US policy towards the oil industries of the Middle East.
28
 Indeed, the 
current trend in Cold War historiography has been to decentre the conflict as, rather than 
focusing purely on US and Soviet policy, historians have begun to include more actors in 
their analysis. As such, there has been a move to consider intra-bloc interaction as well as 
inter-bloc rivalry. Rather than questioning who is to blame for the Cold War, historians 
are instead seeking to emphasise the interaction between the many different actors 
involved.
29
  
 Therefore, relations between the western powers can be analysed within a Cold 
War context that goes beyond their mutual suspicion of the USSR. Historians have begun 
to examine how the Cold War policies of western governments were shaped by their 
individual concerns. In so doing, they have recognised the agency of western policy-
makers rather than viewing them as agents of an all-encompassing US strategy. Moreover, 
it is also then possible to analyse how a network of various global interactions shaped the 
development of the Cold War itself. Thus, a greater number of countries have become 
prominent in the history of the Cold War. Indeed, historians have increasingly come to 
perceive the important role played by European policy-makers in the origins of the 
conflict.
30
 
                                                 
28
 Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil; Pearson, In the Name of Oil. 
29
 Geir Lundestad, ‘How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing 
the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London, 2000), p. 75. 
30
 Olaf Riste (ed.), Western Security: The Formative Years (New York, NY, 1985); Geir Lundestad, 
‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952’, Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1986), pp. 263-77; Lawrence Aronsen and Martin Kitchen, The Origins of the 
Cold War in Comparative Perspective: American, British and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union, 
1941-1948 (London, 1988); Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and 
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Other historians have advanced this line of enquiry by perceiving the Cold War as 
a truly global, rather than predominantly European, conflict. Thus, various case studies 
have recently been written that analyse how a Cold War framework influenced localised 
events around the world.
31
 Rather than simply categorising actors as ‘the West’ and ‘the 
rest’, such histories reveal how neutralist states could contravene a bi-polar view of 
international politics. This most recent historiography has recognised the defining role 
played by the Cold War in all international relations and promotes an expansion of Cold 
War research beyond areas directly related to US-Soviet rivalry in Europe. Historians 
now have the opportunity to focus on how all countries responded to the Cold War and 
influenced its development. Within the historiography of Latin America’s role in the Cold 
War there have been calls for historians to expand their research beyond examination of 
dramatic events that have already been extensively studied, such as the Bay of Pigs.
32
 
While there has certainly been an expansion in the number of Cold War participants 
studied, this has not yet gone far enough, as literature on the role of non-state actors 
remains limited. In reality the private sector could have a huge impact on the mechanics 
of foreign relations yet this is not reflected in Cold War historiography.
33
 
 The role of private enterprise has, in contrast, received attention in studies of 
globalisation and imperial history. Transnational, translocal and global histories have 
made efforts to look beyond the nation-state as the principal agent, and location, of 
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historical change. Historians have sought to decentre national histories, analyse the 
historical role played by non-state actors and focus on issues which transcend and 
transgress the limits of the nation-state. In so doing, these histories emphasise global 
connections and the movement of people, goods, ideas and capital.
34
 Multinational oil 
companies’ global perspectives, interests and operations make them a fitting subject of 
study for historians interested in tracing the development of global interconnectedness. In 
their day-to-day operations, oil companies created connections and interdependence 
between distant locales. The political economy of oil has meant that the networks created 
by multinational oil companies have been of great significance in creating and shaping 
global interactions. By recognising these factors, this thesis seeks to create a synthesis of 
global and diplomatic history by emphasising the agency of non-state actors while 
simultaneously acknowledging the undoubted influence of national governments in world 
politics.  
 In recent years, historians have shown renewed interest in US formal and informal 
imperialism. In his summary of this literature, Paul A. Kramer uses the term ‘imperial’ to 
refer to ‘a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, 
regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce 
relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.’ 35  This 
conceptualisation of imperialism is a useful and necessary tool for understanding British 
and US government intervention in the Venezuelan oil industry. Foreign intervention 
necessarily produced a hierarchical relationship as British and US officials sought to 
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exercise power over the Venezuelan government. Such a dynamic was inherently 
competitive: as British and US policy-makers sought to extend their own influence in 
Latin America this necessarily limited the influence of the other. An imperial perspective 
allows us to analyse, what Kramer describes as, ‘the way that power resides in and 
operates through long-distance connections; the mutual and uneven transformation of 
societies through these connections; and comparisons between large-scale systems of 
power and their histories.’36 Such hierarchical relationships have historically existed both 
as formal and informal modes of imperialism. Indeed, by 1941, the British and US 
governments had experience of possessing formal colonies along with wielding informal 
supremacy over various regions.  
 In line with a more recent trend in the study of imperial history, this thesis seeks 
to reveal how British government officials engaged with the private sector in order to 
maintain and expand their international influence. Such analysis builds upon our 
understanding of British informal imperialism and the hierarchical relationships created 
by commercial asymmetry between countries.
37
 Historians have analysed the impact of 
the private sector on the formation and running of the British Empire and, in particular, 
analysis of gentlemanly capitalism has emphasised the important imperial role played by 
financial and business networks.
38
 Thus, there exists a rich historiography documenting 
the long heritage of cooperation between the British state and private enterprise as 
academics have sought to scrutinise this dynamic in an effort to explain the mechanics of 
imperial power.
39
 Through such analysis, historians have revealed that cooperation with 
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the private sector was a means through which imperial governments were able to develop 
and control their overseas interests.  
In a related strand of research, business historians have revealed that, throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the global reach of multinational corporations 
created rivalry between home countries over access to international markets and raw 
materials.
40
 In particular, this took the form of a US corporate challenge to the established 
European empires. Taken together such research has made clear that a substantial part of 
imperial power rested on the ability of policy-makers to work in cohort with private 
enterprise. This literature reveals the importance historians must place on such networks 
when considering the mechanics of foreign relations. This is especially significant when 
discussing imperial rivalry and the means by which policy-makers attempt to promote 
their own interests at the expense of their competitors. 
Britain’s ability to overcome such imperial challenges has been examined by 
historians of imperialism who have re-evaluated the perceived decline of British prestige. 
As such, scholars have criticised historiography that charts the ‘decline and fall’ of British 
power in the twentieth century and assumes its decline before attempting to explain it. A 
new research trend is emerging that emphasises the continuity of the British world role 
and has revealed that, after the Second World War, Whitehall policy-makers still desired, 
and were capable of, a significant global role.
41
 Consequently, historians should not 
equate British decolonisation with the end of British power. As Whitehall deemed British 
access to foreign oil to be of vital importance, oil diplomacy provides a sound test of the 
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British government’s ability to secure its global interests beyond the formal empire. A 
link exists then, between this strand of imperial historiography and the history of global 
state-private sector interaction. It is possible to combine them into a cohesive whole by 
examining how British policy-makers sought to maintain and expand their world role 
through cooperation with the private sector. Moreover, this coincides with recent 
historiography that has decentred the Cold War. It follows that historians’ analysis of 
intra-bloc interaction should come to include imperial rivalries between western states. As 
such, analysis of the Cold War takes on a greater imperial context and vice versa. 
Concurrently, historians have sought to acknowledge the agency of Latin 
American people and governments. Rather than considering Latin Americans as people to 
whom events simply happen, scholars are making a concerted effort to acknowledge and 
represent Latin American actions.
42
 Yet as Max Paul Friedman rightly points out ‘agency 
and independence are not the same thing.’ 43  Throughout the 1940s, Latin American 
governments, specifically Venezuelan officials, had the desire and ability to shape their 
relationship with the British and US governments. Nevertheless this relationship was 
ultimately uneven, asymmetrical, hierarchical and imperial. It is not contradictory to 
highlight the agency of Latin Americans while simultaneously pointing out the uneven 
dynamic that existed between Latin American governments and their British and US 
counterparts. This is particularly relevant to my analysis of the Venezuelan oil industry 
which focuses on the triangular relationship between British, US and oil company 
officials. The primary aim of this study is not an analysis of the formation of the 
Venezuelan government’s oil policy but, rather, the international response to Venezuelan 
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action. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that Venezuelan officials played a 
decisive role in the development and outcome of events. 
Historians have extensively analysed US policy in Latin America throughout the 
twentieth century and have detailed its oscillation between military intervention and 
diplomatic cooperation.
44
 Yet scant attention has been paid to Britain’s relationship with 
Latin America during the same period and the effect of British intervention on US policy 
in the region. Rory Miller’s Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries provides a good backdrop to British intervention in the region but can only 
provide a broad overview.
45
 Similarly, the collection of essays Britain and Latin America: 
A Changing Relationship provides a sound general history of British relations with the 
region.
46
 Phillip A. Dehne’s On the Far Western Front examines British policy towards 
South America during the First World War, with a particular emphasis on Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.
47
 Dehne focuses his analysis on the wartime ‘battle for the 
dominance of South America’ which was waged between the British and German 
governments.
48
 Most recently, Thomas C. Mills’ Post-War Planning on the Periphery has 
provided an enlightening insight into Anglo-US relations in South America throughout 
the Second World War.
49
 Mills reveals that, despite their intimate wartime alliance, 
British and US policymakers held a mutual distrust in matters relating to South America. 
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Mills’ analysis focuses principally on economic matters and he explains that, 
during the Second World War, British officials sought to both maintain and extend their 
country’s financial interests in South America. Yet, throughout this period, British 
officials regarded the US government as a consistent hindrance to their ambitions in the 
region. While Mills does periodically pause to analyse individual case studies in detail, 
the book serves best as an overview of Anglo-US relations in South America, since the 
author focuses principally on broad trends rather than in depth examinations of country-
specific issues. This does, therefore, provide an opportunity for scholars to test and 
develop Mills’ findings with in-depth analysis of Anglo-US rivalry in specific South 
American countries and industries. Indeed, Mills specifically identifies the Venezuelan oil 
industry as one important industry which could be studied.
50
 Moreover, while the period 
covered by Mills’ study ends in 1945, I trace Anglo-US relations in Venezuela up until 
1948. These additional years allow me to analyse the extent to which the emerging Cold 
War affected British and US policy towards Latin America generally and Venezuela 
specifically. Thus, Mills’ detailed overview provides a sound basis upon which this thesis 
can now build.  
In recent years there have been a number of studies relating to the Venezuelan oil 
industry. However these texts relate to the industry’s effect on Venezuela domestically: 
be it economic, social, or political factors.
 51
 The edited volume Business History in Latin 
America is a valuable historiographical review and includes a section devoted to 
Venezuelan industry.
52
 While such research provides invaluable insight into the 
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Venezuelan internal situation, this thesis takes this literature into a new direction by 
exploring how Venezuela’s oil abundance was perceived externally by foreign policy-
makers and business officials. A more comprehensive overview of Latin American 
history is provided by the twelve-volume Cambridge History of Latin America, which 
analyses the region’s history from the colonial period up to the twentieth century but 
focuses on domestic, rather than international, issues.
 53
 This does leave room then for a 
more specific study of the Venezuelan oil industry’s international importance. 
 
Historical Prologue to British and US Intervention in Venezuela 
For Britain, access to overseas oil was of vital importance as, while the British Isles held 
large deposits of coal, there was no known internal commercial source of oil. In 1912, this 
situation led Winston Churchill to argue that ‘we must become the owners, or at any rate, 
the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the supply of natural oil which we 
require.’ 54  Consequently, in 1914, the British government bought a 51 per cent 
controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company, which held 
the exclusive rights to prospect for oil for sixty years in a vast tract of territory that 
included most of Iran. The deal stipulated that every company director would be a British 
subject and that a Treasury and an Admiralty representative would also be placed on the 
company board. Each of these state officials was given power of veto in decisions of 
British diplomatic or military significance or those affecting the British status of the 
company.
55
  
A major competitor of Anglo-Persian in the international oil industry was the 
Royal Dutch Shell Group, itself the product of an amalgamation between the British 
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"Shell" Transport and Trading Company and the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company in 
1907. Shares in the new venture were split 40-60 between the British and Dutch arms 
respectively but, throughout 1918, the British government took part in talks to ensure 
permanent British financial and managerial control of the company. While these 
negotiations eventually broke down, Shell maintained its headquarters in London and all 
of its operations outside Dutch territories were managed through British-registered 
companies.
56
 Intimate ties with Anglo-Persian and Shell formed a state-private network 
that allowed the British government to both ensure its supply of oil and maintain a 
particularly influential position within the international oil industry as a whole. This level 
of cooperation was mutually beneficial as the oil companies were able to call upon 
diplomatic assistance from the British government in their overseas operations and, by 
1919, British companies controlled fifty per cent of the world’s oil reserves.57 The Second 
World War further emphasised British reliance on overseas oil fields as British oil 
imports grew from 10.5 million tonnes in 1939 to a wartime peak of 20.5 million tonnes 
in 1944.
58
   
Conversely, the USA was the first country in the world to develop a major 
domestic oil industry. In 1900, the USA produced 63.6 million barrels of oil and by 1939 
this had increased dramatically to 1,264 million barrels.
59
 During the first half of the 
twentieth century the USA was consistently producing over 60 per cent of the world’s oil 
yet this industry became dominated by Standard Oil to such an extent that the US 
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government used anti-trust laws to split the company into various smaller firms in 1911.
60
  
By the 1920s, US officials had grown concerned by British dominance of the 
international oil industry and, consequently, began to exert diplomatic pressure in support 
of US oil companies operating overseas. However, as US firms began to make inroads 
into foreign oil fields, and new domestic sources of oil were discovered, US government 
intervention into the international oil industry declined.
61
 
Venezuelan oil production began in earnest during the 1920s as a result of 
competition between large multinational firms.
62
 The country became an important 
battleground in, what an internal Royal Dutch Shell report named, the ‘fight for new 
production’.63 At the beginning of the decade, Venezuela produced 1,300 barrels of oil 
per day but by 1930 this had risen to 370,500 barrels as foreign capital dominated the 
industry.
64
 Shell initially monopolised oil production in the country and Venezuela 
quickly became the company’s largest single source of crude oil.65 However, over time 
this dominance waned until, in 1934, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (SOCNJ) 
overtook Shell to become the country’s largest oil producer.66 Local legislation prohibited 
oil companies owned by foreign governments from operating in Venezuela and, thus, 
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Anglo-Persian was barred access to the country’s oil fields. 67  In 1921, US embassy 
officials suggested to various other Latin America governments that they introduce 
similar legislation.
68
 Despite these restrictions, by 1932, Venezuela had become Britain’s 
largest single supplier, followed by Iran and the USA.
69
 By 1939, Venezuela was long 
established as the world’s leading exporter of crude oil with the third largest known oil 
reserves in the world, after those of the USA and Iran. By 1941, Venezuela was the third 
largest producer of crude petroleum in the world, producing almost the same amount as 
the Soviet Union, which ranked second to the USA.
70
 In the same year, oil accounted for 
ninety per cent of Venezuela’s exports and fifty per cent of the country’s revenue.71  
Between 1941 and 1948, the principal oil companies operating in Venezuela were 
subsidiaries of SOCNJ, Shell and Gulf Oil.
72
 During this period, SOCNJ was the 
country’s largest oil producer, with output amounting to roughly fifty per cent of the 
country’s total. On average, Shell was responsible for around thirty per cent of 
Venezuelan oil production while Gulf’s production made up just under twenty per cent of 
the industry total.
73
 SOCNJ, Shell and Gulf were among the world’s foremost 
multinational oil companies with vertically integrated international operations that 
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covered exploration, production, transport, refining and marketing.
74
 Indeed, the vast 
majority of crude oil produced in Venezuela was shipped to the nearby islands of Curaçao 
and Aruba to be processed in refineries owned by the oil companies.
75
 The multinational 
oil companies’ decision to construct refineries outside of Venezuela was a planned 
strategy to prevent nationalisation of the country’s oil industry as if the government 
confiscated production facilities it would not then have refineries with which to process 
crude oil. However, if refining were moved to Venezuela, the government would be in a 
position to confiscate both production and refining facilities.
76
  
British and US interests in Latin America were not confined to the Venezuelan oil 
industry as the two countries had developed significant political and economic ties to the 
region as a whole. On 2 December 1823, US President James Monroe declared that ‘the 
American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed 
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by 
any European powers.’ The Monroe Doctrine, as it became known, stated that any effort 
by European governments to ‘extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere’ 
would be regarded as ‘the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
States’.77 Yet in the nineteenth century the US government referred to, and applied, the 
principles of the Doctrine inconsistently and intermittently.
78
 Jay Sexton argues that, 
while Monroe’s statement reflected ‘the imperial ambitions of the expansionist United 
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States’, US officials ‘would disagree with one another over its meaning, purpose, and 
application’.79  
Concurrently, the British government saw the newly independent countries of 
South America as important outlets for British investment and goods. Indeed, from the 
1820s until the end of the century it was British, rather than US, business interests that 
dominated South America.
80
 However, the dawn of the twentieth century saw the US 
government make a more concerted effort to encourage trade with Latin America as 
Washington officials increasingly perceived the region as a US sphere of influence.
81
 
Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 ‘corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine reflected this effort to 
establish hemispheric supremacy with the President declaring that ‘wrong doing or 
impotence’ on the part of Latin American governments could ‘force’ the US government 
to act as an ‘international police power’ in the region.82 This statement of imperial intent 
was followed by military interventions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico 
and Nicaragua between 1906 and 1927 as the US government sought to protect its 
political and economic interests in Latin America.
83
 US officials deemed these 
interventions to be a necessary component of a paternalistic civilising mission that would 
bring modern capitalist development to the supposedly primitive societies of Latin 
America.
84
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This programme of Americanisation was supported by US business interest which 
grew rapidly throughout the region, promoting free-market capitalism, industrial 
production and consumerism.
85
 Subsequently, the Anglo-US economic rivalry in Latin 
America intensified as US capital became the predominant economic force throughout 
most of the region.
86
 As Thomas C. Mills argues, the First World War in particular 
marked ‘an important turning point in the rise of US commercial power in South America, 
and the corresponding decline of British influence.’87 While P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins 
characterise Anglo-US interwar rivalry in South America as a ‘fierce … power struggle’, 
it was US business interests that ultimately prevailed as, by 1938, South America 
received 27 per cent of its imports from the USA and 14 per cent from Britain.
88
 
Nevertheless, the continent remained a significant trading partner for Britain, accounting 
for around 7 per cent of British exports and 9 per cent of British imports in 1937.
89
 
 
Sources 
This thesis is based primarily on archival research and in order to gauge the perceptions 
of British policy-makers towards their role in world affairs it makes use of a wide range 
of material from the National Archives in Kew (NA). Of particular significance to this 
research are the General Political Files of the Foreign Office (FO 371) which provide an 
insight into the opinions of various Foreign Office (FO) officials throughout the 1940s. 
This series contains files focused specifically on developments in Venezuela which 
include memoranda, reports and comments written by Whitehall officials assigned to the 
FO’s South American Department and diplomats stationed in Caracas. This thesis makes 
use of FO files to analyse the formation of British policy towards Venezuela and assess 
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the level of import FO officials placed on Venezuelan oil. Documents found in FO 371 
also contain correspondence between FO and Shell as both parties regularly shared their 
opinion of events in Venezuela. By analysing such exchanges, this thesis reveals how the 
various levels of interaction between the state and private sector affected international 
relations. Moreover, Treasury (T) and Board of Trade (BT) files detail the economic and 
business benefits Britain gained from the Venezuelan oil industry, thereby providing a 
different perspective to FO 371. 
The archival series ‘POWE 33’ deals exclusively with the topic of energy and 
includes the papers of the British government’s Petroleum Department (PD). Between 
1929 and 1940, the PD operated within the Mines Department but was then made an 
independent body with its own Secretary for Petroleum. In June 1942, the PD was 
renamed the Petroleum Division and was absorbed into the newly-created Ministry of 
Fuel and Power (MFP). Throughout this time, the PD was dedicated to matters relating to 
oil policy, which makes its documents particularly pertinent to this thesis. The files not 
only provide an insight into British attitudes towards Venezuela but also towards the 
international oil industry more generally. Shell officials were also in regular contact with 
the PD and this correspondence provides further insight into the company’s relationship 
with the British government. Papers of the Cabinet (CAB) and Prime Minister’s Office 
(PREM) reveal the extent to which the opinions of these various departmental groups 
influenced the top levels of British policy-making. In order to gauge the strategic 
importance of Venezuelan oil for the British war effort, this thesis also makes use of 
documents from the War Office (WO) and Admiralty (ADM). 
Taken together these state papers detail the diversity of opinion that existed within 
the various levels of British policy-making and allow for an assessment of how far there 
existed a consensus of opinion within Whitehall. Due to Whitehall’s close working 
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relationship with Shell, NA files also contain some of the company’s internal memoranda 
and correspondence. These provide an insight into the views of Shell officials and their 
relationship with the British, US and Venezuelan governments. By following the 
development of British policy throughout the years 1941 to 1948, this thesis reveals how 
British policy-makers sought to respond to a changing geopolitical climate. NA files are 
of use in examining the extent to which the British government’s desire to gain influence 
in Venezuela was part of a larger foreign policy aim of expanding its global power. 
Moreover, as this thesis covers the early Cold War period, it uses these documents to 
analyse the extent to which the rise of the USA and USSR caused British officials to 
reassess their own world role.  
 In regards to US policy towards Venezuela, this thesis makes use of relevant 
government documents, in particular the General Records of the Department of State (RG 
59) held at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Due to the State 
Department’s central role in US diplomacy, these documents provide an insight into the 
evolution of US policy towards Venezuela within the context of broader US foreign 
policy. Moreover, this thesis uses these documents to analyse the importance of 
Venezuela within State Department efforts to formulate a cohesive foreign oil policy. As 
oil was central to US national security during the Second World War and Cold War, it 
also makes use of the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military bodies to 
analyse their role in policy-making.  
 Furthermore, this thesis incorporates documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York, and the Harry S. Truman Presidential 
Library in Independence, Missouri, which contain the papers of various government 
bodies and senior figures within the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. In particular, 
the Truman Library contains Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents which outline 
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the Agency’s perceptions of Latin America, the oil industry, and Venezuela with a 
specific emphasis on the threat posed by communism and the Soviet Union. CIA opinion 
could be highly influential in government policy-making and an analysis of these 
documents helps to elucidate the development of US Cold War foreign policy. The 
Library of Congress in Washington, DC also contains the papers of Cordell Hull and 
Harold L. Ickes who helped to formulate US policy towards Latin America and the oil 
industry respectively. These various documents have allowed this thesis to analyse the 
formation of policy at the highest levels of the US government and trace the evolution of 
its policy towards Venezuela from the Second World War to the Cold War. 
 In addition, this thesis utilises the papers of George S. Messersmith, which are 
held at the University of Delaware Library in Newark, Delaware. Messersmith was a 
State Department expert on Latin America and acted as US Ambassador to Cuba, Mexico 
and Argentina during the 1940s. His correspondence with other US officials gives an 
insight into the formation of US foreign policy towards Latin America. This study also 
makes use of Max Weston Thornburg’s private papers, which provide a unique 
perspective on US foreign oil policy during the 1940s.
90
 Between 1941 and 1943, 
Thornburg acted as the State Department’s Petroleum Adviser and was instrumental in 
developing the US government’s foreign oil policy during that time. This collection 
includes documents that cannot be found in the official National Archives but which trace 
the construction of US policy towards the international oil industry. For an appreciation 
of broader developments within US foreign policy, this thesis also uses material from the 
edited collection of US government documents contained in the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series.  
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This extensive use of both British and US documents allows this thesis to compare 
the policies of both governments towards the Venezuelan oil industry throughout the 
1940s. Such an approach allows for a detailed analysis of Anglo-US relations during this 
period and an examination of extent to which rivalry over Venezuelan oil created tensions 
between British and US officials. In addition, this study utilises Dutch government 
documents found in the edited collection Documenten betreffende de Buitenlandse 
Politiek van Nederland, 1919-1945 (Documents Relating to the Foreign Policy of the 
Netherlands, 1919-1945). Due to Shell’s close relationship with the Dutch government, 
some of these documents outline the views of Shell officials in relation to Venezuela. The 
Dutch perspective is also relevant to this thesis as, throughout the 1940s, the islands of 
the Dutch West Indies were home to oil refineries that processed Venezuelan crude oil. 
For a broad international perspective of developments in Latin America, this thesis uses 
relevant archival material available at the United Nations Archive in New York City, 
New York. 
 Documents which provide an insight into the views of oil company officials are of 
particular relevance to this research due to its focus on the role of state-private networks 
within international relations. Thus, this thesis uses documents from the Rockefeller 
Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York which, due to the Rockefeller family’s ties 
to SOCNJ, contain company reports and correspondence. It also incorporates material 
from internal Shell documents found at the company’s archive in London. These oil 
company documents help to elucidate the attitudes, actions and influence of oil company 
officials while, empirically they detail the level of oil production in Venezuela. These 
sources also provide an insight into the relationship between national governments and oil 
companies and the level of cooperation that existed between them. As such, they allow 
this thesis to analyse state-private sector interactions and the effect of such relationships 
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on the mechanics of foreign policy and foreign relations. Furthermore, British and US 
newspapers as well as the Economist magazine of the time also contain reports of oil 
company board meetings. These reports are useful in that they contain additional financial 
records and information concerning levels of Venezuelan oil production along with 
statements from high-level oil executives.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
The thesis follows a chronological structure in order to gain a clear understanding of the 
changing perceptions of British and US policy-makers. The first chapter analyses British 
and US attitudes towards Venezuela at the beginning of the 1940s and outlines the 
importance of the country’s oil industry to British and US interests. British and US 
officials’ policies towards Venezuela formed part of a broader aim of expanding their 
influence in Latin America as a whole. From a US perspective, Latin America was vitally 
important as a source of raw materials and outlet for US capital investment. Moreover, as 
war raged in Europe, US officials sought to encourage pan-American unity as a central 
component of hemispheric defence. As British officials attempted to develop their own 
interests in the region they often felt that US officials were deliberately thwarting these 
efforts. 
For British and US officials, the Second World War underlined the importance of 
securing access to overseas sources of oil. In order to secure this vital interest, US 
officials began to formulate a coherent foreign oil policy that took inspiration from the 
British government’s role within the international oil industry. As the first chapter reveals, 
British and US policy-makers placed great emphasis on Venezuela as a wartime, and 
post-war, source of oil. Yet competition for control of overseas oil had the potential to 
create conflict within Anglo-US relations. Indeed, British and US efforts to expand their 
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interests in the international oil industry and Latin America set the scene for conflict in 
Venezuela. 
The second chapter examines the series of negotiations that took place between 
1941 and 1943 concerning the Venezuelan Hydrocarbons Law. British government 
officials sought to protect the established legal position of the oil companies in Venezuela 
in order to ensure continued access to Venezuelan oil. They therefore encouraged the oil 
companies to form a united hard-line position in response to the Venezuelan 
government’s attempts to increase taxation of the country’s oil industry. However, US 
officials were fearful of a potential drawn-out conflict developing between the oil 
companies and Venezuelan government. Thus, the US government pressured oil company 
officials to quickly agree terms with the Venezuelan authorities. Ultimately, British and 
US officials needed the support of oil company officials to carry out their policies. Thus, 
this chapter emphasises the central and decisive role played by oil companies in British 
and US diplomacy. 
The third chapter analyses the British and US reaction to Venezuelan attempts to 
establish oil refining capabilities on the mainland during 1944. British and US officials 
argued that Venezuelan efforts to limit the amount of oil refined in the Dutch West Indies 
violated the free-trade principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter. British and US officials 
were concerned that Venezuelan policy would both undermine their efforts to organise 
post-war international trade and put their access to Venezuelan oil at risk. Thus, both 
local and international concerns led British and US officials to denounce Venezuelan 
policy. However, this chapter demonstrates that such diplomatic intervention had the 
potential to undermine, as well as aid, the oil companies’ position in Venezuela. 
The fourth chapter focuses on Venezuelan displeasure at Allied plans to increase 
oil refining in the Dutch West Indies during 1944 and subsequent efforts by British and 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
32 
 
US officials to pacify the Venezuelan government. This chapter argues that while British 
and US officials sought to formulate a post-war system governing the international oil 
industry, the Venezuelan government was able to use its local authority to powerful effect. 
As such, it examines the various levels at which national governments could successfully 
exercise power in the international oil industry.  
Finally, the fifth chapter evaluates British and US attitudes towards the 1945 
Venezuelan revolution and 1948 coup d’état. While this period was characterised by 
dramatic upheaval in Venezuelan domestic politics, British and US policy-makers 
continued to focus their attention on the country’s oil industry. As a Cold War framework 
began to develop in international relations, British and US officials became increasingly 
concerned by the threat posed by communist sabotage of Venezuelan oil production. As 
such, this chapter argues that throughout this period, while the broad international context 
changed, British and US policy towards Venezuela was still principally governed by the 
political economy of oil. 
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Chapter One 
The Formation of British and US Policy towards Venezuelan Oil, 1938-1942 
 
Between 1938 and 1942, the Venezuelan oil industry took on great significance for 
British and US officials seeking to secure their supplies of foreign oil. These officials did 
not formulate their policy towards the Venezuelan oil industry in isolation but instead 
imbued it with their broad geopolitical concerns. Thus, in order to understand British and 
US intervention in Venezuela during this period, it is necessary to analyse the two 
government’s wider foreign policy aims. In particular, British and US officials’ attitudes 
towards Venezuela were influenced by their perception of Latin America, the world 
system of trade and the international oil industry while the Second World War intensified 
their national security concerns. Moreover, these factors continued to influence British 
and US policy in Venezuela throughout the 1940s. What follows is an analysis of these 
various strands of British and US foreign policy and the implications for the two 
governments’ policies towards the Venezuelan oil industry. 
 Between 1938 and 1942, the US government sought to consolidate and expand its 
hegemonic role in Latin America by leading pan-American economic and political 
cooperation. Its so-called ‘Good Neighbor’ policy was designed to create a harmonious 
relationship with Latin American governments while US officials began to 
internationalise the New Deal through increased economic intervention throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. In response to the Great Depression, Washington sought to increase 
US exports to Latin America through pan-American trade agreements. Indeed, Latin 
America became a test case for the free trade programme that the US government sought 
to universalise through international agreements such as the Atlantic Charter. The threat 
of Axis infiltration in the Western Hemisphere later led US policy-makers to place 
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increased importance on pan-American solidarity and Latin America’s economic stability. 
As a result, they further extended their hemispheric New Deal to support the economic 
development of Latin America. US officials also perceived the region as an obvious pool 
from which the USA could draw its substantial oil needs as fears of diminishing domestic 
oil reserves led them to begin formulation of a coherent foreign oil policy. Taking 
inspiration from the British government’s role within the international oil industry, US oil 
policy became based upon increased collaboration with multinational oil corporations. All 
of these foreign policy strands affected US perceptions of the Venezuelan oil industry 
throughout the 1940s. 
While British officials urgently sought US support for their war against Germany, 
they were suspicious of the Roosevelt administration’s foreign policy and plans for post-
war reconstruction. They felt that US policy in Latin America was antagonistic to their 
own interests in the region and were made anxious by Washington’s efforts to open up 
the British Empire to external trade. Thus, while the Atlantic Charter appeared to 
advocate international free trade, there was an inconsistency in British and US attitudes 
towards a universal open door policy. Furthermore, US intervention in the international 
oil industry had the potential to undermine the British government’s wartime reliance on 
Venezuelan oil. Thus, by 1942, there were a number of unresolved issues that had the 
potential to cause conflict between the British and US governments in matters relating to 
the Venezuelan oil industry. 
 
The Origins of US Interest in Venezuelan Oil 
US intervention in the Venezuelan oil industry had its origins in Washington’s broader 
policy towards Latin America and, in particular, the formation of its hemispheric New 
Deal. The crisis of the Great Depression and landslide electoral victory of Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt in 1932 granted the US government a statist mandate to increase federal 
intervention in US business and society. The Roosevelt administration’s New Deal 
programme was legitimised by popular demand for economic stability and social justice 
as First World War interventionist programmes were resurrected and put to use.
1
 The 
government’s statism included a desire for increased federal intervention in the national 
oil industry. Domestic oil policy came under the purview of Secretary of the Interior 
Harold L. Ickes who subsequently sought to regulate and stabilise domestic oil production 
with the help of the newly created Petroleum Administrative Board and the Planning and 
Coordination Committee. Along with government officials, the latter also included 
representatives from the oil industry.
2
 However, Ickes’ statement that the oil industry 
should be declared a public utility under centralised federal control alienated many oil 
executives who were concerned by excessive government intervention in their industry.
3
 
Moreover, the conflicting views of large, small, domestic and multinational oil companies 
made it difficult for the US government to forge an effective alliance between the state, 
private sector and general public.
4
  Indeed, between 1933 and 1941, the US oil industry 
and state governments blocked any meaningful federal role in the domestic oil industry.
5
 
Concurrently, the potential for the outbreak of war in Europe underlined the 
importance of oil as a vital war material. In 1934, Japanese policies to increase state 
control of the oil industry and stockpile oil reserves alarmed both British and US officials 
who were concerned that the oil would be used for military expansion. Moreover, Japan’s 
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increased intervention in the oil industry threatened the free trade principles that the 
Roosevelt administration sought to promote throughout the 1930s.
6
 Indeed, the 
importance of securing access to oil must be understood within broader issues relating to 
international trade. In turn, developments in US trade policy need to be placed within the 
specific context of the international economic and political climate of the 1930s.  
With the Great Depression on-going, US officials saw the need to create export 
markets for US goods in order to stimulate domestic industry and increase employment. 
However, the Depression had led national governments to enact trade restrictions and 
form trading blocs in order to protect their domestic industries from outside competition. 
Such restrictive controls hindered international trade and prejudiced US exports in foreign 
markets.
7
 State Department officials in particular favoured tariff reduction with Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull being an especially vehement advocate of free trade.
8
 For Hull, the 
importance of free trade was not limited to economics as he contended that trade fostered 
broader international cooperation while protectionism increased competition and, 
consequently, the likelihood of war.
9
 He argued in favour of multilateral reduction in 
tariffs and trade barriers, working on the basis that ‘unhampered trade dovetailed with 
peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war.’10 Although 
Roosevelt was in favour of reduced tariffs, he did not view the matter with such fervour 
as his Secretary of State. For the President, free trade was an extension of the New Deal: 
a means of increasing export markets for US agriculture and industry.
11
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In particular, the Roosevelt administration sought to expand trade with Latin 
America as a means of creating export markets for US goods. Roosevelt’s 
characterisation of the US government as a ‘good neighbor’ in his 1933 inaugural address 
subsequently became synonymous with Washington’s policy toward Latin America. 
However, as originally intended, Roosevelt’s aspirations were not limited to the Western 
Hemisphere as the President sought to break free of isolationism. Indeed, in his address, 
Roosevelt explicitly referred to US ‘world policy’, rather than Latin American policy, 
when he stated that: 
In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the 
policy of the good neighbor - the neighbor who resolutely respects 
himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others - the 
neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of 
his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.
12
 
 
Nevertheless, what became known as the Good Neighbor policy led the US government 
to publicly abandon the military intervention that had previously characterised its policy 
in Latin America.
13
 In its place, the Roosevelt administration sought to promote pan-
American cooperation and increase economic ties between the USA and its southern 
neighbours.
14
 
As part of this strategy, the government established the Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council in 1933 and the Export-Import Bank in 1934 which were designed to 
protect US investments in, and stimulate trade with, Latin America.
 15
  Concurrently, US 
officials promoted free trade principles and policies at pan-American conferences in 
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Montevideo in 1933 and Buenos Aires in 1936.
16
 Furthermore, in 1934, the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement Act (RTAA) was passed by Congress, which allowed the executive 
branch to negotiate with other governments for mutual tariff reductions and most-
favoured-nation status.
17
 These measures constituted an internationalisation of the New 
Deal as the Roosevelt administration extended its interventionism beyond the domestic 
economy to that of Latin America. 
 The principal aim of the RTAA was to increase US exports to Latin America, 
which had fallen from $5.240 billion in 1929 to $1.675 billion in 1933.
18
 Furthermore, US 
exports were facing increasing competition from German goods. From 1934, the Nazi 
government’s ‘New Plan’ (Neuer Plan) redirected German trade toward South America 
via a system of bilateral barter agreements.
19
 By the end of the 1930s, the German share 
of Latin American exports had increased by twenty-five per cent over its 1929 level, 
sparking strong complaints from British and US businesses and politicians. Moreover, 
during the same period, Germany’s share of Latin American imports rose by sixty per 
cent. Conversely, the USA and Britain failed to reach their 1929 share of Latin America’s 
external trade. By 1938, Germany had become the second most significant trading partner 
with Mexico, Central America, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
In each case, Germany was behind the USA but ahead of third-ranked Britain.
20
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Nevertheless, despite its limited success, the RTAA programme formed a basis from 
which the US government could build its free trade ambitions and forge stronger 
cooperative ties with Latin America, complementing the general principles of the Good 
Neighbor policy. 
US officials viewed increased competition from German trade within the context 
of the wider threat posed by Nazi Germany to their government’s preponderant role in 
Latin America. Throughout 1938 and up to the outbreak of war in Europe, Roosevelt 
believed that the Axis powers were determined to dominate Europe and Asia, which 
would subsequently exclude the USA from world trade and undermine its position in 
Latin America.
21
 Latin America’s significance within US policy was increasingly based 
not only on growing trade and diplomatic cooperation but on hemispheric defence against 
potential Axis aggression.
22
 On 14 April 1939, Roosevelt pledged ‘that my country will 
also give economic support, so that no American Nation need surrender any fraction of its 
sovereign freedom to maintain its economic welfare.’23 Washington hoped that economic 
assistance to Latin America would stabilise the region and prevent governments drawing 
financial support from the Axis powers.
24
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The eruption of war in Europe led the US government to place further emphasis 
on pan-American multilateralism and it sought to foster economic cooperation at the first 
Consultative Meeting of American Foreign Ministers held in Panama in September 1939. 
Attended by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the meeting led to the creation of 
the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee consisting of twenty-
one experts in economic problems, one for each of the American republics, which was 
installed in Washington. The final act of the meeting stated that the Committee would 
work on the basis that liberal trade principles formed ‘the goal of their [Latin American 
governments’] long-term commercial policies in order that the world shall not lack a basis 
of world-wide international trade in which all may participate after world order and peace 
may be restored.’ This would include the removal of any ‘obstacles which render difficult 
the interchange of products’ throughout the Americas, including reduction in custom 
duties.
25
 Welles described the committee to Hull in vague and broad terms as a 
‘permanent body which will turn its attention to any and all questions of inter-American 
relationships in these fields in which it may appear that useful result is to be expected.’26 
The Second World War placed increased significance on this effort as Washington 
officials saw free trade as a means of creating greater hemispheric economic stability and 
solidarity. 
As Randall Bennett Woods has argued, following the outbreak of war, US 
officials perceived multilateralism as ‘the economic phase of internationalism’. 
Multilateralism became seen by US policy-makers as ‘the only ideological alternative to 
communism on the one hand and fascism on the other. It was a uniquely American 
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stratagem that combined humanitarian ideals with free enterprise and the profit motive.’27 
In his annual message to Congress on 3 January 1940, Roosevelt publically linked 
economic isolationism with war, stating that: 
For many years after the World War blind economic selfishness in 
most countries, including our own, resulted in a destructive mine-
field of trade restrictions which blocked the channels of 
commerce among nations. Indeed, this policy was one of the 
contributing causes of existing wars. It dammed up vast unsalable 
surpluses, helping to bring about unemployment and suffering in 
the United States and everywhere else.
28
 
 
Within such a perspective, free trade promoted international peace, cooperation and 
prosperity while economic protectionism led to suffering, competition for resources and, 
ultimately, military conflict. Thus, Washington was able to use the language of peace to 
create export markets for US goods. That is not to say that US policy-makers were 
insincere in their claims that free trade encouraged peace but, nevertheless, there were 
also clear economic benefits to be gained by a reduction in tariffs throughout Latin 
America. As Warren F. Kimball argues, for US officials, ‘[p]romoting peace and profit 
simultaneously was an appealing policy.’29   
 On 6 November 1939, the US and Venezuelan governments agreed a treaty on 
mutual tariff reduction that demonstrated Washington’s desire to increase its economic 
links with Latin America through free trade policies.
30
 Moreover, as Venezuela was the 
world’s foremost exporter of oil, the agreement gave Washington an opportunity to 
secure US access to overseas oil supplies. The increased importance of Venezuela within 
US foreign policy was reflected when, on 23 December 1938, the US legation in 
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Venezuela was elevated to an embassy.
31
 The tariff advantages obtained from the 
Venezuelan government under the treaty covered 96 agricultural and industrial products. 
On the basis of US trade figures for 1938, exports to Venezuela of products covered by 
these 96 items represented a value of $18,712,000 and accounted for 35.9 per cent of total 
US exports to Venezuela. Duty reductions in varying degree were obtained on 35 items 
and assurances against less favourable customs treatment were obtained in the case of the 
remaining 61 items. In return, the US government granted tariff concessions to Venezuela 
on 14 items, which in 1938 accounted for 88.6 per cent of the total value of Venezuelan 
exports to the USA. The most important commodities affected were crude petroleum and 
fuel oil, which in 1938 constituted 74.6 per cent of total imports into the USA from 
Venezuela, worth $14,965,000.
32
 
Imports of crude petroleum and fuel oils from Venezuela were made duty-free but 
subject to an excise tax. The excise tax was reduced from 1/2 cent to 1/4 cent a gallon on 
annual imports not in excess of 5 per cent of the total quantity of crude petroleum 
processed in US refineries during the preceding calendar year. Any imports in excess of 
the quota continued to be taxed at the 1/2-cent rate, which was bound against increase. 
The total quantity of crude oil processed in US refineries in 1938 was 1,165,015,000 
barrels, 5 per cent of which was 58,251,000 barrels.
33
 This 5 per cent quota was split 
between various oil-exporting countries based on their level of imports into the US in the 
first ten months of 1939. Under this system, Venezuelan oil was given 92.2 per cent of 
the quota.
34
 This was divided between oil shipped directly from Venezuela, which was 
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given 71.9 per cent of the quota, and Venezuelan oil refined in the Dutch West Indies, 
which received 20.3 per cent of the quota.
35
  
This arrangement received criticism from those, such as the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America, who believed that it impinged upon the US domestic 
oil industry.
36
 Experts argued that, as it cost nearly $1 barrel more to produce oil in the 
USA than in Venezuela, the reduction in import tax would place Venezuelan oil in a 
position to break the US market.
37
 Indeed, the Venezuelan trade agreement was of benefit 
to the US companies operating in Venezuela as it increased the competitiveness of 
Venezuelan oil in the USA in relation to domestic oil. This was also advantageous to the 
US government as the agreement encouraged the national market to diversify its supplies 
of oil, rather than rely on domestic production. Moreover, through this agreement the 
federal government was able to gain a tariff reduction on US exports entering Venezuela 
to the benefit of US business interests. Simultaneously, the federal government was able 
to promote the USA as a market for Venezuelan oil but with strict quota limits that would 
protect the domestic oil industry. Thus, the US government was able to promote the ideals 
of free trade and pan-American cooperation while simultaneously protecting its own 
national interests. Yet ultimately this intervention into the international oil industry was 
limited and indirect.  
US policy towards Venezuela cannot be understood without reference to the 
question of Latin American economic nationalism. The quota system placed on oil 
imports into the USA was a means by which the US government could discipline the 
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Mexican government for its nationalisation of the country’s oil industry in 1938.38 The 
Mexican oil industry was not allocated an individual share of the quota on oil imports into 
the USA and, instead, was forced to share 3.8 per cent of the quota with other countries 
that had not been given individual allocations.
39
 In 1938, the two largest oil companies in 
Mexico were subsidiaries of Shell and SOCNJ respectively but as a consequence of 
nationalisation the Mexican government prohibited multinational oil companies from 
operating in the country and expropriated their operations. British and US officials feared 
that the Mexican government’s actions would set a precedent for nationalisation, thereby 
threatening oil company operations throughout the world. Thus, they responded by 
denouncing the nationalisation, supporting the oil companies’ legal position and calling 
for prompt compensation.
40
 In fact, the Mexican case was part of a broader trend of local 
government intervention in Latin American oil industries.
41
 
The Argentine government had already created a completely state-run oil 
company in 1922 and, before a military coup in 1930, had considered total nationalisation 
of the country’s oil production.42 The Argentine example became an important influence 
for other Latin American officials as the 1930s saw an increased interest in state 
capitalism throughout the region. The global economic contraction known as the Great 
Depression led Latin American governments to seek out new opportunities to 
industrialise and increase their foreign currency reserves through import-substitution. 
However, during the 1930s, the major multinational oil companies aimed to stabilise 
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world oil production and were not prepared to invest heavily in new Latin American 
operations. In response, Latin American officials sought to lessen their dependency on 
foreign investment for domestic industrialisation by establishing state-run companies.
43
 In 
1931, the Uruguayan government formed a state refining company which, by 1937, sold 
fifty per cent of the country’s refined oil output.44 Moreover, in 1932 and again in 1939, 
the Chilean government threatened nationalisation of oil production while, in 1937, the 
Bolivian government proceeded with nationalisation and expropriated SOCNJ’s 
concessions in the country.
45
 Such incidents were not only detrimental to US business 
interests but also  jeopardised the US government’s oil security by disrupting oil 
production and endangering US access to overseas oil. 
In the Mexican and Bolivian cases, expropriation had occurred after disputes had 
arisen between the local governments and foreign-owned oil companies.
46
 While the US-
Venezuelan trade agreement might encourage Venezuelan oil exports to the USA, it did 
not constitute direct intervention in the operation of the oil industry or seek to regulate 
relations between the local government and US oil companies. However, in the years that 
would follow, the US government increasingly sought to manage relationships between 
oil companies and the governments of oil-producing countries. Rather than responding to 
nationalisation, US officials hoped to defuse conflict in the oil industry in order to pre-
emptively prevent expropriation from occurring. Concurrently, the British government 
had its own significant interest in Venezuelan oil. 
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British Dependence on Venezuelan Oil, 1938-1940 
By the late 1930s, Britain had become dependent on Venezuelan production for its oil 
needs, leading the British government to act when the Second World War threatened this 
vital interest. By the beginning of 1938, thirty-nine per cent of Britain’s oil supplies were 
supplied from refineries on Aruba and Curaçao, and ninety-two per cent of the oil refined 
on these West Indian islands was of Venezuelan origin.
47
 While the British government 
held a 51 per cent stake in Anglo-Persian, Iran only accounted for twenty per cent of 
Britain’s oil supplies. As such, Britain was heavily reliant on the operations of Shell, 
SOCNJ and, to a lesser extent, Gulf in Venezuela. Moreover, Venezuelan oil could be 
relatively quickly transported to Britain as Curaçao and Aruba were closer in sea miles 
than the Middle East. Thus, one FO official emphasised that Latin American oil fields 
were not only important due to ‘their size of production, but because they are favourably 
placed from a sea transport point of view’, which would be particularly significant in a 
time of war.
48
 While access to Venezuelan oil guaranteed Britain’s oil supplies, it did 
make the government highly reliant on foreign oilfields that lay outside its formal empire. 
In turn, this meant that the British government was dependent on multinational oil 
companies such as Shell. 
 In the years immediately prior to the outbreak of war between Germany and 
Britain, the British directors of Shell were keen that the company should not do anything 
which would be contrary to British government policy. However, the government could 
not count on the support of the company’s Dutch chairman, Sir Henri Deterding: an 
admirer of Adolf Hitler who believed that Nazi Germany was the only power capable of 
thwarting the threat posed by communism and the Soviet Union. In 1935, these views led 
Deterding to initiate discussions with the Nazi government concerning the possibility of 
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Shell providing a year’s supply of oil to Germany on credit. Disturbed by this 
development, and by his generally erratic behaviour, the other Shell directors eased the 
chairman into retirement in 1936. Following Deterding’s death six-months before the 
outbreak of war, his shares were distributed among the other company directors, which 
effectively thwarted any German ambitions to gain control of Shell and its oil.
49
 
Nevertheless, the episode underlined the potentially disastrous consequences of a 
breakdown in relations between the British government and Shell. Indeed, the over-
arching British oil policy was reliant on a state-private network that linked the 
government to multinational oil companies like Shell. 
 Leading up to the outbreak of war, the British government increased its intimacy 
with the multinational oil companies. The British Oil Board had been founded in 1925 
and given the task of administration and rationing of British oil supplies in a time of war. 
In January 1939, the separate Petroleum Department was given the broader duty of 
directing oil policy. At the same time, the major oil companies with business in Britain 
cooperated with the government to regulate the oil market, which in 1938, was dominated 
by Shell, SOCNJ and Anglo-Iranian, which held market-share of 40, 30 and 15 per cent 
respectively. Just prior to the outbreak of war, these companies agreed to pool their 
resources to form the Petroleum Board which was run out of Shell-Mex House in 
London. During wartime, the Board would set prices approved by the government, 
essentially creating a national monopoly for oil products.
50
 The high number of oil 
company employees who were brought into wartime administration blurred the 
distinction between private enterprise and government.
51
 
 The downside to British reliance on foreign oil was made apparent by the 
Mexican government’s decision to expropriate its country’s oil industry in 1938. For the 
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British government, any attack on the legal position of these companies was not a 
localised issue but a challenge to the state-private network on which its oil policy was 
based. Thus, British and oil company officials were concerned that the Venezuelan 
government might take inspiration from a successful Mexican expropriation.
52
 As one 
Shell director put it, the expropriation could establish ‘a precedent … throughout the 
world, particularly in Latin America, which would jeopardize the whole structure of 
international trade and the security of foreign investment.’53 Moreover, British officials 
were concerned that expropriation of oil company holdings could have adverse effects on 
a future British war effort.  
In March 1938, John Balfour, head of the Foreign Office (FO) American 
Department, outlined these possible ramifications when he wrote that: 
We must, moreover, bear in mind that by their oil concessions in 
foreign countries British interests are able to build up facilities in 
the way of transport, refineries, etc. which are available for 
national defence purposes in time of war. It is, moreover, only too 
certain that for some time to come Latin-American countries are 
not likely to possess the native capacity and organising power to 
exploit their own resources as efficiently as foreign interests. The 
immediate effect, therefore, of the expropriation of British-owned 
oil properties will inevitably be to diminish the output of oil and 
consequently to reduce the quantities available for our own 
purposes. It is to my mind therefore, of the first importance that 
during this critical period in international affairs we should do all 
we can to show that it is not in the interests of a Latin-American 
country like Mexico to eliminate British interests from 
participating in the exploitation of its oil resources.
54
 
 
This was particularly relevant in relation to Venezuela. As F. C. Starling, head of the 
Petroleum Department, pointed out, in ‘South American oil producing countries the oil 
fields are operated mainly by British and American interest and in the event of emergency 
those countries, particularly Venezuela, will be looked to for substantially increased 
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supply.’ Indeed, Starling felt that Venezuela’s ‘importance in time of emergency cannot 
be over emphasized’ and that, therefore, the British government ‘must leave no stone 
unturned to prevent the [Mexican] example being followed by other countries.
55
 This 
priority would come to bear in later years as the British responded to the Venezuelan 
government’s increased intervention in the oil industry. 
 The particular importance of Venezuelan oil to British military strategy was 
demonstrated by British efforts to ensure the security of the oil refineries on the Dutch 
colonies of Aruba and Curaçao. By March 1938, the Oil Board had estimated that British 
war requirements of oil and oil products from the Dutch West Indies would be 9,634,000 
tons in the first year of a major war in Europe with the Mediterranean closed, and 
6,304,000 tons with the Mediterranean open, on the assumption that oil supplies from the 
USA would also be available.
56
 Thus, the Admiralty began discussions with the FO over 
what could be done to secure, what was termed, ‘this vital traffic’ in the event of war in 
Europe.
57
 The two departments agreed that, if war broke out, British merchant ships 
sailing from Aruba and Curaçao would be routed via Trinidad and that escort vessels 
would protect sea routes in the region. In addition to these defensive arrangements, it was 
agreed that Consular Reporting Officers would be stationed on Aruba and Curaçao in 
order to carry out any necessary rerouting of shipping.
 58
 
Following the outbreak of war in Europe, both British and US officials protested 
to the Dutch government that the defences in the West Indies were inadequate. 
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Subsequently, the Dutch government made efforts to bolster the islands’ defences.59 In 
April 1940, the British government began to make proposals for sending an Anglo-French 
force to Aruba and Curaçao in the event of a German invasion of the Netherlands. War 
Office officials felt that the refineries were ‘of great strategic importance’ as the oil they 
produced was of ‘vital importance to our war effort’. In particular, the War Office argued 
that the refineries were an ‘indispensable source of aviation fuel’, which made their 
protection a ‘necessity’ as their security could be threatened by sabotage, naval 
bombardment, or attack by raiding parties.
60
  
Immediately prior to the German invasion of the Netherlands, the British 
government suggested to the Dutch authorities that British and French troops be stationed 
on the islands. Initially, the Dutch refused but reversed their position when, the next 
morning, German troops crossed over the Netherlands border. Subsequently, the Dutch 
government allowed a small force of British and French troops to be stationed on Curaçao 
and Aruba respectively on the understanding that they would be ‘placed at the disposal of 
local Dutch authorities’.61 As Bob Moore argues, the wording ‘at the disposal’ allowed 
the British government to ensure the security of the oil refineries while simultaneously 
respecting the colonial authority of the Netherlands.
62
 Indeed, the War Office made sure 
to impress upon the troop commander stationed in Curaçao that the island remained a 
Dutch colony and that the ‘status of the territory is in no way modified by the presence of 
your forces.’ Moreover, the War Office ordered the commander to ‘do your utmost to 
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cultivate friendly relations’ with the Dutch authorities and ensure that British actions met 
with their ‘approval and consent’.63 Nevertheless, as Moore suggests, its reliance on the 
refineries may have led the British government to station troops on the islands without 
Dutch permission.
64
 
Indeed, Whitehall presented the US government with a fait accompli as the British 
Ambassador in Washington, the Marquess of Lothian, informed Cordell Hull that British 
and French troops would be sent to the islands only after the decision had already been 
made in London.
65 However, Lothian did state that if the US government ‘felt inclined to 
cooperate’ with the British, ‘such cooperation would be most welcome’.66 Hull pointed 
out that the governments of the Western Hemisphere would, in all likelihood, assume that 
the British had claimed jurisdiction over Curaçao. Thus, he felt that, regardless of intent, 
the British government’s actions would foster criticism throughout the region. Hull told 
the ambassador that British interests would have been better served if London had 
discussed the matter in advance with other interested governments.
67
 Assistant Secretary 
of State Adolf Berle told Lothian that the US government felt that Dutch authorities had 
the situation in the West Indies entirely in control.
68
 However, its wartime dependence on 
Venezuelan oil made defence of Curaçao and Aruba an overriding concern for the British 
government. Yet this had the potential to create conflict with US officials who were 
sensitive to broader issues in pan-American politics. The Good Neighbor policy and US 
desire for hemispheric cooperation led the State Department to take greater interest in the 
concerns of Latin American governments in contrast with British officials whose primary 
                                                 
63
 NA, WO 216/151, War Office to O.C. Troops, Jamaica, 11 May 1940. 
64
 Moore, ‘Anglo‐American Security’, p. 459. 
65
 NARA, DS 856B.01/20, Hull memorandum of conversation with Philip Henry Kerr, 11th Marquess of 
Lothian, 10 May 1940; NARA, DS 856B.01/11, Lothian to Hull, 10 May 1940. 
66
 NARA, DS 856B.01/11, Lothian to Hull, 10 May 1940; NA, CAB 77/4, OCB (41) 69, report by the 
Executive Committee of the Oil Control Board, 10 August 1940; NA, CAB 77/4, OCB (41), Oil Control 
Board 14th meeting, 22 December 1941. 
67
 NARA, DS 856B.01/20, Hull memorandum of conversation with Lothian, 10 May 1940. 
68
 NARA, DS 856B.01/18, Berle memorandum of conversation with Lothian, 11 May 1940. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
52 
 
focus was securing oil supplies for the war effort. Indeed, the US government’s political 
and economic interests in hemispheric solidarity were much greater than those of British 
officials. 
The Venezuelan government was also concerned by British intentions in the 
Caribbean. Caracas officials feared that the British government, already in possession of 
Trinidad, might take control of not only Curaçao and Aruba but possibly other islands as 
well. Such a development would leave the British government with a chain of islands 
along the northern coast of Venezuela thereby blocking off the north of South America 
from the Atlantic. The Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Gil Borges, told US 
embassy staff in Caracas that this would be unfavourable to both the Venezuelan and US 
governments. He pointed out that the refineries on Curaçao and Aruba formed an integral 
part of the Venezuelan economy and his government would be sensitive to any 
developments that might jeopardise these interests.
69
  
The British government’s imperial role in the Caribbean fostered suspicion among 
Venezuelan officials who had an important economic stake in the status of Curaçao and 
Aruba. Thus, the security concerns of the oil-importing British government could create 
conflict with a Venezuelan government economically dependent on oil exports. It is 
possible that Venezuelan officials, aware of US interest in fostering pan-American 
solidarity, hoped that Washington would put pressure on the British government to 
withdraw its troops. However, the US government was unwilling to commit to defending 
the islands itself and was ultimately satisfied with British assurances that the islands 
would remain under Dutch control. Thus, British and French troops were stationed on the 
islands without further discontent.
70
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 Following Italy’s entry into the war in June 1940, tankers were no longer able to 
transport oil from the Middle East to Britain via the Mediterranean and, instead, oil had to 
be shipped the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.
71
 For the British 
government, this situation placed even greater importance on ensuring uninterrupted 
supplies of Venezuelan oil for the war effort. Following the defeat of France in June 
1940, British officials no longer felt able to trust the policies of the French government, 
as when only days later in early July the French military informed London of their plans 
to withdraw troops from Aruba.
72
 Thus, Whitehall once again became concerned for the 
safety of the oil refineries as the War Office emphasised that ‘both Curacao [sic] and 
Aruba are vital to British war effort and no risks can be taken’.73 Officials in London 
were worried that the Dutch authorities might oppose the stationing of British troops on 
Aruba for fear of Britain gaining too strong a hold over the colony.
74
 However, the Dutch 
government did not object.  
 In July 1940, the Marquess of Lothian met with Cordell Hull to discuss the matter. 
Hull was worried that, at the upcoming Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
American Republics in Havana, Latin American governments could well demand that 
Caribbean islands be placed under US control for the purposes of defence. The British 
Ambassador told Whitehall that Hull had voiced his concern that ‘the whole of America 
was extremely sensitive about these landings by one European Power on territory owned 
by others in the Caribbean’. As such, Hull asked the British government to avoid action 
that might inflame US opinion and, as a means of avoiding further controversy, he 
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suggested that Canadian troops, rather than British, be stationed in Aruba.
75
 Indeed, at the 
meeting in Havana, the Venezuelan government helped to secure a resolution that 
prohibited the transfer of any European colony in the Americas to a non-American power. 
While this principle was intended to prevent German annexation of territory, it would also 
apply to any British effort to lay permanent claim to Aruba and Curaçao.
76
 Although the 
British government approached the Canadian authorities in the hopes of sending a 
combined Anglo-Canadian force to Aruba, the Canadian government refused.
77
 However, 
after being informed of the Canadian position, the US government acquiesced to British 
troops being stationed on the island.
78
 
 The British government’s vital wartime interest in securing uninterrupted supplies 
of Venezuelan oil led British officials to take a proactive commitment to defending the 
refineries on Curaçao and Aruba. Over the course of the war, the Allies controlled over 
ninety per cent of the world’s oil output while the Axis powers controlled just three per 
cent. Monopolising such an important war material was of critical value to the British 
government and its allies. Indeed, as Richard Overy argues, ‘[i]t would be wrong to argue 
that oil determined the outcome of the war on its own, though there could scarcely have 
been a resource more vital to waging modern combat.’79 Yet, the British government was 
entirely dependent on overseas territories for the oil supplies so vital to the country’s 
national security. Indeed, as David Edgerton has argued, due to Britain’s ‘privileged 
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place’ within the international economic order, the British war effort ‘could draw on 
resources from all over the world’.80 Thus, while Britain had a ‘dependence on overseas 
supply’ for important war materials, the British government remained able to effectively 
wage war due to its international trade links.
81
 Yet this necessitated that the British 
government act to defend distant strategically vital locales such as Curaçao and Aruba, 
which had the potential to create conflict with the Dutch, US and Venezuelan 
governments which all had an important stake in the islands.  
 
Development of US Policy towards Venezuelan Oil, 1939-1941 
Between 1939 and 1941, the US government developed its interventionist approach to the 
economies of Latin America and the international oil industry, which consequently 
shaped its attitude towards Venezuela. In 1939, a State Department memorandum 
suggested that greater diplomatic intervention in Latin America could help to prevent 
future nationalisation of US business interests. The document, submitted to Economic 
Advisor for International Affairs Herbert Feis and Sumner Welles, argued that: 
There are very important American investment and trade interests 
to be considered. Many of those investments and part of that trade 
relate to industries and materials in which continued American 
control or participation is of great importance to our own national 
interest. Finally, any constructive assistance that the United States 
can give to other American republics during this critical period 
may serve to check the growing tendency toward expropriation of 
foreign (largely American) property in those countries.
82
 
 
Such a policy of intervention based on ‘constructive assistance’ rather than militarism 
allowed Washington’s protection of US business interests in Latin America to be 
undertaken as part of, rather than in opposition to, the tenets of the Good Neighbor policy. 
US government officials increasingly perceived themselves as regulators of Latin 
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American trade, economy and industry. This role differed from that of previous 
administrations in that it was based on consent via diplomatic cooperation rather than 
domination through military interventionism.
83
 
The US government was not alone in perceiving Latin American economic 
nationalism as a threat. SOCNJ executives were fearful that the nationalisation of 
Mexican oil would put their worldwide operations at risk by setting a precedent for other 
Latin American governments. In response to the Mexican expropriation, Major Tom R. 
Armstrong of SOCNJ wrote that: 
the United States is in growing danger from any toleration of such 
confiscatory policies, which will benefit neither the confiscating 
countries nor, obviously, the American owners of the properties 
confiscated. They will bring to Latin America a period of disorder 
and loosen the whole social fabric, for it will be an invitation to 
the have-nots of all countries to wipe out those whose foresight, 
prudence and intelligence have enabled them to accumulate the 
capital and skill without which the creation of wealth becomes 
impossible. … Far more is involved in the current issue than oil 
properties in Mexico. If Mexico can get away with its present 
arbitrary act there is no safety for American property anywhere in 
Latin America or elsewhere, and sooner or later in some part of 
the world, drastic action will be called for.
84
 
 
In 1939, Nelson A. Rockefeller, SOCNJ shareholder and grandson of Standard Oil 
founder John Davison Rockefeller Sr., took a trip to Venezuela and company officials 
saw this as an opportunity to defend their interests. Prior to his departure, various SOCNJ 
executives proposed topics he might bring up in conversation with Venezuelan officials. 
They suggested to Rockefeller that he should highlight the negative aspects of Mexican 
expropriation and emphasise the need for the oil industry’s production costs to remain 
low so that the companies could remain competitive.
85
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However, Rockefeller felt that it was the attitude of oil company officials that 
needed to change. During his trip, he attended a dinner party in Caracas where he met the 
wife of a US businessman who, despite having lived in Latin American for eighteen 
years, did not speak Spanish. Rockefeller translated for this woman in her conversation 
with the Venezuelan President of State and, after dinner, asked her why she had failed to 
learn the local language. ‘Why should I learn - who would I talk to if I did?’ came the 
reply. Rockefeller found this attitude very telling. The woman also told the story of a US 
diplomat who, when drunk, would try to break into the Venezuelan presidential palace. 
Rockefeller viewed the night’s conversation as indicative of the general lack of 
responsibility on the part of US representatives abroad.
 86
  
Upon his return to the USA, Rockefeller wrote a memorandum that stressed the 
need to convince the Venezuelan people that SOCNJ, and US business more generally, 
was ‘not interested solely in coming down to squeeze as many dollars out of the country 
as possible’.87 The document was presented to SOCNJ President William Stamps Farish 
II who suggested that Rockefeller give a speech on the subject to an audience of SOCNJ 
executives.
88
 In his address, Rockefeller emphasised the need for oil company employees 
to recognise their moral and social responsibility to the countries within which they 
operated. He argued that by acknowledging and acting on these responsibilities the oil 
companies could avoid later recriminations, such as industry expropriation. In order to 
‘regain the confidence of the people’, he suggested that company employees should learn 
the language, habits and psychology of local communities and become more involved in 
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the educational, social and economic development of the areas within which they 
worked.
89
 
Concurrently, SOCNJ employee H. R. Barbour submitted recommendations for a 
programme designed to improve the company’s public relations in Venezuela. However, 
this consisted entirely of the production of propagandistic promotional material, such as a 
company magazine.
90
 For some SONCJ executives, avoiding a repeat of Mexican 
expropriation necessitated victory in a battle of ideas between collectivism and private 
property rights. Barbour felt it necessary for ‘intelligent, long-viewed leaders’ to educate 
the masses who ‘feel rather than think, are concerned with the day’s needs rather than 
with tomorrow’s social goal.’ It would be the role of SOCNJ to ‘make use of modern 
propaganda methods’ and ‘influence the thinking, understanding and actions of such 
leaders.’ If it failed in this educational task, Barbour believed that ‘the have-nots of the 
world, mislead [sic] by designing and unscrupulous political leaders, finally may get the 
upper hand and when they do they will destroy the present economic system, its savings 
and its working capital.’91  
There was certainly an overt paternalistic quality to the views of SOCNJ 
executives toward oil-producing countries as their statements revealed both a patronising 
view of the mass public and apprehension of possible class warfare. Subsequently, 
Barbour’s public relations programme was accepted and put into operation by Henry 
Edward Linam, President of SOCNJ’s Venezuelan subsidiary.92 Yet such measures were 
superficial and based on improving the company’s public image rather than systemic 
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changes that would quell economic nationalism or combat the problems outlined by 
Nelson Rockefeller.  
Moreover, none of the suggestions raised within SOCNJ sought increased US 
government intervention in the company’s affairs. Yet, by 1940, State Department 
officials perceived a need to increase their role within the international oil industry. This 
formed part of a broader strategy to improve relations between US business and Latin 
American governments in order to avoid expropriation of private property. 
Nationalisation of the Mexican oil industry had demonstrated that the escalation of 
disputes between US businesses and Latin American governments could harm 
Washington’s interests. Avoiding similar clashes was especially important following the 
outbreak of a major war in Europe, which increased the need for solidarity among the 
governments of the Western Hemisphere.
93
  
By June 1940, Cordell Hull perceived various international problems relating to 
the oil industry that needed to be resolved. In a speech prepared for an audience of oil 
executives, he stated that ‘your industry is so important and some of the problems facing 
it are so urgent’ that a ‘general size-up of the situation’ was needed. The Secretary of 
State was aware that the relationship between the government and the multinational oil 
companies was strained. He felt that both parties had made errors, stating that: 
I know that there has been considerable criticism of the 
Department of State in certain instances. To some extent this 
criticism may be justified. However, in all fairness, you must 
admit that the companies have also made many mistakes in the 
past; for instance, looking back over the situation in Mexico, you 
probably can see that you might have done better and that some of 
the difficulties could have been avoided, if there had been better 
teamwork.  
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In order to avoid future mistakes, Hull felt that it was necessary to increase the level of 
cooperation between the oil companies and the State Department, which would help to 
protect US oil interests. He therefore stated that: 
This department and I personally have always wanted to do what 
is best to protect our American interests and we feel this duty very 
keenly. Our intentions in this regard are very definite and in order 
to perform this duty which is incumbent upon us we must have 
your cooperation and we must have plans prepared to meet 
difficulties that are foreseeable. We want to work out 
arrangements to facilitate such cooperation. The problems facing 
the Department are manifold; we feel our men in the field are 
doing an excellent job on the whole and we should like to 
examine the possibility of improving the cooperation between 
them and your people.
94
 
 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle put it another way when he wrote in December 
1939: ‘[n]ot that we love the oil companies, but we have to preserve some sort of norm by 
which relations can be carried on.’95 
US officials’ desire for an increased role in the oil industry was one aspect of a 
broader international economic interventionism. This interventionism, which had grown 
out of US policy towards Latin America, was based on a New Deal conception of reform. 
This outlook was expressed by President Roosevelt on 12 January 1940 when he referred 
to ‘a new approach that I am talking about to these South American things. Give them a 
share. They think they are just as good as we are and many of them are.’96 As David 
Green points out, notions of ‘sharing’ reveal differing perceptions of economic 
sovereignty.
97
 The Mexican government’s claim to ownership of subsoil rights had shown 
that Latin American governments were prepared to use their political authority to gain 
control over their country’s resources rather than merely ‘share’ in the wealth those 
resources produced. As Green argues, a Latin American government which implemented 
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such economic power ‘would be making an unequivocal declaration of economic 
sovereignty. In any international economic transactions, it would be giving rather than 
receiving a share of its own nation’s resources.’98  
Thus, Washington was keen for US businesses to improve their relations with 
Latin American governments as a means of preventing the nationalisation of the region’s 
industries. As such, the US government sought to ensure that business interests retained 
their power to ‘give’ Latin American people ‘a share’ before Latin American 
governments took that power for themselves. The New Deal had introduced new levels of 
state intervention within the US domestic economy but, nevertheless, the Roosevelt 
administration had reformed, rather than rejected, capitalism.
99
 William E. Leuchtenberg 
has astutely described this reformism as a ‘halfway revolution’ and it was this approach 
which Washington sought to export to Latin America.
100
 The US government wished to 
internationalise the New Deal by encouraging reform of state-private sector relations 
abroad while protecting private property rights. At the same time, improved relations 
between US businesses and Latin American governments complemented the broader aims 
of the Good Neighbor policy.  
Moreover, by the spring of 1940, following the defeat of France, securing the 
Western Hemisphere from Nazi infiltration and invasion was a top priority for Roosevelt, 
Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.
101
 The internationalisation of the New 
Deal had begun in response to the Great Depression but now Washington officials saw 
                                                 
98
 Ibid., p. 39. 
99
 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York, NY, 1996), 
pp. 4-6; Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, pp. 372-377; Donald R. Brand, ‘Competition and the New Deal 
Regulatory State’, in Sidney M. Milkis and  Jerome M. Mileur (eds), The New Deal and the Triumph of 
Liberalism (Amherst, MA, 2002), pp. 166-192. 
100
 William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, NY, 1963), 
p. 347. 
101
 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 233-236; Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Annual Message to the Congress, 6 January 1941, in Rosenman (ed.), Papers and Addresses of Roosevelt, 
1940 Vol., pp. 666-667; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, 
(Washington, DC, 1960), pp. 31-39. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
62 
 
hemispheric economic interventionism as a tool of national defence. To limit Axis 
influence in Latin America and secure hemispheric stability, the US government 
endeavoured to further support the region’s economic development.102 Roosevelt argued 
that this pan-American economic cooperation constituted ‘a program of economic defense 
designed to supplement our military defense program’.103 With this in mind, in August 
1940, Nelson Rockefeller was brought into government as head of the new Office for 
Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics. 
Later renamed the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the department 
was tasked with fostering economic and cultural links between the USA and Latin 
America.
104
 For Rockefeller, US interests in Latin America were best served by 
stimulating sustained economic growth throughout the region as he argued that ‘economic 
defense of the Hemisphere requires concrete evidence now that this nation is irrevocably 
committed to a long range, continuing program of Hemisphere economic development 
and cooperation.’105 In line with the broad aim of wartime hemispheric solidarity, he used 
his position to formulate policies aimed at improving Latin Americans’ health, diet and 
general quality of life.
106
  
These efforts were supported, in September 1940, by a $500 million increase to 
the Export-Import Bank’s budget which was used to extend lines of credit to Latin 
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America to help fund industrialisation, agricultural development and public works. These 
loans helped the region’s governments overcome balance of payments problems and 
limited the impact of the wartime loss of European markets.
107
 Moreover, during the war, 
US financial advisory missions encouraged Latin American governments to employ 
Keynesian interventionism as a means of fostering economic development and 
industrialisation.
108
 These measures further expanded Washington’s hemispheric New 
Deal by increasing the US commitment to managing Latin America’s social and 
economic well-being.  
As Emily Rosenberg argues, by the time the USA became a full belligerent in the 
Second World War, ‘the President had already acquired a full range of controls over 
foreign economic affairs’.109 The crises of the Great Depression and Second World War 
had led the US government to develop and test these controls in Latin America as part of 
a hemispheric New Deal designed to encourage trade, economic stability and political 
cooperation throughout the Americas. US intervention in the industries of Latin America 
also extended to the oil trade as Washington officials sought to dispel any issues that 
might create ruptures in pan-American solidarity. Beginning in 1940, Washington acted 
to expedite a settlement between SOCNJ and the Bolivian and Mexican governments 
regarding the two expropriation cases.
110
 The RTAA had enabled the Roosevelt 
administration to encourage imports of Venezuelan oil to the USA but its action in 
Bolivia and Mexico constituted a greater involvement in the politics of the international 
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oil industry. Before 1940, Washington had punished Latin American governments for 
expropriation of oil company properties but it was now committed to resolving such 
disputes on terms favourable to Latin Americans.
111
  
Oil was also central to US relations with the Japanese government as, by 1939, 
Japan imported around eighty per cent of its supplies from the USA. Following Japanese 
military aggression in East Asia, the Roosevelt administration was divided on whether to 
impose an oil embargo on the country. There were those, such as Harold Ickes, who 
supported an embargo as a means of depriving the Japanese government of the fuel 
necessary to prosecute war. However, other US officials, such as Cordell Hull, feared that 
efforts to deny Japan oil would only encourage an attack on the oil-producing 
Netherlands East Indies. Ultimately, the Japanese invasion of French Indo-China in July 
1941 led the US, British and Dutch governments to impose a ban on exports of oil to 
Japan. While US-Japanese negotiations did take place these ultimately broke down and, 
on 7 December 1941, the Japanese military attacked the US fleet at Pearl Harbour.
112
 US 
official’s experience of relations with the Japanese government in the years leading up to 
the Pearl Harbour attack underlined the international importance of oil as a strategic 
resource. As Fiona Venn argues, the ‘centrality of oil to modern warfare, if it needs 
further demonstration, is clearly apparent in its prominent role in Japanese-American 
relations.’113 
 Subsequently, New Deal statism was dwarfed by the level of state intervention 
instigated by the Second World War as the demands of wartime mobilisation led the US 
government to take a greater role in the lives of its citizens than ever before.
114
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particular, it was placed in a managing role within the US oil market as war highlighted 
the military importance of securing readily available sources of oil.
115
 On 28 May 1941, 
Roosevelt appointed Harold Ickes as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense within 
the newly created Office of the Petroleum Coordinator. Later renamed the Petroleum 
Administration for War, the office’s function was to ensure that the USA was able to 
maintain adequate stocks of oil as part of the government’s wartime mobilisation.116 The 
conflict also led to the creation of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board in July 1942, which 
was responsible for procurement, shipment, and distribution of US oil supplies for 
military purposes.
117
  
During the Second World War the US government employed a number of ‘dollar-
a-year men’. This term referred to business managers who received a nominal 
government salary, continued to collect their company pay, and helped to organise US 
wartime mobilisation.
118
 This arrangement blurred the state-private dichotomy, creating 
an intimate relationship between government and private enterprise. These state-private 
actors included oil executives who were employed by the government to aid with the 
formulation, and execution, of US oil policy. To provide advice on issues relating 
principally to the domestic oil industry, the government established the Petroleum 
Industry War Council which was made up of some seventy-nine industry executives. An 
additional industry group, the Foreign Operations Committee, was also formed to 
                                                                                                                                                  
in the War’, in The Army and Navy Journal, United States at War, p. 85; Sparrow, Warfare State, pp. 3-15; 
Polenberg, War and Society, pp. 5-36. 
115
 Harry A. Stuart, ‘Petroleum and the War Effort’, in The Army and Navy Journal, United States at War, p. 
51; Harold L. Ickes, Fightin’ Oil (New York, NY, 1943), pp. 3-17. 
116
 LC, Harold L. Ickes Papers, Box 219, File: Secretary of Interior File, Oil 15, Roosevelt to Ickes, 28 May 
1941; John W. Frey and H. Chandler Ide (eds), A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-
1945 (Washington, DC, 1946), pp. 14-16; Harold L. Ickes, ‘Resources for Victory’, in The Army and Navy 
Journal, p. 29; Ickes, Fightin’ Oil, pp. vii-x; FDRL, OF 4435b Petroleum Industry War Council, Box 3, 
Petroleum Coordinator for War, File: Petroleum Industry War Council, 1943, Addresses before the 24th 
Annual Meeting of the American Petroleum Institute, 10-11 November 1943. 
117
 Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy, p. 125; Frey and Ide (eds), A History of the Petroleum 
Administration for War, p. 18. 
118
 Sparrow, Warfare State, pp. 6-7; Polenberg, War and Society, pp. 90-91; Richard E. Holl, From the 
Boardroom to the War Room: America’s Corporate Liberals and FDR’s Preparedness Program (Rochester, 
NY, 2005), pp. 1-9. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
66 
 
consider matters relating to the international oil industry.
119
 In particular, it was becoming 
increasingly important for the government to formulate a strategy that would ensure the 
USA’s access to overseas oil fields, including those of Venezuela. By 1941, no major 
new oil fields had been discovered in the USA for a number of years and it was feared 
that domestic supplies of oil would only last for a further fifteen years.
120
  
In order to facilitate the construction of a foreign oil policy, the US government 
employed oil industry managers who would be able to provide expert opinion. Secretary 
of the Interior Harold L. Ickes selected Ralph K. Davies, vice president of Standard Oil 
Company of California (SoCal), to be Deputy Petroleum Coordinator for National 
Defense. In October 1941, Davies produced a memorandum that outlined the potential 
problems facing the United States. The document argued that ‘the United States must 
have extra-territorial petroleum reserves to guard against the day when our steadily 
increasing demand can no longer be met by our domestic supply’. Referring to British oil 
policy, Davies stated that ‘Great Britain has long recognized this principle, and in result 
we find the British in control of oil fields throughout the world.’ The memorandum 
reasoned that this policy should be emulated, arguing that ‘the petroleum resources of 
Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and other Caribbean countries must be considered to be 
reserves for the United States.’121  
Thus, US officials’ concerns regarding oil supplies informed their attitude towards 
Latin America. While the US government did not have formal control over Latin 
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America, it exercised a hegemonic level of influence over the region. Combined with the 
region’s geographical proximity to the USA and the presence of rich oil fields in the area, 
Latin America became an obvious pool from which vital oil supplies could be drawn. 
Moreover, US companies held concessions for oil production in various Latin American 
countries, which gave these corporations an element of control over the region’s output. 
After reading Davies’ memorandum, Ickes forwarded it to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, writing that it was ‘one of the most important documents that I have sent to 
you’.122 
Ickes wrote to Roosevelt in the same vein on 1 December 1941, stating that it was 
‘of the utmost importance that we look ahead in this matter of oil from a nationalistic 
point of view as we have not done to date. So far as I can see the future depends upon oil 
more than upon any other factor.’ Like Davies, he felt that the US government should 
seek to emulate Britain which ‘lacking any oil of her own, long ago set out to stake out 
claims in other parts of the world.’ He felt that Washington, conversely, had ‘relied upon 
private companies, whose interests do not always run parallel to those of the Nation. It 
seems to me that we ought at least begin to formulate a National policy, our known 
reserves being what they are, and the importance of oil to civilisation being what it is.’123 
Roosevelt replied to Ickes stating that he was ‘deeply conscious of the situation regarding 
the future and have talked about it on many occasions with the State Department, the 
Army and Navy and even private producers. As you say, there is no assurance that our 
own oil will be sufficient twenty years from now.’124  
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Furthermore, in July 1941, the State Department appointed Max Weston 
Thornburg to the role of Special Assistant to Sumner Welles as a consultant on petroleum 
matters. Thornburg, who had previously worked as a corporate executive at SoCal, was 
assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.
125
 After joining 
the State Department he began work on the construction of a coherent foreign oil policy 
for the US government, which he felt was severely lacking.
 In Thornburg’s view, the 
absence of an office in the State Department devoted particularly to oil problems had 
resulted in a diversity of policies among its various divisions.
126
 However, he stopped 
short of Ickes’ and Davies’ statism, and supported an approach to oil policy that would 
see both government and private enterprise collaborating to mutual benefit.
127
  
Thornburg stated that the USA would not be able to maintain its role as an oil-
exporting country and its future position in world oil affairs would depend upon the 
control it could exercise over the distribution of oil exported by other producing 
countries.
128
 He supported an approach to oil policy that would see both government and 
private enterprise working together in the US national interests but felt that the attitude of 
State Department officials was generally ‘sceptical if not mistrustful’ towards the large 
multinational companies. While government officials felt that the oil companies operated 
with too little regard for international relations, Thornburg also perceived a generally 
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corresponding attitude of scepticism, mistrust and lack of understanding on the side of the 
companies. He judged that this was down to ‘an almost complete lack of personal 
acquaintance between responsible leaders in the industry and policy officials in the 
Department’ and believed that closer ties between the two groups would help foster a 
‘mutual understanding and confidence’.129 He argued that a ‘tremendous step in advance 
will have been taken when responsible and representative leaders in the industry and 
responsible officials of Government begin to put their heads together on problems of 
national importance’.130 Thus, for Thornburg, dispelling this mutual aloofness between 
government and industry was of urgent importance.
131
  
On 2 December 1941, he gave Sumner Welles the first outline of a programme of 
study aimed at formulating a foreign oil policy for the US government. Welles expressed 
interest and asked to be kept informed as to its progress.
132
 By the end of December, 
Thornburg had been appointed as Chairman of the Foreign Petroleum Policy Committee 
and had established the new Office of the Petroleum Adviser, of which he was head.
133
 
The office’s stated aim was to achieve consistency in handling issues concerning oil and 
to assist ‘all interested branches of the Government and the oil industry to use in the most 
effective manner our powerful international position in what is perhaps the most 
important of the strategic raw materials.’134 
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In Thornburg’s view, the State Department’s general aim should be to reduce 
friction between multinational oil companies and host countries, which would ultimately 
be to the benefit of both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. By creating 
international agreements, he argued that it was possible to fix certain rights, obligations 
and rules of behaviour to which governments and private enterprise could conform. 
Thornburg had faith in the ability and willingness of US oil companies to help write, and 
then follow, such accords. He argued that it would then be necessary to convince other 
countries, beginning with Britain, to support these sets of agreements. Such an 
arrangement would secure each government’s vital interests, eliminate the potential for 
conflict, and allow prosperity for all. Thus, for Thornburg, successful oil policy was 
based on cooperation between host countries, home countries, and oil companies.
135
  
By the end of 1941, various individuals and organisations in Washington were 
labouring to formulate the government’s foreign oil policy. While Ickes endorsed a statist 
approach to the issue, Thornburg’s corporatist model sought to achieve greater voluntary 
cooperation between national and private interests. Despite these differences, both 
approaches formed part of the internationalisation of the New Deal as Washington 
assumed the responsibility to supervise overseas industries. These issues were not limited 
to Latin American countries, although Thornburg felt that the US national interest was 
‘more closely woven with theirs than with countries across the world.’ 136  Indeed, 
hemispheric solidary took on even greater importance once the US government became a 
full belligerent in the Second World War.
137
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For Welles, the potential for Axis infiltration into Latin America placed yet even 
greater import on achieving pan-American cooperation. He wrote that ‘the maintenance 
of the unity of the Western Hemisphere’ was of ‘vital significance to the United States’ 
and that ‘the security of the United States depends upon the attainment of that 
objective’.138 Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the US naval fleet relied on 
uninterrupted use of the Panama Canal in order to move ships from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. In order for the security of the canal to be assured, it was necessary for Latin 
American governments to aid in the defence of the hemisphere by taking steps to prevent 
Axis activities in their territories.
139
 The military shared the State Department’s fears 
regarding the security of Latin America as Army and Navy planners called for various 
studies and strategies to be produced in order to counter the threat posed to the Western 
Hemisphere by the Axis powers.
140
 
Welles, Hull and Roosevelt agreed that ensuring Latin American support for the 
Allied cause was of vital importance and it became one of the US government’s central 
aims at the 1942 Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics 
in Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, Welles was able to secure a resolution supported by the 
Latin American governments that recommended the breaking of relations with the Axis 
powers.
141
 For Welles, the Good Neighbor policy had destroyed ‘the grounds for that 
bitter hostility toward the United States’ that had been created in Latin America by 
repeated US military intervention. He argued that the policy had led to a ‘wholly new 
spirit of co-operation’ between the USA and Latin America and that it was this 
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‘hemispheric solidarity’ that had caused Latin American countries to support the Allied 
war effort.
 142 
The US government’s war effort also placed further importance on its access to 
raw materials. Consequently, the pan-American meetings at Havana and Rio increased 
the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee’s purview to include, 
among other duties, the formation of an economic mobilisation plan and list of strategic 
raw materials. During the war, Latin America supplied twelve of the fourteen materials 
listed as strategic by the US Army-Navy Munitions Board in 1940.
143
 US officials 
perceived hemispheric multilateralism as an important part of wartime contingency as a 
prerequisite to ensuring against Nazi infiltration and providing the USA with war 
materials. This particular model of pan-American solidarity constituted a hemispheric 
New Deal which Washington officials had originally formulated to promote US economic 
growth but had expanded in response to the Second World War. Moreover, the Western 
Hemisphere acted a test case for the US government’s broader free trade programme. In 
order for these plans to come to fruition it was necessary for Washington to form an 
accord with the British government. 
 
British Response to US ‘Multilateralism’, 1940-1942 
Having established their hemispheric New Deal, US officials sought to extend their 
interventionism to the world as a whole but their efforts to globalise free trade brought 
them into conflict with Whitehall. Prior to entering the Second World War as a full 
belligerent, the US government had already begun to formulate its plans for post-war 
international organisation. In his State of the Union address of 6 January 1941, Roosevelt 
listed the ‘four essential human freedoms’ upon which the US government would base 
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future world security. The President described these four freedoms in decidedly 
international and universal terms: 
The first is freedom of speech and expression -- everywhere in the 
world. 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his 
own way -- everywhere in the world. 
The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world 
terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every 
nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants -- everywhere in 
the world. 
The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world 
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a 
point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a 
position to commit an act of physical aggression against any 
neighbor -- anywhere in the world.
144
 
 
Roosevelt laid out these principles in stark contrast to the military aggression carried out 
by the Axis powers. He stated that the four freedoms formed ‘a definite basis for a kind of 
world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis 
of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a 
bomb.’145 These values would later form the basis of US war aims in the minds of the US 
public and constituted a foundation for post-war reconstruction framed in direct 
opposition to the Axis powers.
146
  
Roosevelt’s assertion that it was necessary to secure ‘economic understandings 
which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life’ reflected Washington’s desire 
to expand its role in economic affairs beyond the Western Hemisphere.
147
 Indeed, the US 
government sought to apply its pan-American free trade paradigm to the rest of the world. 
As Wayne S. Cole has argued, Latin America served as a ‘side door to internationalism’ 
for the Roosevelt administration or as Warren F. Kimball puts it, ‘the Good Neighbor 
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Policy was exportable outside the hemisphere.’148 While Cole and Kimball focus on the 
US government’s desire to spread the pan-American model of regional organisation, the 
free-trade agreements that US officials had cultivated in the Americas were also 
‘exportable’.149 As early as 1936, Roosevelt stated that ‘the American Republics have 
given a salutary example to the world’ as ‘the principles of liberal trade policies’ had 
‘shone forth like a beacon in the storm of economic madness which has been sweeping 
over the entire world’.150  
While the US government was broadly in favour of free trade, this threatened the 
British Empire’s policy of imperial preference which had been introduced in 1932 to 
combat the effects of reduced international trade during the Depression. Within this 
system, intra-empire trade was encouraged through a reduction in tariffs between 
members of the Empire, thereby prejudicing external trade.
151
 British support was needed 
if the US government’s free trade agenda were to become truly international. However, in 
the first years of the war, with the Axis on the ascendance, US policy-makers were 
concerned that British officials might give assurances to other governments concerning 
post-war planning without prior consultation with Washington.
152
 In particular, US 
officials feared that the British government might conclude a deal with German officials 
that would allow for German penetration of Latin America. Adolf Berle wrote in his diary 
on 29 March 1940 that: 
there has always been a strong opinion in Great Britain for 
making peace with the Germans on the best terms. ... It would be 
just like some bright Englishman to concede them a sphere of 
                                                 
148
 Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, p. 357; Kimball, The Juggler, p. 110. 
149
 Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, pp. 357-363; Kimball, The Juggler, pp. 107-127. 
150
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address before the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1 December 1936 in Samuel Irving Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. V: The People Approve, 1936 (New York, NY, 1938),  pp. 604, 
607-608. 
151
 Ian M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939 (London, 1974), pp. 279-290; Allister Hinds, 
Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958 (Westport, CT, 2001), pp. 7-9; Ian M. 
Drummond, British Economic Policy and Empire, 1919-1939 (Abingdon, 2006), pp. 89-104. 
152
 Alan P. Dobson, U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940-1946 (London, 1986), pp. 64-66. 
THE FORMATION OF BRITISH AND US POLICY TOWARDS VENEZUELAN OIL 
75 
 
influence in South America, leaving it up to us to meet the 
ensuing situation.
153
 
 
Indeed, Thomas C. Mills has branded a number of US officials as ‘Hemisphere 
isolationists’.154 Mills argues that, while Washington generally advocated an open door 
policy and sought to bring an end to exclusive trading blocs such as the British Empire, 
US officials did not always apply this principle to Latin America. For Mills, this 
isolationist tendency correlates with what John Lamberton Harper has labelled 
‘Europhobic-hemispherism’. 155  Indeed, Lamberton Harper argues that suspicions of 
British policy were dominant within the Roosevelt administration.
156
 Certainly, Sumner 
Welles was antagonistic towards the British presence in Latin America and was critical of 
Britain’s imperial role in South America and the Caribbean.157  
Throughout 1941, Cordell Hull and the State Department sought to achieve, what 
they considered to be, the linked aims of combating German military aggression and 
gaining entry into the British Empire’s markets.158 During 1940, the British government 
sold securities and exhausted its gold and dollar reserves to finance the purchase of war 
materials from the US yet, despite this, Washington policy-makers continued to 
overestimate British economic strength.
159
 Many US officials believed that the British 
government was deliberately exaggerating its financial difficulties and Latin America was 
repeatedly discussed in conversations regarding possible provisos attached to US aid. 
Washington officials, including Roosevelt, suggested that before receiving economic 
assistance, the British should sell their assets in the Western Hemisphere or transfer them 
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to US ownership. Similarly, they proposed that the British government could repay Lend-
Lease aid by transferring their Latin American assets to US control.
160
 British financial 
withdrawal from the Americas would lead the USA to increase its political and economic 
hegemony in the region yet further and amounted to a modification, and extension, of the 
Monroe Doctrine with the aim of limiting European influence in Latin America.  
 Ultimately, US officials felt that rising nationalism in Latin America made the 
ownership of British assets a curse rather than a windfall.
 161
 Nevertheless, US 
undertakings to provide the British government with war materials increasingly included 
conditions that were of benefit to US business interests. Many US officials felt it 
unreasonable that their government provided aid to the British while US exports were 
simultaneously being denied access to a seemingly affluent British Empire. The Lend-
Lease Act became seen by many US officials as a means of forcing the British 
government to abandon its system of imperial preference.
162
 Such thinking was distinct 
from, but nevertheless correlated with, President Roosevelt’s distaste for European 
imperialism which he viewed as an out-dated and unacceptable feature of international 
relations.
163
  
 While the State Department wished to gain commitments from the British 
government concerning specific policy details, the President sought to limit Anglo-US 
agreements to broad principles. For Roosevelt, discussion of policy minutiae, especially 
regarding trade, would potentially create conflict within the emerging Anglo-US wartime 
alliance at a time when unity between the two governments was of paramount 
importance.
164
 By the summer of 1941, the precarious state of their war effort meant that 
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British officials were enthusiastic about the opportunity to enter into discussions with 
their US counterparts who might potentially be persuaded to enter the war as full 
belligerents.
165
 Subsequently, after discussions between top level officials from the two 
governments, on 14 August 1941, the Atlantic Charter was issued as a joint Anglo-US 
declaration that broadly laid out the two governments’ plans for the post-war world.166 
Elizabeth Borgwardt has described the Anglo-US talks as ‘a bold attempt on the part of 
Roosevelt and his foreign policy planners to internationalize the New Deal.’167 More 
precisely, the Atlantic Charter was an expansion of the Roosevelt administration’s earlier 
efforts to internationalise the New Deal throughout Latin America. As such, the Charter 
reflected US officials’ ambition to extend their leadership role in the Americas to cover 
international post-war reconstruction.  
The issue of free trade had created discord between British and US officials 
leading up to, and during, construction of the Atlantic Charter. Article IV of the Charter, 
which dealt with the issue of trade, proved to be most divisive for US and British 
officials.
168
 Article II stated that the signatories ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under which they will live’. Simultaneously, in Article IV, the 
two governments agreed to ‘endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to 
further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on 
equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their 
economic prosperity’. Thus, self-determination did not extend to a government’s trade 
policy and instead the Charter universalised free trade practices. The Charter had been 
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written solely by British and US officials yet it was an agreement to which all 
governments were now expected to conform as it called into question the right of a 
national government to dictate its own economic and foreign policies. This was indicative 
of the contradictions inherent within the US brand of liberalism, which maintained that a 
people had the right to choose their own form of government but placed limits on what 
form of government was acceptable. 
Welles and Roosevelt drafted Article IV to state that the British and US 
governments ‘will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access without 
discrimination and on equal terms to the markets and to the raw materials of the world 
which are needed for their economic prosperity.’ Welles told Churchill that the article 
was intended to apply to the Ottawa Agreement but that the phrase ‘they will endeavor to 
further’ did not imply formal and immediate contractual obligation. The Prime Minister 
told Welles and Roosevelt that, while he was personally opposed to the Ottawa 
Agreements, he would need to consult the Dominions before he could commit to the 
article as written. In order to avoid delay, Roosevelt agreed to enter the proviso ‘with due 
respect for their existing obligations’ into the article and remove the phrase ‘without 
discrimination’.169 However, Welles believed that this modification destroyed any value 
in the article and felt that if the British and US governments could not agree to ‘a 
restoration of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and 
realise that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world 
was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the postwar world.’ 170  In his 
memoirs, Cordell Hull also described himself as being ‘keenly disappointed’ by Article 
IV. He felt that the phrase ‘with due respect for their existing obligations’ ‘deprived the 
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article of virtually all significance since it meant that Britain would continue to retain her 
Empire tariff preferences against which I had been fighting for eight years.’171 
The issue was raised again in relation to Lend-Lease as US officials once more 
attempted to gain a British commitment to free trade.
 
During the autumn of 1941, British 
and US officials discussed the Lend-Lease Master Agreement that the latter hoped would 
bring an end to imperial preference. However, this plan received stiff opposition from 
British officials, especially from John Maynard Keynes. Moreover, as the US government 
entered the war in December 1941, Roosevelt was keen to avoid disagreement over a 
contentious issue that might undermine Anglo-US cooperation. As such, the President 
agreed to Churchill’s request that, again, imperial preference be exempt from any 
agreement on free trade.
172
 Nevertheless, in July 1942, Harry Hawkins, head of the State 
Department’s Division of Commercial Policy Agreements, argued that Washington’s 
priority should be to pressure Whitehall to accept ‘the virtual abolition of Empire 
preferences and renunciation of bilateralism.’ 173  Despite these sentiments, British 
imperial preference remained in place throughout the Second World War and US officials 
only succeeded in gaining vague commitments concerning free trade from their British 
counterparts.
174
 As John Darwin has argued, Whitehall officials ‘imagined survival [of 
the Second World War] in imperial terms, as the full recovery of the British world-
system’. This included restoring Britain as the centre of a global network of trade and 
resisting demands for the Empire to be opened to US business.
175
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Moreover, Whitehall officials sought to expand, as well as maintain, their 
international influence. In April 1942, Victor Perowne produced a memorandum entitled 
‘Anglo-Latin American Relations’ which argued that short and long range considerations 
dictated that British policy should be ‘to establish or maintain the most intimate and 
cordial relations possible with the Latin American countries’. Perowne stated that, in the 
short term, Latin America was the last remaining source of supplies essential for the 
successful prosecution of the war while, in the longer term, it would play an important 
role for Britain in the post-war period. Perowne pointed to the region’s significance as an 
‘immense’ area of British capital investment, a source of supply, and a market for British 
manufactured goods. The memorandum also highlighted the increasingly important 
political role Latin American countries would play after the war. Perowne felt that, in the 
coming years, the region would be able to exert considerable influence over the USA due 
to the Good Neighbor policy and the needs of Pan-American defence.
176
 Ronald Fraser, 
Assistant Secretary at the Board of Trade, felt that Britain was in a fairly strong position 
to achieve such aims. He believed that, following the war, South American countries 
would have to look to Europe as a market for a very important part of their production, 
while ‘a natural reaction against the U.S.A. after the war may lead them to act in a 
friendly manner towards ourselves’. 177  There were, therefore, compelling reasons for 
Whitehall officials to pursue increased British influence in Latin America.  
In order to achieve this aim, British policy-makers sought to collaborate with the 
US government and form a bilateral approach to Latin American questions.
178
 As such 
they were pleased with the anti-Axis resolutions made at the 1942 pan-American 
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conference in Rio de Janeiro.
179
 After the surrender of France in June 1940, it seemed 
improbable that British victory would be achieved through military victory on European 
soil. Rather than attempting to overwhelm Germany with direct force in central Europe, 
British strategists now focused on blockading German trade. This approach, combined 
with Anglo-US offensives against Germany’s allies in the Mediterranean and Asia, 
remained central to British strategy up until the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 
1944. This campaign played to British naval strength and ability to control international 
trade networks but, in order to be fully effective, the blockade needed the support of other 
governments, particularly those of Latin America.
180
 As a 1940 War Cabinet 
memorandum stated, 'the central and south American countries could provide the enemy 
with large quantities of essential raw materials’. Thus, ‘the whole-hearted co-operation of 
the Americas with us in enforcing the blockade by curtailing potential sources of supply 
would be of the utmost value, and would afford a very substantial relief to the Royal 
Navy by freeing ships engaged on blockade duties for service elsewhere’.181 US efforts to 
enlist the support of Latin American governments to the Allies’ cause could well aid the 
British government’s overall military strategy.  
However, the Roosevelt administration’s economic intervention in Latin America, 
which formed the basis of their hemispheric New Deal, created concerns in London. As 
Thomas Mills has revealed, British officials were suspicious of the motivations behind 
US efforts to achieve a broader form of pan-Americanism. Washington’s efforts to ensure 
British support for international free trade made US officials susceptible to accusations of 
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hypocrisy if they appeared to stray from multilateralism.
182
 In regards to Latin America, 
Victor Perowne felt that some US officials sought to create a form of imperial preference 
for themselves. Despite Cordell Hull’s distaste for British imperial preference, British 
officials perceived the Secretary of State to be an ally in regards to Latin America. They 
believed that Hull’s support of free trade extended to Latin America, unlike some of his 
colleagues, most notably Under Secretary Sumner Welles.
183
 British officials were 
particularly wary of Welles, who they believed was determined to eliminate European 
interests and influence in the region.
184
 At the end of 1941, Perowne was of the opinion 
that Welles specifically ‘quite naturally regards Latin America as his own particular 
oyster’.185 Indeed, throughout the Second World War, British officials believed that US 
policy-makers were consistently hindering their ambitions in Latin America. Such 
feelings were summarised by Francis Edward Evans, who stated that: 
I find the U.S. attitude consistent with American tradition and 
reasonable in the light of American experience. It is an extension 
– indeed, no more than a continuance – of the policy which has 
been followed by the U.S. for 120 years … Europe, in the Pan-
American view, must be allowed no part of the politics of the 
Americas, for as long as Europe produces imperialism, Europe is 
suspect.’186 
 
Within Whitehall, it was widely believed that US officials aimed to achieve hemispheric 
self-containment and US preponderance in Latin America.  
 In November 1939, The Economist magazine warned that unless the British 
government acted to encourage trade with Latin America, ‘the alternative is still further 
decay in our export industries and impairment of that ability to call on the resources of the 
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whole world on which our ability to win the war unconditionally depends.’187 Indeed, 
during the Second World War, British policy-makers specifically identified Latin 
America as an area within which British influence could, and should, be expanded.
188
 
However, The Economist also cautioned that throughout the region, ‘United States 
influence is strong. No easy task awaits British traders in these parts.’189 The 1942 pan-
American conference in Rio only heightened British concerns. Prior to the conference, 
Reuters quoted a senior official in the US Commerce Department who claimed that the 
USA had drawn up a programme designed to promote inter-American trade. The 
proposed policy would abolish all trade barriers within the Americas, establish a common 
currency for all anti-Axis nations, and permit the use of US naval and air units to convoy 
hemispheric shipping. Perowne felt such a move would gain support among US policy-
makers as a balance to British imperial preference. Moreover, he believed some US 
officials considered it a legitimate aim to achieve the virtual, if not complete, elimination 
of European trade from the markets of Latin America.
190
  
Ronald Fraser at the Board of Trade perceived a ‘rather ugly train of opinion in 
the United States’ on the subject of ‘hemispheric solidarity’. He felt it likely that after the 
war the US government would ‘wish to lay the foundations of hemispheric self-
containment in the strategical sphere which might in certain circumstances extend to 
economic self-sufficiency.’ Such a policy would ‘fall in with the wishes of those 
Americans whose one idea will be to grab the [South American] markets.’191 In March 
1942, Perowne wrote: ‘[l]et us admit that at times a Pan-American customs union must 
look pretty attractive to the Department of Commerce, to the Import and Export Bank, 
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and to commercial entities with a large stake in South America.’ He went on to write that 
such a union: 
would be inconsistent with efforts to remove or reduce the 
incidence of Imperial Preference, and would mean the 
abandonment, for the duration of the war at least, of Mr. Cordell 
Hull’s long campaign on behalf of liberal principles of 
international trade. None the less, there may be not a few in 
Washington who would like to see Pan-American preference put 
into the scales to balance imperial preference
192
 
 
Thus, British officials criticised US Latin American policy by invoking the very 
multilateral free trade doctrine that US officials espoused.
193
  
 Reuters’ insights into the pan-American conference proved to be erroneous as the 
US government failed to table such a policy at Rio. Sir Owen Chalkley, the Commercial 
Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, rubbished the idea that US officials had 
ever considered doing so. Chalkley did, however, concede that the problem of Anglo-US 
economic relations with Latin America was ‘most difficult’. He felt that any difficulties 
could only be solved by ‘a spirit of mutual confidence which I fear is still lacking in many 
American as in British quarters.’ He went on to say that ‘mutual suspicions remain and 
will continue to plague us’.194 Christopher Steel, First Secretary in the FO, suggested that 
Chalkley had ‘become a bit tinged with the Washington point of view’ during his ten 
years in the USA, leading him to view ‘his American friends with less suspicion than he 
might in consequence’.195 
 Sir Edward Mather-Jackson at the FO felt that British suspicions were justified 
having been ‘aroused by a marked difference in Anglo-American relations in that which 
concerned Latin America and that which concerned other parts of the world.’ 196  It 
appeared to British officials that the US government promoted a multilateral open door 
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policy everywhere but Latin America.
197
 Thus, it was not unreasonable for Mather-
Jackson to be concerned that the USA’s ‘materialistic urge might be set free to achieve its 
own ends in South America at a time when our own hands were bound by the war 
effort.’198 At the same time, there was a belief within the FO that the US government 
would use blacklisting against German industry in Latin America as a justifiable means of 
promoting US business in the region. In February 1942, Lord Halifax felt that there could 
be ‘no doubt’ that the US government intended for German business interests to be 
‘entirely supplanted’ by their own.199 US officials were similarly distrustful of British 
blacklisting policy, which they felt was equally business orientated. British Ambassador 
Donald St. Clair Gainer reported that US officials in Caracas neither understood nor 
approved of British blacklisting policy, viewing it as ‘purely mercenary’.200  
 Despite being allies in the Second World War, British and US officials held a 
mutual distrust when it came to Latin American issues. This suspicion of US policy in 
Latin America was indicative of British officials’ wider concern that the long-term aims 
of US foreign policy and post-war planning would undermine their own global interests. 
In June 1943, Welles wrote that wartime cooperation between the American republics 
was ‘the outstanding achievement’ in the history of international relations.201 He viewed 
pan-American cooperation as an example of an informal ‘regional federation’ that ‘should 
constitute a cornerstone in the world structure of the future.’202 The Under Secretary 
oversaw the formation of the Roosevelt administration’s post-war planning committee 
and its various subcommittees. In July 1942, Welles became head of the international 
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organisation subcommittee which held a total of forty-five meetings between July 1942 
and June 1943. The subcommittee met weekly in Welles’ office and was tasked with 
designing post-war international organisation. The outlines which the group created 
reveal the extent to which Welles, and the US government, sought to globalise the New 
Deal.
203
  
 Welles’ statements on post-war international organisation led to British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden’s concerns that US policy-makers aimed to construct a ‘New 
Deal for the World’.204  British policy-makers believed that, following the end of the 
Second World War, Britain would continue to play a pivotal role in international politics 
but were unsure as to the form that post-war international organisation would take and the 
effect of US policy on their own world position.
205
 Meanwhile, Churchill’s concentration 
on military matters made him indisposed to formulate a coherent British plan for post-war 
international organisation.
206
 Eden feared that US policy-makers sought to impose ‘their 
“Tennessee Valley Authority” nostrums for the organization of international society, 
which they tend to urge with missionary fervor.’207 Similarly, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, Isaiah Berlin, argued that US officials viewed ‘the New Deal as the New 
Islam, divinely inspired to save the world.’ 208  Such scepticism was common among 
Whitehall officials who feared that US efforts to fashion a global New Deal would hinder 
British post-war reconstruction.
209
 
The Roosevelt administration had extended the domestic reach of the federal 
government through a variety of New Deal programmes and society-wide mobilisation 
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for the Second World War. The perceived success of these endeavours gave US policy-
makers the optimism to extend their intervention to a global level and design post-war 
international organisation.
210
 For Elizabeth Borgwardt, this globalised New Deal 
culminated in the ‘Zeitgeist of 1945’ as Washington officials took a leading role in 
establishing multilateral international institutions such as the United Nations and World 
Bank.
 211
 Michael J. Hogan has similarly argued that a synthesis of New Deal principles 
formed the basis of Washington’s post-war Marshall Plan.212 As a precursor to these 
initiatives, US officials first established a hemispheric New Deal programme as, between 
1933 and 1941, Latin America became a testing ground for the Roosevelt 
administration’s extension of domestic interventionism to an international level. The 
experience of fostering pan-American economic and political cooperation gave the US 
government the confidence and experience to construct a truly global New Deal. This 
marked the beginning of a pattern within US foreign policy as, in the second half of the 
twentieth century, Washington also trialled neoliberal and neoconservative policies in 
Latin America before applying them to the rest of the world.
213 
  
Conclusion 
Various historians have analysed the US government’s increasing role in the international 
oil industry during the early 1940s but have failed to acknowledge the important role the 
internationalisation of the New Deal played in this development.
214
 US intervention in the 
international oil industry, which began in Latin America, did not exist in a vacuum but 
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was part of a broader hemispheric New Deal as the Great Depression and Second World 
War led the US government to form policies, institutions and multilateral agreements to 
manage Latin America’s economic development. This chapter adds credence to the 
literature arguing that the Second World War led to the rise of a US effort to globalise the 
New Deal. However, it also provides a necessary corrective to existing accounts of this 
development by demonstrating the importance of Latin America as a testing-ground for 
US foreign policy.  
Between 1933 and 1941, Washington trialled its management of international 
economics and multilateral organisation in Latin America before making them part of its 
global New Deal programme. These initiatives were initially prompted by the US 
government’s desire to stimulate domestic economic growth through increased trade with 
Latin America. Subsequently, the outbreak of war in Europe led the US government to 
foster hemispheric solidarity and stability through increased economic interventionism in 
Latin America. By exporting New Deal reformism to Latin America, Washington also 
hoped to ensure that the region’s governments did not follow a form of economic 
nationalism that might lead to expropriation of US business interests. In order for the 
New Deal to be exported to Latin America, it was necessary for Washington to forge 
closer and more cordial relationships with the region’s governments. This was achieved 
through the Roosevelt administrations’ Good Neighbor policy and its leading role in pan-
American organisation during the Great Depression and opening years of the Second 
World War.  
The expansion of the New Deal overseas also required that Washington take a 
proactive interventionist role in the affairs of multinational corporations operating in 
Latin America. Just as the New Deal had renegotiated the US government’s role in 
domestic business, Washington now sought to protect its foreign interests by supervising 
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the relationship between multinational corporations and Latin American governments. 
Representing the evolution of the hemispheric New Deal, the Roosevelt administration’s 
forays in the oil trade began in Venezuela as part of the RTAA programme and later 
became more pronounced as Washington sought to bring an end to disputes in Mexico 
and Bolivia. By 1941, Thornburg and Ickes both sought to extend this interventionism 
beyond the Americas through a corporatist and statist approach respectively.  
Concurrently, Washington sought to extend its hemispheric free trade programme 
to the rest of the world. In order for the New Deal to be truly globalised, it was necessary 
for US officials to reach an understanding with Whitehall regarding post-war 
international organisation. However, British officials sought to protect their own 
international role and perceived aspects of US foreign policy to be antagonistic to their 
interests. In particular, they became concerned that the US government was attempting to 
remove British influence from Latin America. Seen from a British perspective, US 
promotion of pan-American solidarity was merely an attempt to create a hemispheric 
trading bloc comparable to the Empire’s system of imperial preference. Thus, as the 
British government sought to protect its own trading bloc from being dismantled by US 
officials, they perceived an element of hypocrisy in US policy.  
Moreover, while US foreign oil policy took inspiration from that of the British 
government, it also created the potential for conflict within the newly formed Anglo-US 
wartime alliance. Increased State Department interventionism within the international oil 
industry could create competition between the British and US government for control of 
overseas oil sites. Thus, there remained a number of unresolved issues that had the 
potential to create conflict between the British and US governments. In subsequent years, 
Anglo-US variance would come to the fore in Venezuela, as British and US officials 
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sought to protect their often incompatible interests within Latin America and the oil 
industry. 
91 
 
Chapter Two 
British and US Intervention in Venezuelan Tax Negotiations, 1941-1943 
 
The Second World War led the British and US governments to collaborate to an 
unprecedented degree but the politics of international oil were still able to create conflict 
between the allies as they sought to protect their wartime, and post-war, fuel supplies.  By 
the onset of war, the British government had already developed intimate ties with Shell 
but the conflict increased the importance of this relationship as Britain became reliant on 
Venezuelan oil to fuel its global war effort. However, the expropriation of the Mexican 
oil industry had demonstrated that Latin American governments could undermine a 
British oil policy that was reliant on privately-owned corporations. Therefore, British 
policy-makers felt obliged to act when it appeared that their interests in Venezuelan oil 
were threatened by the independent actions of the local government. 
 For the US government, the war years involved greater involvement in the 
international oil industry than had previously been attempted. Through the New Deal and 
wartime mobilisation, the Roosevelt administration had increased its role in the US 
domestic economy and the perceived success of these endeavours provided the 
government with an ideology that espoused the virtues of state involvement in private 
enterprise.
1
 Having increasingly intervened in the domestic oil industry, Washington 
policy-makers began to apply the same approach to the international oil trade.
2
 This 
increasingly interventionist role went beyond matters strictly relating to oil as the US 
government sought to convert privately-owned multinational oil corporations into agents 
of foreign policy. This strategy would both guarantee US supplies of oil and ensure that 
                                                 
1
 Sparrow, Warfare State, pp. 3-15; Polenberg, War and Society, pp. 35-36; Brinkley, ‘The New Deal and 
the Idea of the State’, pp. 85-121. 
2
 Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, pp. 10-22; Nash, United States Oil Policy, pp. 128-179. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
92 
 
the independent actions of oil executives did not undermine the government’s foreign 
policy aims.  
This was particularly significant in Latin America where growing demand for 
economic reform had the potential to create tension between US business interests and the 
local population.
3
 By mediating between oil companies and Latin American governments, 
US policy-makers hoped to defuse any such conflict and uphold the tenets of the Good 
Neighbor policy.
4
 This interventionism characterised the US government’s foreign policy 
during the Second World War as the Roosevelt administration shaped post-war 
international organisation.
5
 Consequently, the international oil industry became a test case 
for the state-private sector collaboration which would be central to post-war US foreign 
policy and its globalised New Deal.  
 Between 1941 and 1943 British and US policy-makers intervened in the 
Venezuelan government’s attempts to increase taxation of Venezuela’s oil industry in 
order to safeguard their access to Venezuelan oil. However, while the US approach 
reflected the broad aims of the Good Neighbor policy, the principal objective of British 
officials was to secure the legal rights of the multinational oil companies operating in 
Venezuela. These conflicting approaches created tension within Anglo-US relations, 
which was exacerbated as both governments sought to gain the support of privately-
owned oil companies for their disparate policies.  
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Background to the Tax Negotiations 
In 1941, Venezuelan oil production was dominated by the industry giants of SOCNJ, 
Shell and Gulf.
6
  While SOCNJ and Gulf were US based companies, Shell’s holdings in 
Venezuela were under British managerial control.
7
 However, the three major companies 
had acquired their concessions at different times and on the basis of differing petroleum 
laws. There were, in fact, ten different laws under which the various companies operated. 
Some operated according to the Mining Law of 1905, others according to the Mining Law 
of 1910. Some of the companies paid royalties on a basis of quantity, others on the basis 
of value.
8
 While Shell, paid a royalty tax of only 2 bolívares (Bs.) per ton of oil produced, 
SOCNJ and Gulf had acquired their concessions later and, therefore, paid a higher rate of 
7.5-15 per cent of the commercial value of their gross production.
9
  
Any concession dating from 1908 to 1935 had been granted during the rule of the 
country’s former dictator, General Juan Vicente Gómez, who enjoyed cordial relations 
with SOCNJ, Shell and Gulf.
10
 Following Gómez’s death, his successor, Eleazar López 
Contreras, introduced a new law governing the oil industry that set minimum royalties on 
crude oil at 15 per cent. However, this new legislation only applied to new concessions 
and, consequently, the oil companies simply refused to extend their holdings in the 
country.
11
 Subsequently, the Second World War put further pressure on the Venezuelan 
government to reform taxation of the country’s oil industry. 
                                                 
6
 Tinker Salas, The Enduring Legacy, p. 3. 
7
 Payton-Smith, Oil, pp. 13-14. 
8
 NARA, DS 831.6363/1252, ‘Reported Possible New Legislation in Venezuela Affecting American Oil 
Companies. Visit of Gustavo Manrique Pacanius, Procurer General of Venezuela, to Negotiate, According 
to Report, with Oil Companies’, James P Moffitt, Consul in Caracas, to Hull, 8 August 1941. 
9
 NARA, DS 831.6363/1252, ‘General Report on the Oil Situation in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curacao’ 
Knowles to Ickes, 11 September 1941. 
10
 McBeth, Gómez and the Oil Companies, pp. 213-214; Rómulo Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics 
(Boston, MA, 1979), pp. 3-48; Rabe, The Road to OPEC, p. 40. 
11
 Edwin Lieuwen, ‘The Politics of Oil in Venezuela’, in John D. Wirth (ed.), The Oil Business in Latin 
America: The Early Years (Lincoln, NE, 1985), p. 198. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
94 
 
In response to the outbreak of war, the Venezuelan government announced its 
neutrality and continued to trade with both the Axis and Allied powers but, nevertheless, 
the conflict illustrated the oil industry’s vulnerability to external disturbances.12 Before 
the outbreak of hostilities, the principal markets for Venezuelan oil were the countries of 
Western Europe. However, the British wartime blockade of continental Europe prevented 
Venezuelan oil from reaching the substantial overseas markets of German-controlled 
countries and the loss of these markets was not appreciably offset by increased exports to 
Britain and its allies.
13
 This drop in demand had a knock-on effect for Venezuelan 
production which fell from 560,400 barrels per day in 1939 to 502,300 barrels in 1940 
and, as the government taxed the oil companies based on the amount of oil they produced, 
tax revenue also declined.
14
  
However, in the second half of 1940, the closure of the Mediterranean and the 
German threat to the Middle East increased British demand for Venezuelan oil while the 
USA also increased its imports. In 1939, forty per cent of total British oil imports were of 
Venezuelan origin and this had increased to eighty per cent by 1942.
15
 Significantly, 
Venezuelan oil was particularly suitable for conversion into the 100-octane aviation fuel 
necessary for powering the Royal Air Force.
16
 As such, Venezuelan production began to 
make a progressive recovery and reached record average daily output of 621,300 barrels 
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in 1941.
17
 Indeed, that same year, oil comprised 94.3 per cent of the total value of 
Venezuelan exports.
18
 Nevertheless, the volatile and unpredictable nature of wartime 
trade created an incentive for the Venezuelan government to reassess taxation of an 
industry of such importance to the national economy. 
Moreover, the Venezuelan government had a political, as well as economic, 
incentive to revise taxation of the oil industry. In 1941, President Isaías Medina Angarita 
came to power amidst public clamour for social and economic reform. While the 
Venezuelan political system was largely undemocratic, the opposition Acción 
Democrática party (AD) was granted legal recognition the same year and began to enter 
candidates for election. AD was a well-organised social democratic group that pressed the 
Medina government to introduce various reforms, including legislation that would 
increase taxation of the foreign oil companies.
19
 At the beginning of July 1941, President 
Medina’s personal representative, Attorney General Gustavo Manrique Pacanins, invited 
the three major oil companies to enter into discussions that would lead to the formation of 
a new law governing the oil industry. Manrique stated his intention to negotiate with the 
oil companies to formulate mutually acceptable legislation which would set a uniform 
rate of taxation covering all of their operations.
20
 In a memorandum sent to the 
companies, he expressed his desire to create a ‘good law which would fully satisfy the 
requirements of the oil industry of Venezuela and secure foundations favourable to its 
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future development.’21 British and US interests in Venezuelan oil led both governments to 
take a keen interest in developments. 
 
British Reaction to Events in Venezuela 
On 24 June 1941, the British Ambassador in Caracas, Donald Gainer, reported to the FO  
that the Venezuelan government was in the process of fashioning a new petroleum law 
designed to increase taxation of the oil companies. Gainer was concerned that the ‘rising 
tide of nationalism’ in Venezuela would lead any change in tax laws to be politically, 
rather than purely economically, motivated. He argued that such political motives would 
take ‘little account of justice or expediency’ and lead the government to arbitrarily 
disregard the oil company’s legal rights.22 If the Venezuelan government attempted to 
impose heavy financial burdens on the privately-owned oil companies, this could lead to a 
prolonged dispute which could potentially hinder oil production in the country. 
Maintaining access to Venezuelan oil was vital to Britain and any disruption within the 
industry could potentially cause serious harm to the British war effort. For the British 
government, a challenge to Shell’s position in Venezuela was not a localised issue but a 
challenge to the state-private network on which British oil policy was based. Thus, Gainer 
concluded that that ‘sooner or later grave difficulties will arise’.23 
 Within the British government, the matter was principally handled by the Foreign 
Office and the Petroleum Department (PD). The two departments immediately began 
communication with high-level Shell officials, namely Barthold Th. W. van Hasselt and 
Sir Frederick Godber, Shell’s most senior managers in Caracas and London respectively. 
Van Hasselt had had been chosen by Shell to represent the company in discussions with 
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Manrique and F. C. Starling, the director of the PD, judged him to be a ‘good, 
straightforward fellow’ with a clear understanding of the situation.24 Rather than two 
distinct entities that can be clearly defined, Whitehall and Shell bureaucracies were at 
times intertwined to a remarkable degree. As each party informed the other of 
developments in Venezuela, they collaborated fully and enjoyed a cordial relationship. 
Shell officials were given government documents to study, including transcripts of 
discussions between British and foreign delegates. Similarly, Shell sent Whitehall 
officials copies of their company’s internal correspondence.25 The views of the FO, PD 
and Shell officials largely corresponded.
 26
 They felt that, legally, the oil companies’ 
position was very strong but also agreed that any prolonged delay in reaching a settlement 
could provoke friction which could potentially have serious consequences.
27
 Thus, British 
and Shell officials shared a common interest in seeking to prevent the Venezuelan 
government from taking radical action. 
 However, PD and FO officials emphasised different aspects of the case. Starling, 
stressed that due to British ‘dependence, particularly in war but also in peace, upon freely 
available supplies of oil from overseas it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of 
counteracting at every stage a tendency to weaken the legitimate links between this 
country [Britain] and its nearest source of supply [Venezuela].’ 28  If the Venezuelan 
government drastically altered the terms of Shell’s concessions, this could create a 
precedent that other oil-producing countries might follow. This would not only endanger 
Britain’s wartime oil supplies but would undermine a British oil policy that relied on 
foreign governments recognising the legal claims of multinational corporations. PD 
officials did not view events in Venezuela as a local issue but placed them within a 
                                                 
24
 NA, POWE 33/224, Starling to Perowne, 7 October 1942. 
25
 NA, POWE 33/224, Sir Frederick Godber, Shell, to Starling, 21 August 1942. 
26
 NA, POWE 33/224, Maurice R. Bridgeman, PD, to Perowne, 22 December 1941. 
27
 NA, POWE 33/224, Bridgeman to Godber, 17 December 1941. 
28
 NA, POWE 33/224, Starling to Foreign Under-Secretary Richard Law, November 1941. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
98 
 
lineage of nationalist action that included the 1928-1932 dispute between Iran and Anglo-
Persian, and the Mexican expropriation of 1938.
29
 Thus, for Starling and the PD, it was 
vital that the British government should intervene in order to support the oil company’s 
legal rights.
30
 FO officials, while sympathising with this view, placed greater importance 
on maintaining cordial relations with the Venezuelan government. They were concerned 
that a prolonged dispute between the oil companies and the Venezuelan government 
would hinder oil production in the country, and therefore seriously endanger the British 
war effort. Victor Perowne, head of the FO’s South America Department, stated that ‘it is 
to be hoped that the companies will behave sensibly. The prime consideration must, 
anyhow, be the maintenance of the existing flow of the Venezuelan oil into the Allied 
pool’.31  
 Britain’s military strategy was highly reliant on an international trade network that 
connected the British Isles to the Empire and beyond as the government was unable to 
support its war effort through domestic materials and goods. It was through this network 
that Britain ensured access to vital war materials, such as oil.
32
 With this in mind, Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden stated that the ‘oil companies will be wise if they accept the 
additional burdens with good grace.’33 Eden also agreed with Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State Orme Sargent who felt that it would be fatal for the oil companies to ‘haggle 
overmuch in the hope of getting slightly better terms’.34  
 Due to Shell’s close association with the British government, a long-lasting 
disagreement between the oil company and Venezuelan authorities could well have an 
adverse impact on Anglo-Venezuelan relations. In the case of Mexican expropriation, 
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British policy-makers had supported Shell’s legal rights by boycotting Mexican oil and 
severing diplomatic ties with the country but such action conflicted with their broader aim 
of increasing, rather than reducing, British links with Latin America.
35
  Thus, Perowne 
wrote to the PD, stating that the FO was ‘impressed with the unfortunate repercussions 
which any embitterment of the dispute between the companies and the Government 
would have on our relations with Venezuela and perhaps also with the United States’.36 It 
was known that the US government desired economic and political stability throughout 
Latin America and would look unfavourably on any disturbance caused by British 
companies in the region. Godber succeeded in placating FO fears by stating that that it 
‘would be highly impolitic for the Oil Companies to deal arbitrarily with the 
Government’ and that the issue required ‘delicate and sympathetic handling’.37 
 In order to protect their shared interests, Whitehall and Shell officials felt that the 
oil companies should present the Venezuelan government with a united front in any 
negotiations. Gulf and SOCNJ managers also agreed with this policy. This united front, 
supported by both the British and US governments, would allow the oil companies to 
resist any unreasonable Venezuelan demands and safeguard British oil supplies.
38
 
Whitehall officials felt that the attitude of US policy-makers with regards to Mexico had 
been unhelpful, with their complacency leading to a lack of unity that undermined the oil 
companies’ position. They had always feared that the US attitude towards Mexico would 
encourage the Venezuelan government to take unreasonable action against the oil 
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companies and, keen to avoid this, now aimed to gain the support of their US 
counterparts.
39
 
 
US Reaction to Events in Venezuela 
The State Department learnt of the Venezuelan government’s plans at the beginning of 
July 1941 when Major Tom R. Armstrong of SOCNJ informed Livingston Satterthwaite 
of the State Department’s Division of the American Republics. Satterthwaite was 
immediately concerned and told his colleagues that the ‘question was of such importance’ 
that the Department needed to keep abreast of events.
40
 However, Ruth Sheldon Knowles, 
the Petroleum Specialist within the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator for National 
Defence, perceived ‘mutual distrust and considerable antagonism between the 
government and the companies and both parties expect it will be exceedingly difficult to 
reach an agreement’. She compared the situation to a ‘momentous poker game and there 
are nothing but blue chips on the table and each holds a strong hand’.41 Such concerns 
shaped the attitude of US officials towards the negotiations. 
Unlike Britain, the USA did not depend on Venezuelan oil for its wartime needs 
but US policy-makers were cognizant of the importance it held for the Allied forces more 
generally. Cordell Hull felt that Axis action could lead to a state of affairs whereby the 
‘entire war situation’ might hinge on the maximum production and distribution of the oil 
resources of Venezuela.
42
 Similarly, Sumner Welles was aware that anything impairing 
the efficient functioning of the oil companies would ‘threaten the availability of an asset 
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vital to the successful conduct of the war.’43 Furthermore, such disruption could well 
create economic problems for the Venezuelan government, which derived a huge part of 
its income from the oil industry. US officials perceived the economic well-being of Latin 
America to be an important aspect of the Good Neighbor policy and a requirement for 
ensuring that the region remained stable and able to secure itself from Axis attack or 
influence.
44
  
In the late 1930s, disagreements between the national governments and oil 
companies in Mexico and Bolivia had resulted in nationalisation and expropriation and, 
by 1941, the US government was in the process of attempting to arbitrate a settlement that 
would bring both cases to a close.
45
 Such prolonged disputes between US oil companies 
and Latin American governments threatened to undermine the hemispheric solidarity 
which US officials saw as vital for wartime national security.
46
 Within this context, State 
Department officials were worried that any legal dispute between the Venezuelan 
government and US oil companies could generate animosity towards the USA throughout 
the region.
47
 Such apprehensions led them to be sympathetic to the Venezuelan position 
and concerned by the attitude of oil company managers. 
 Moreover, State Department officials and Frank P. Corrigan, the US Ambassador 
to Venezuela, were sceptical of the specific representatives that SOCNJ and Gulf had 
appointed. Livingston Satterthwaite of the State Department’s Division of the American 
Republics stated that he would be greatly surprised if Henry Edward Linam and Tom 
Armstrong, the SOCNJ representatives, would be able to ‘generate an atmosphere in 
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which the really serious oil problems can be settled’.48 In November 1938, in response to 
the Mexican government’s expropriation of the oil industry, Linam had stated that the 
large oil companies would focus their future development programmes in countries where 
their investments were protected by conservative and friendly governments. At the time, 
Linam had singled out the López Contreras government for particular praise, comparing 
its policies favourably to those of the Mexican government.
49
  
Both Linam and Armstrong now felt that the terms of the oil companies’ old 
concessions should be maintained and were against a change in legislation. This view was 
shared by Dr Alejandro Pietri, who worked for SOCNJ in Venezuela, as well as SOCNJ 
Director Everit Jay Sadler. Their position was also supported by Professor Edwin M. 
Borchard of Yale University, a specialist in international law who worked as a SOCNJ 
consultant. These men felt that it was better to risk loss in Venezuela than to create a 
dangerous precedent that could lead to problems in other oil-producing countries.
50
 
Moreover, Corrigan feared that James M. Greer, the lawyer representing Gulf, would 
frustrate the Venezuelans with an overly legalist point of view.
51
 The US Ambassador 
informed Washington that Manrique had also been disappointed by the oil companies’ 
choices, having hoped to speak directly with the management of the parent companies.
52
 
State Department officials were concerned that the attitude of these oil company 
representatives could lead to a drawn-out disagreement that would undermine their own 
interests in Venezuela. 
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 Unlike the FO, the State Department had not immediately collaborated with the 
oil companies operating in Venezuela and, in general, there was a great deal of mistrust 
between the two groups. The antagonism between oil company managers, especially 
those of SOCNJ, and the US government was no doubt informed by the 1911 antitrust 
ruling that had forced Standard Oil to split into several separate companies.
53
 These 
misgivings were then given further credence by the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal 
philosophy, which espoused the virtues of government intervention in business dealings. 
Executives from the large oil firms had been opposed to the New Deal’s intervention into 
the oil business and had been repulsed by the statist principles espoused by Petroleum 
Coordinator for War Harold L. Ickes.
54
  
 Indeed, a number of oil company officials held anti-New Deal and anti-Roosevelt 
views.
55
 Linam, President of SOCNJ’s Venezuelan subsidiary, was described by Rodney 
A. Gallop of the FO as a ‘fanatically anti-New Deal’ businessman who ‘hates Roosevelt’s 
guts’.56 Similarly, Everette Lee DeGolyer, a prominent figure within the oil industry, felt 
that the New Deal would lead ‘either to revolution or dictatorship.’57 In 1935, Joseph 
Newton Pew Jr., President of the Sun Oil Company and a prominent member of the anti-
New Deal group the American Liberty League, argued that the oil industry ‘has not asked 
for and doesn’t want Government control’.58 Pew warned that New Deal policies aimed to 
establish ‘economic dictatorship’ and were ‘merely the beginning of a grand program for 
centering all authority, credit, financial resources and economic direction in the 
Government at Washington.’59 The Pew family consequently spent $1.5 million in a vain 
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attempt to thwart Roosevelt’s 1936 presidential campaign.60 ‘New Dealer’ became used 
by oil executives as a derogatory term to refer to those wishing to increase government 
involvement in their affairs.
61
 By the late 1930s, this antipathy towards the New Deal and 
President Roosevelt was common among US business executives.
62
 
US government efforts to export the New Deal to Latin America caused domestic 
tensions between state and business interests to be internationalised. Just as the New Deal 
had increased the federal government’s role in the domestic economy, Washington 
officials now appeared to seek an increased role in US businesses operating overseas. 
From the perspective of the oil companies, this could only lead to less autonomy and 
greater government intervention in their affairs. Furthermore, oil company officials feared 
that the Good Neighbor policy would cause any intervention to be favourable to the 
Venezuelan government, rather than to themselves. Summarising these fears, van Hasselt 
told the FO that he was wary of the US position, concerned by the possible effect of the 
Good Neighbor policy and felt that negotiations could be imbued with ‘quite a lot of 
“new deal” unpleasantness’.63  
 Such misgivings were exacerbated by the relationship between the US 
Ambassador and the oil executives in Venezuela. In general, the US oil officials were 
very distrustful of Ambassador Corrigan whom they considered to be a New Dealer, 
personally opposed to their interests.
64
 Van Hasselt was also unimpressed with Corrigan, 
feeling that the Ambassador was unhelpfully vague.
65
 For his own part, Corrigan was 
incensed with the oil companies’ constant, and sometimes very outspoken, disapproval of 
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President Roosevelt, which he felt verged on the treasonable.
66
 The US Ambassador did 
not take the oil companies fully into his confidence and was of the opinion that ‘local 
managers are so blinded by local problems that they cannot see the whole picture.’67 He 
described the local oil executives as ‘a reactionary group of men’ who were constantly 
‘harking back always in their minds to the old Gomez [sic] days as the golden days, 
hoping against hope that the calendar will be turned back.’ He believed that the whole 
case came down the fact that the oil companies, who had ‘invested in and taken out many 
millions of dollars from the Venezuelan subsoil have neglected to develop the important 
asset of good will’. The Ambassador felt that the local oil company officials had shown 
‘political ineptness’ for their failure to gain sympathetic contacts within the Venezuelan 
government.
68
 
Things came to a head when Corrigan failed to inform US company officials of a 
conversation he had held with President Medina, which increased Linam’s distrust of the 
Ambassador to the point where he stated that he was ‘through with the Embassy for 
keeps.’69 Oil executives did not mislead the State Department, nor did they withhold 
information when explicitly asked to provide it, but Corrigan lamented their reluctance to 
take US officials into their confidence.
70
 Thus, the State Department did not share 
Whitehall’s ability to utilise the oil company bureaucracies as agents of government 
foreign policy. There was now a growing perception among US officials that this should 
change, and that their government should take a greater interventionist role in the 
international oil industry.  
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 Events in Venezuela must be placed within this greater context of the evolution of 
US foreign oil policy as depleting domestic oil reserves placed increased significance on 
overseas oil fields. US officials repeatedly perceived British oil policy, which had 
successfully secured Britain’s access to foreign oil, as a model to which the US 
government could, and should, aspire. This policy would be based on a national approach 
to oil that would see US policy-makers increasingly intervene in the international oil 
industry.
71
 Petroleum Adviser Max Thornburg had stressed that such a strategy required 
increased cooperation and collaboration between the government and US oil companies 
operating overseas.
72
 Events in Venezuela presented an opportunity to test these ideas. 
 
State Department Intervention 
Between August and November 1941, Manrique discussed the proposed legislation with 
Henry Edward Linam, James M. Greer and Barthold Th. W. van Hasselt who represented 
SOCNJ, Gulf and Shell respectively. These talks culminated, at the end of October, with 
the oil companies presenting a draft law to Manrique that was hoped could serve as a 
working basis for the new legislation. At the end of November, he informed the oil 
companies that the draft seemed to be a good basis on which to start negotiations and that, 
after preparing his comments, he would again meet with the oil companies no later than 
the middle of January. The Attorney General failed to organise such a meeting but, at the 
beginning of 1942, further economic and political pressures would lead the Venezuelan 
authorities to take a more proactive approach to negotiations.
73
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Throughout 1941 and 1942, the wartime needs of hemispheric defence led to a 
greater degree of cooperation between the US and Venezuelan governments. Venezuelan 
war preparedness was particularly important for US national security due to the country’s 
oil industry and proximity to the Panama Canal.
74
 Consequently, at the beginning of 
1941, the Venezuelan government allowed US bombs and a small number of troops to be 
stationed on its mainland as additional protection against Axis attack on West Indian oil 
refineries.
75
 Furthermore, in March 1941, the two governments agreed that a four-year US 
naval mission would be dispatched to Venezuela in order to help organise the local navy 
and, in July 1941, they negotiated a Lend-Lease agreement that would enable the 
Venezuelan government to spend a total of $20 million on military materiel.
76
 On 28 
April 1941, President Medina outlined his support for the US defence programme for the 
Western Hemisphere and declared that ‘nations living close together must stick 
together.’77 
Following the US entry into the war at the end of 1941, the Venezuelan 
government quickly froze Axis funds and broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, 
Italy and Japan.
78
 Subsequently, in January 1942, delegates at the Meeting of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Rio de Janeiro passed a 
resolution recommending that all Latin American governments follow suit.
79
 The 
Venezuelan authorities also conferred with US officials to ensure that steps were taken to 
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defend the country’s oil fields from sabotage and subsequently announced that foreign 
residents would require travel permits to pass through oil-producing regions.
80
 This was 
followed up by a further Lend-Lease agreement in March 1942 that saw US weaponry 
and personnel dispatched to Venezuela to help secure the oil industry from coastal 
attack.
81
 At the same time, in coordination with the US and Dutch authorities, the 
Venezuelan government formed a civil and military commission to aid in the defence of 
Aruba and Curaçao.
82
  
Despite these precautions, the Venezuelan oil industry was further disrupted by 
the Second World War throughout 1942 as the German military increased its U-boat 
operations in the Caribbean.
83
 On 16 February 1942, Axis submarines sank two tankers 
off the coast of Aruba before attacking and slightly damaging SOCNJ’s oil refinery.84 In 
reprisal for these losses, the Venezuelan government confiscated seven Axis vessels, two 
of which had been scuttled by the Axis powers in an effort to obstruct oil exports.
85
 
Nevertheless, Axis attacks in the Caribbean continued and, on 19 April 1942, U-boats 
bombarded Shell’s refinery on Curaçao.86 By July 1942, German submarines had sunk 
some 141 ships in the Caribbean area and a further 173 ships by September.
87
 These 
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attacks, along with an Allied tanker shortage, made it impossible to export all of the oil 
Venezuela produced.
88
  
In response, the oil companies limited their production to an eight-year low of 
405,900 barrels per day in 1942.
89
 This drop in output had a knock-on effect for the 
Venezuelan government’s tax revenue which was reduced to Bs. 291.8 million for 1942, 
compared with Bs. 350.9 million for 1939.
90
 Yet, in April 1942, SOCNJ’s Venezuelan 
subsidiary announced its financial results for the previous year which showed a record net 
income of $12,297,275 for 1941 as compared with $6,834,170 for 1940.
91
 This 
announcement coincided with a time of economic hardship for the Venezuelan people as 
the scaling down of oil production led to high unemployment, a reduction in government 
salaries and the introduction of new taxes.
92
 Again, economic and political pressures on 
the Venezuelan government combined as AD and the Venezuelan press intensified their 
calls for an increase in taxation of the oil industry.
93
  
On 12 March 1942, Manrique called each of the three major companies to inform 
them that he was travelling to the USA but that this was chiefly for reasons of health 
rather than in connection with the new oil legislation.
94
 In fact, Manrique used his time in 
Washington to encourage the US government to intervene in tax negotiations. During his 
visit, Manrique met with officials from the State Department’s Division of the American 
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Republics and complained that ‘the companies, while being extremely affable and full of 
protestations of a desire to cooperate, continue to insist on taking a legalistic approach 
rather than a broad approach to the problem.’ He stated that the companies did not wish to 
give up any of the ‘so-called rights’ that they had acquired in the past and if their attitude 
did not change, court action would be the only alternative.
95
  
Manrique was keen to avoid a repeat of the Mexican expropriation but believed 
that in Venezuela there was an unhelpful tendency for both the government and oil 
companies to entrench themselves in a legal position and expect the other party to 
surrender. The Attorney General appeared sympathetic to the position of the oil 
companies, suggesting that the greater share of the blame for past conflict ‘must be placed 
on lack of intelligence, or honesty, or both, on the part of Venezuelan officials’. He felt 
that both the Venezuelan government and public were almost completely ignorant of 
matters pertaining to the oil trade and usually ignored industry advice. Nevertheless, 
Manrique argued that any concession pre-dating 1936 held the ‘original sin’ of having 
been granted under the Gómez regime. Thus, in order to reach a complete understanding 
between the oil companies and the government, he argued that a general revision of 
concessions was necessary.
96
 
 The Attorney General had been involved in contentious discussions with the 
foreign oil companies before. In the first quarter of 1941 the Venezuelan government 
threatened legal action against both Gulf and SOCNJ after it was discovered that the two 
companies had unpaid back taxes. While SOCNJ agreed to make a settlement of Bs. 
4,000,000, the Venezuelan Government struggled to reach an agreement with Gulf, who 
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owed an estimated Bs. 47,643,608.
97
 Manrique negotiated on behalf of the government 
and eventually Gulf agreed to pay $10,000,000, roughly two-thirds of the amount owed. 
The oil company considered this to be a considerable sacrifice while Philip W. Bonsal, of 
the State Department’s Division of the American Republics, felt that Gulf had been ‘very 
fortunate in extricating themselves from a very difficult situation in which their own 
unreasonableness had placed them’.98 
 Throughout this affair, US policy-makers had been concerned that a public 
disagreement between the Venezuelan government and the US oil company would create 
unfavourable publicity that they felt would, in all probability, have repercussions 
throughout Latin America. Thus, wishing to avoid the case going to court, the State 
Department found it necessary to intervene and encouraged Gulf to reach a settlement.
99
 
While its involvement was minor, this episode demonstrated the State Department’s 
willingness to promote sound relations between US companies and foreign governments 
through pro-active intervention. While the US government held no stake in the particulars 
of Gulf’s tax bill, the matter became imbued with wider State Department concerns to 
ensure wartime hemispheric cooperation. Manrique’s depiction of oil company 
intransigence in the more recent tax negotiations seemed to confirm US officials’ existing 
fears that the independent actions of oil company managers would undermine their own 
interests in Venezuela and, therefore, they felt compelled to intervene. 
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In March 1942, Bonsal met with Wallace Pratt, the vice president of SOCNJ, and 
made it clear that his government expected the oil companies to act promptly to resolve 
the Venezuelan tax issue. He informed Pratt that he was speaking at the instruction of 
Under Secretary Sumner Welles and emphasised the national interest in maintaining the 
flow of oil from Venezuela. He stated that this would best be achieved through continued 
operations by US companies but that this had now been placed under threat. Pratt 
expressed surprise that the situation was as serious as Bonsal had described and stated 
that he would think over what had been said.
100
 In fact, Pratt’s own outlook made him 
more receptive to State Department opinion than either Linam or Armstrong as the 
expropriation of the Mexican oil industry had convinced him that the oil corporations 
needed to alter their conduct in Latin America. Pratt felt that the relationship between the 
oil industry and Latin American governments should be based on the mutual interest of 
both parties, rather than merely legal obligation.
101
 Manrique’s trip to the USA had 
successfully led the State Department to take a proactive involvement in the negotiations 
and to begin placing pressure on US companies to adopt a position amenable to the 
Venezuelan government. In August 1942, President Medina once again dispatched 
Manrique to Washington, this time with a memorandum outlining Venezuelan grievances 
and a personal letter from Medina to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
102
 This constituted 
a clear attempt to gain the further involvement, and support, of the US government in the 
negotiations. FO officials viewed events with trepidation.
103
  
 
British and US Disagreement 
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Before Manrique left for Washington, Gainer emphasised to the Attorney General that 
any agreement between the oil companies and the Venezuelan government ‘must be 
freely and frankly negotiated by mutual consent and not forced on the companies by any 
form of coercion by the Government.’104 British officials believed that Manrique’s visit to 
Washington was a ‘fishing trip’ designed to measure US support of the Venezuelan 
position and Perowne felt that ‘the attitude of Mr. Welles may make the catch a good 
one!’105 FO officials were generally frustrated by the views of Sumner Welles who, at the 
beginning of October 1942, made clear his disdain for the British desire for a united 
front.
106
  
While for British officials, Mexican expropriation had demonstrated the 
importance of maintaining a united front, Welles had been given the opposite impression. 
The Under Secretary felt that hard-line stance from the oil companies in Mexico had led 
to the prolonged antagonism that had culminated in the industry’s expropriation. He 
argued that the tactics of the oil companies in Venezuela had been characterised by 
similar ‘delay and evasion’ and that the country’s oil legislation was ‘no longer applicable 
to an established industry operating one of the richest and best proven oil fields in the 
world.’ Thus, Welles felt it necessary to impress on the oil companies the need to 
abandon an ‘exaggeratedly legalistic position’ and proposed that they should enter into 
separate discussions with the Venezuelan government, which would encourage a swift 
end to negotiations.
107
  
 Throughout his time in the State Department, the Good Neighbor policy took 
primacy in the mind of Sumner Welles who was fluent in Spanish and had a long-held 
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professional interest in Latin American affairs, having served as a diplomat in Argentina 
during the First World War. In May 1920, he was named deputy chief of the Division of 
Latin American Affairs and, a few months later, was made its acting chief.
108
 In 1928, 
Welles wrote that US strategy in Latin America constituted ‘a blustering policy of 
intimidation’ and argued that if US policy-makers wished to maintain their preeminent 
role in world affairs it was necessary for them to re-evaluate their attitude towards Latin 
America. Summarising these views, he asserted that: 
In the identification of its interests both political and material, on 
a basis of absolute equality, with the interests of its sister 
republics of the continent, and in the rapid removal of the grounds 
for their distrust lies [the USA’s] real advantage.109 
 
In 1933, Welles wrote to Roosevelt, stating his belief that the ‘creation and maintenance 
of the most cordial and intimate friendship between the United States and the other 
republics of the American Continent must be regarded as a keystone of our foreign 
policy.’110 Therefore, he rejected the notion that military intervention should be used to 
protect the investments of US businesses in Latin America.
111
 
 In 1937, Welles was made Under Secretary of State and he quickly began to exert 
his influence over US foreign policy. Due to Cordell Hull’s failing health, the Secretary 
of State was unable to perform many of his duties and Welles stepped in to manage the 
day-to-day operations of the State Department. He had daily meetings with President 
Roosevelt, who was keen to evade Cordell Hull and personally shape his administration’s 
foreign policy.
112
 Charles E. Bohlen, a long-serving US diplomat, recalls that ‘Welles, 
with Roosevelt’s support, usurped many of the Secretary’s functions, and Hull did not 
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attend any of the summit meetings.’113 The Under Secretary also re-designed the State 
Department bureaucracy, combining the Latin American and Mexican Divisions into a 
single ‘American Republics’ Division that was led by his close colleague Laurence 
Duggan. Concurrently, Welles ensured that all matters relating to inter-American affairs 
were channelled through his own office.
114
  
The Under Secretary clearly felt that he was better suited to managing US-Latin 
American relations than his superior, Cordell Hull,  stating in 1951 that: 
The truth is that Mr. Hull was devoid not only of any knowledge 
of Latin-American history, but also of the language and culture of 
our American neighbors. He had no understanding of Latin-
American psychology. He had little grasp of the social and 
economic problems that the Latin-American republics presently 
confront.
115
 
 
Thus, while originally formed under Cordell Hull, the Good Neighbor policy was largely 
implemented under the direction of Welles. The policy was particularly important in a 
time of war, and in a country as rich in oil as Venezuela.  
British policy-makers, fearful of Latin American nationalism, viewed the situation 
differently. Gallop of the FO summed up the feelings of Whitehall when he stated that a 
united front was the only method by which the oil companies ‘would be in a position to 
resist Venezuelan demands and attempts to play them off against each other.’116 British 
officials were generally concerned that Welles’ commitment to the Good Neighbor policy 
could lead him to ‘appease’ Latin American governments to an unhelpful degree.117 At 
the end of 1941, Perowne commented that ‘Mr. Welles is a champion turner of the other 
cheek as far as Latin America is concerned’ and, in the case of Venezuela, he feared that 
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Welles’ idea of separate discussions could only lead to a greater risk of expropriation.118 
This view was shared by Harold Wilkinson who, demonstrating Whitehall’s intimate ties 
with the oil industry, acted as both President of Shell’s US marketing subsidiary and the 
British government’s Petroleum Representative in Washington.119  
 Moreover, Wilkinson felt that Max Thornburg was determined to ensure US 
control over the oil resources of the Western Hemisphere and suspected him, and the 
State Department generally, of conspiring to remove Shell from Venezuela. He believed 
that US officials would be pleased with Venezuelan expropriation of the oil industry if it 
allowed the USA to gain greater influence within the country. Starling was equally 
pessimistic while Perowne felt that, for the purposes of preserving British interests in 
Venezuela, the FO would be wise to contemplate the worst and attempt to persuade the 
US government that its interests would not be best served by eliminating Shell from 
Venezuela.
120
 Gallop felt that the FO was contending with the ‘deeply rooted prejudices 
of Mr. Sumner Welles, who has strong views on both Oil Companies and Latin America, 
and who seems fundamentally averse from facing any Latin American country with an 
Anglo-American united front in any circumstances and on any issue.’121 The level of 
influence that Sumner Welles had over US foreign policy in Latin America meant that he 
would likely dictate the level of Anglo-US cooperation in Venezuela and his dismissal of 
a united front boded ill for British hopes for a multilateral approach. Godber of Shell was 
unhappy with how things had developed and argued that ‘a continued policy of 
appeasement is unlikely to result in a permanent solution to difficulties’.122 
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 While British officials viewed US policy towards Venezuela within their pre-
existing suspicions of the Good Neighbor policy, Fiona Venn has revealed how rivalry 
over control of oil sites took on a central role in Anglo-US relations throughout the 
twentieth century.
123
 This competition could create suspicion and mistrust between 
British and US officials, evidenced in the case of Venezuela. Such views reveal that 
underlying the Anglo-US wartime alliance were deep-seated suspicions as officials from 
both countries sought to promote their own overseas interests. Thus, while the British and 
US governments enjoyed an unprecedented level of collaboration during the Second 
World War, a competitive element still existed in Anglo-US relations which could come 
to the fore over issues pertaining to oil and Latin America. In Venezuela, there was a 
stand-off as both Whitehall and Washington officials sought to follow disparate policies 
aimed at furthering their own interests.  While US policy was more accommodating to the 
Venezuelan position, the British desire for a united front was more sympathetic to the 
interests of the oil companies. This deadlock was broken, not by discussion between 
British and US policy-makers, but by a decision made by the SOCNJ Executive 
Committee. 
 
The Success of US Policy 
Manrique’s second trip to Washington in August 1942 would prove crucial and lead the 
US government to intervene more directly in negotiations. The memorandum he delivered 
to Roosevelt stressed the unhelpful attitude of the oil companies and Venezuelan hopes 
that legal action could be avoided.
124
 In keeping with the principles of the Good Neighbor 
policy, Roosevelt’s reply emphasised his desire for continued good relations between the 
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USA and Venezuela.
125
 Manrique repeated the Venezuelan view of events to Sumner 
Welles who reassured him that the State Department ‘would do whatever it appropriately 
could to facilitate a friendly adjustment’. 126  Manrique’s trip confirmed Washington 
suspicions that the oil companies were placing the USA’s future oil supplies, and the 
Good Neighbor policy, at risk. In response to this impending calamity, the State 
Department increased its involvement in negotiations. 
 During Manrique’s visit, Max Thornburg’s role increased dramatically as he used 
events in Venezuela as a test case of US government intervention in the international oil 
industry. He met unofficially with Manrique repeatedly during the Attorney General’s 
stay in Washington with the two men speaking for hours at a stretch about the 
Venezuelan oil situation.
127
 Thornburg also discussed the matter with personal friends 
who worked for the oil companies involved and spoke at length with Wallace Pratt, the 
vice president of SOCNJ.
128
 Ultimately, the Petroleum Adviser believed that if Henry 
Linam was involved in negotiations they would ‘get nowhere except deadlock’ and 
argued that both he and Thomas Armstrong were ‘incapable of dealing with this situation 
except on the basis of the experience they have had during the past twenty years.’129 This 
intransient position hindered the application of Thornburg’s collaborative vision of US 
foreign oil policy. On 23 September 1942, Welles, Thornburg and Bonsal met with 
Clarence H. Lieb, Wallace Pratt and Armstrong of SOCNJ. During this meeting the State 
Department officials successfully convinced Pratt that Linam should take no further part 
in negotiations.
130
 On 21 October, Manrique spoke to Bonsal, stating that the oil 
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companies appeared much more amenable, a fact he attributed to Thornburg’s 
involvement.
131
 
 Pratt’s meetings with State Department officials had convinced him that SOCNJ 
needed to follow a more accommodating policy in Venezuela but it was now necessary 
for him to convince the SOCNJ leadership to commit the company to State Department 
policy. Pratt could credibly argue that a new tax law had practical advantages for SOCNJ 
as its existing position in Venezuela might struggle to withstand legal scrutiny. The 
company’s concessions in Venezuela had been acquired under the country’s former 
dictator, Juan Vicente Gómez, and were stained by allegations of bribery. If the 
Venezuelan government did take the matter to court, SOCNJ executives did not feel that 
their company would be given a fair hearing. Moreover, these old concessions were valid 
for another twenty years, whereas if SOCNJ agreed to a new tax law, they would be 
granted new concessions covering a forty-year period. Pratt’s case was supported by 
Manrique, who also met with the SOCNJ management in New York in the autumn of 
1942.
132
   
 Furthermore, throughout 1942, SOCNJ executives had been publicly accused of 
treason due to their association with the German firm IG Farben.
133
 During the Second 
World War, Senator Harry S. Truman led the US Senate Special Committee to Investigate 
the National Defense Program which found that this business relationship had directly 
hindered US wartime rubber production. As Truman explained at the time: 
Standard Oil [of New Jersey] had agreed with the German I. G. 
Farben Company that in return for Farben giving Standard Oil a 
monopoly in the oil industry, Standard Oil would give the Farben 
Company complete control of patents in the chemical field, 
including rubber. Thus when certain American rubber 
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manufacturers made overtures to Standard Oil Company for 
licenses to produce synthetic rubber, they were either refused or 
offered licenses on very unfavorable terms … Needless to say, I. 
G. Farben’s position was dictated by the German government.134 
 
 On 25 March 1942, SOCNJ agreed to license its rubber patents, royalty-free, to 
US firms but this failed to prevent further investigation into the company and the 
detrimental effect of international cartels on the US war effort.
135
 Between April and 
August 1942, the Senate’s Committee on Patents also scrutinised SOCNJ’s dealings with 
IG Farben. During the Committee’s hearings, Senator Robert M. La Follette condemned 
SOCNJ in emotive terms when he asserted the ‘people are not in a frame of mind to be 
gentle with industrial treason at home while American boys die on battlefields scattered 
all over the globe.’ He went on to state that ‘the efforts of our own and other anti-Axis 
countries to prepare for war were impaired if not hamstrung by giant cartel agreements 
which crossed national boundaries and thwarted announced governmental policies.’136 
This called into question the rights of companies to protect their private property if, in so 
doing, they hindered the US war effort. Speaking of the rights of SOCNJ to protect its 
rubber patents, Committee Chairman Senator Homer T. Bone argued that: 
It would present an intolerable picture to Americans that private 
property rights should be protected by the lives of our boys and 
those property rights should not be enlisted in this fight. … I do 
not think that Americans generally are going to look with 
tolerance on any argument that patent rights are above the human 
rights of our boys; and the sooner we can recognize that, the 
sooner we can expand the whole war effort.
137
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Society-wide mobilisation for war had altered perceptions of the relationship between the 
state and the private sector as US companies were now expected to support the war effort, 
regardless of whether or not it was in their financial interests. 
This issue received wide-spread press coverage and the high-profile case may 
have discouraged SOCNJ officials from inciting the displeasure of the US government 
any further.
138
 Gallop of the FO suspected that this was the case when he argued that the 
State Department was ‘profiting’ from the oil company’s ‘weakened position in the 
United States to detach them from the United Front of the Companies’.139 Believing that 
they could expect no support from the US government and fearing prolonged disruption 
to their Venezuelan operations, SOCNJ’s Executive Committee did in fact decide to leave 
the British government’s united front. Both Armstrong and Linam resigned soon after and 
Pratt was appointed to take their place in negotiations.
140
 In a letter to President 
Roosevelt, Sumner Welles described this action as the removal of ‘persons who had 
ceased to be agreeable to the President of Venezuela and other leading Venezuelan 
officials.’141  
 Having convinced SOCNJ to abandon the united front, the State Department now 
approached Shell and, at the end of October, the company’s representative in the US, 
Frank J. Hopwood, met with Manrique and Thornburg. Thornburg said that US 
companies would now furnish the State Department individually with the terms which 
they would accept and if Venezuelan officials felt that these were constructive they would 
consider resuming negotiations. He told Hopwood that if Shell wanted to follow the same 
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course he would be happy to act as a mediator.
142
 Following his return to Venezuela, 
Manrique began a written correspondence with Thornburg and, on 30 October, Thornburg 
sent the Attorney General a detailed nine-point outline of the policy he felt the 
Venezuelan government should follow. The document advised that Venezuelan officials 
abandon the threat of legal action and resume negotiations with the foreign oil companies. 
Thornburg also suggested that the government tax oil production at a flat rate of one-
sixth, which he felt was optimum both for the Venezuelan government and the oil 
companies.
143
 Copies of this letter were also sent to all the oil companies operating in 
Venezuela.
144
 
 FO officials were rather dismayed by this sudden development. Gallop felt that it 
was clear that Manrique had ‘been given the green light by Mr. Sumner Welles’ and, in 
reference to the earlier fishing trip metaphor, stated that the Attorney General’s ‘catch 
must have exceeded his wildest dreams’. 145  He went on to say that it was ‘most 
exasperating that we should have been put on the spot in this way by Mr. Sumner Welles’ 
while Perowne felt that Welles had ‘successfully manoeuvred to gain control of the 
situation’ and would have successfully endeared himself to the Venezuelan 
government.
146
 PD officials also very much disliked the way the matter had been handled 
by the State Department.
147
 On the matter of how best to proceed, Shell officials were 
now placed in an uncomfortable position. If they agreed to Thornburg’s offer, any 
measure of a hard-line stance would have to be abandoned and the State Department’s 
policy followed. Yet if they refused, their company would be forced to act alone and risk 
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possible legal action.
148
 Ultimately, Gallop felt that if Shell ‘attempts to take an 
independent line … their prospects will be poor’.149  
After discussing the situation with Whitehall it was decided that at least some 
semblance of a united front should be attempted in order to avoid Shell’s isolation and, 
consequently, the company’s board acquiesced to Thornburg’s proposal.150 Thornburg 
was at first concerned about the intransigent position of Gulf officials and, in response, 
the Venezuelan government threatened to produce claims against the company for past 
avoidance of taxation. Thus, once Shell and SOCNJ had agreed to the State Department’s 
proposal, Gulf officials had little choice but to follow suit.
151
 The oil companies had now 
abandoned any notion of a hard-line stance based on a united front and had acquiesced to 
State Department demands. 
This development was met with alarm among Shell’s senior management. Godber 
was unhappy with how things had developed and argued that matters were ‘getting 
seriously out of hand’ and that the ‘present trend of negotiations is very serious’.152 Van 
Hasselt argued that in view of the ‘web of political intrigue which as a matter of course is 
woven around the whole situation in Caracas we cannot be cautious enough’. The Shell 
manager considered Thornburg to be a ‘New Dealer and Good Neighbour [sic] Policy 
advocate apt to consider no price too high to obtain a long term peace’.153  He predicted 
that their ‘Latin mentality’ would drive Venezuelan officials to seek the highest possible 
concessions from the oil companies.
154
 In so-doing, he pre-emptively discredited 
Venezuelan demands by casting them as the result of unreasonable racial temperament, 
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rather than considered government policy. It followed, therefore, that Shell’s resistance to 
the Venezuelan attitude was valid, logical and natural. The Shell manager also believed 
that Thornburg was ‘out to secure through a deal made here improvement in relationships 
in other Latin-American countries.’155 From van Hasselt’s perspective, the combination of 
Venezuelan assertiveness and US mollification could lead to onerous financial burdens 
being placed on Shell. US oil company officials were also bitterly opposed to 
Thornburg’s involvement and felt that they had ‘once again been sold down the river by 
the State Department and a bunch of new dealers in Washington’.156 Alenjandro Pietri of 
SOCNJ declared it a ‘disgrace’ that the Venezuelan government had approached the State 
Department.
157
  
The Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor policy was designed to encourage 
pan-American solidarity as a means of ensuring wartime hemispheric defence, export 
markets for US goods and political cooperation throughout the Americas.
158
 One aspect 
of this strategy was to ensure cordial relations between US business interests and Latin 
American governments. Consequently, US officials, including Thornburg, consistently 
took on a self-assigned mediator role between US businesses and Latin American 
officials. By taking on this responsibility, US officials hoped to prevent nationalisation of 
important Latin American industries, as had occurred in Mexico.
159
 If successful, 
government intervention could protect the private property rights of US businesses while 
simultaneously advancing broad foreign policy aims. Indeed, Thornburg told Hopwood 
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that he believed that a satisfactory settlement in Venezuela would pave the way for a 
better atmosphere in Latin America, and in particular, a solution in Mexico.
160
  
  At the beginning of November 1942, Thornburg wrote to Manrique, urging the 
Attorney General to strike while the ‘iron is hot’. While this was, in theory, an unofficial 
correspondence, copies were forwarded to State Department officials, including Cordell 
Hull.
161
 Subsequently, in November, the Venezuelan government invited the Petroleum 
Adviser to offer consultation on general world oil affairs.
162
 Thornburg added a 
handwritten ‘ostensibly, of course’ to this description of his role and the State Department 
urged him to accept the invitation so that he could help bring negotiations to a speedy 
conclusion.
163
 Once he arrived in Venezuela, Thornburg informed Gainer that the 
negotiations fell within the scope of his instructions and discussions subsequently re-
commenced on the basis of his 30 October letter to Manrique.
164
 Starling informed the FO 
that both Shell and PD officials felt that the terms demanded by the Venezuelan 
government were unreasonable and would be ‘more onerous’ on Shell than the US 
companies. Yet he also stated that ‘I have already indicated in earlier correspondence how 
much we dislike having to settle our problems through the medium of the State 
Department, but for the moment there is apparently no alternative.
165 
 The State Department had successfully constructed a situation best suited to 
Venezuelan pacification and any obstruction to the US preference for a prompt settlement 
had been removed. Despite the Anglo-US wartime alliance and British reliance on 
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Venezuelan oil, State Department officials did not seek to collaborate with Whitehall 
when formulating their policy. Instead the attitude of US officials was informed by the 
Good Neighbor policy and their emerging foreign oil strategy. While this oil policy did 
include consideration of the Allies’ wartime needs, British opinion was not sought after. 
Corrigan and Gainer did share their views at an embassy level but such discussions had 
no impact on the formation of State Department policy.
166
 A new petroleum law was 
enacted in Venezuela on 13 March 1943 that increased the taxation of the petroleum 
industry to royalties of one-sixth: the rate that Thornburg had suggested to Manrique.
167 
In response, Welles told the British Ambassador in Washingon, Viscount Halifax, that a 
‘fresh disaster’ had been avoided.168  
 While the new hydrocarbons law increased taxation of the Venezuelan oil 
industry, it also provided the oil companies with the right to convert their old concessions 
into new ones of forty years’ duration. Moreover, the law stipulated that after these forty-
year concessions expired, the holders would have the right of first-refusal in their 
renewal. It also empowered the oil companies to search government-owned land for new 
sources of crude oil. Oil company officials hoped that the new law would foster a stable 
relationship with the government and they felt able to plan their future Venezuelan 
operations with increased assurance.
169
 Thus, by the end of May 1943, 46 oil companies 
controlling 99.6 per cent of Venezuela’s oilfields had converted their holdings to the new 
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forty-year concessions while the president of SOCNJ’s local subsidiaries, Clarence H. 
Lieb, quickly announced plans for ‘intensified development’ of Venezuela’s oilfields.170  
 
Ramifications for British Oil Policy 
For Perowne, the whole affair had undermined the notion that British oil policy should be 
built upon a state-private network. He believed that Britain’s access to Venezuelan oil 
relied upon sound relations between the British and Venezuelan governments and that this 
did not necessitate that British companies operated in the country.
171
 Indeed, for Perowne, 
Shell’s holdings in Venezuela were likely to cause tension within Anglo-Venezuelan 
relations as British ownership of ‘public utilities’ in South America could too often create 
friction between the British government and the ‘lusty, young nationalistic republics of 
the sub-continent’ which resented foreign domination of their industries. 172  Yet he 
pointed out that ‘Starling, for reasons which he has never been able to explain, believes 
that there is some special virtue in British ownership of foreign oilfields insofar as 
concerns the supply of oil to this country’. For Perowne, this was incorrect thinking and 
he argued that it would not be in Britain’s best interest to see Shell expand their 
operations in Venezuela.
173
 Thus, Perowne wrote to Starling, contending that ‘the greater 
the stake Shell has in Venezuela, the greater the hostages to fortune we shall have given 
in that country, and the greater possibility of trouble between the two governments and of 
that trouble being of more serious dimensions.’174  
Starling was ‘disturbed’ by Perowne’s suggestion that Shell should limit its 
holdings in Venezuela. As no other major British oil companies operated in the country, 
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asking Shell to limit its expansion in Venezuela would lead the industry to become 
completely dominated by US companies. Moreover, he argued that the general idea that 
Britain should deliberately limit its involvement in the international oil industry ‘would 
be a very serious step indeed from a national and defence point of view and one which we 
certainly could not support.’175 Starling had also discussed the issue with Godber, to 
which both Perowne and Gallop took exception.
176
 Perowne emphasised the high level of 
intimacy that existed between the PD and Shell when he commented that ‘the fact of 
course is that to Mr Starling it is the F.O. who are the outsiders, not Sir F. Godber.’177  
 Indeed, the British government had, since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
based their oil policy on a state-private network that emphasised the benefits of close ties 
between government and multinational oil companies. Perowne was, rather casually, 
suggesting a reversal of this entire policy. The relationship between the PD and the 
privately-owned multinational oil companies was especially close. Thus, when the PD 
and FO disagreed over the utility of Shell’s holdings in Venezuela, some in the FO 
questioned their colleague’s objectivity. This split within Whitehall suggests that, while a 
British policy built upon state-private collaboration had been in operation for a number of 
years, it could still cause tension within Whitehall. As the governments of oil-producing 
countries were increasingly demanding a greater share of industry profits, the British 
government’s corporate ties could be perceived as a burden rather than a blessing. 
 
Thornburg’s Role 
Max Thornburg would later write that conflict in Venezuela was brought about by ‘the 
superficial antagonism arising out of mutual distrust, personal antipathies, petty chiselling 
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and increasingly severe combat tactics’. Yet he contended there still existed an 
‘underlying body of mutual benefit and dependence, upon which a lasting and beneficial 
relationship could be made to rest.’178 It was this mutually beneficial relationship that 
Thornburg sought to bring to the fore and he wrote that it was due to State Department 
intervention that ‘both the welfare of Venezuela and our continued interest in her oil 
exports seem now to be assured’. He argued that the fact that the State Department had 
not officially taken part in negotiations was ‘begging the question’.179 Thornburg’s role 
had been usefully ambiguous as it had allowed him to advise the State Department, 
Venezuelan government and oil companies simultaneously, all the while ensuring that US 
foreign policy objectives were met. Moreover, keeping State Department intervention 
‘unofficial’ helped to prevent any offense to Venezuela’s national dignity.180 
Thornburg felt that the episode had highlighted the benefits of government 
intervention in the oil industry more generally and pressed for a continuation of such 
action in other areas of the globe.
181
 Such ideas were quickly gaining support within the 
US government as the Second World War highlighted oil’s importance as a strategic 
resource. From a military perspective, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the tactical need 
for US post-war control of overseas oil fields in case of any future conflict.
182
 The level 
of State Department interest in this topic was made clear when, in February 1943, Herbert 
Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs, joked that it appeared to be ‘Committees 
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for Petroleum Week’ as US officials proposed the creation of an ever increasing number 
of high-powered petroleum committees and organisations.
183
 
Such views led to a foreign policy based upon a New Deal conception of state-
private sector interaction that sought to increase the governmental role in private 
enterprise, ensuring that companies such as SOCNJ and Gulf acquiesced to the fulfilment 
of the Roosevelt administration’s foreign policy objectives. Such beliefs lay behind the 
Roosevelt administration’s decision to create the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC) 
in June 1943. The PRC was formed with the intention that it would purchase a controlling 
interest in the Arabian-American Oil Company in an attempt to create a national oil 
company comparable to the British Anglo-Iranian. However, this proved to be an ill-fated 
venture as opposition from the oil industry, general public and Congress meant that the 
project was quickly abandoned.
184
 Nevertheless, the episode should be viewed as a 
continuation and extension of US policy in Venezuela. Britain was seen as a model for 
how US oil policy could operate overseas, with close ties between the state and the 
private sector perceived to be of vital importance.  
Attitudes within the federal administration were shifting with an increased desire 
for government involvement in the international oil industry. By 1942, there was a 
consensus in Washington that the US government had a central role to play in managing 
the international oil industry and, in Venezuela, its intervention had proven effective. This 
interventionism formed part of a broader hemispheric New Deal as the US government 
intervened in the industries of Latin America to ensure wartime economic stability and 
hemispheric solidarity. Michael J. Hogan has argued that, following the Second World 
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War, New Deal principles became applied to foreign policy as US policy-makers sought 
to rebuild the economies of Western Europe, via the Marshall Plan, through corporatist 
collaboration and public-private power sharing.
185
 Similarly, Scott Lucas has developed 
the term ‘state-private network’ to describe US foreign policy during the Cold War.186 For 
Lucas, this term denotes “the extensive, unprecedented collaboration between ‘official’ 
US agencies and ‘private’ groups and individuals in the development and implementation 
of political, economic, and cultural programs in support of US foreign policy”.187 The 
international oil industry became a testing ground for the state-private sector 
collaboration that characterised US post-war foreign policy as US policy-makers explored 
how multinational corporations could be utilised to meet foreign policy objectives.   
 Nevertheless, Thornburg’s ambiguous part in the affair did cause multiple 
controversies. During the negotiations, William F. Buckley Jr., attorney for Pantepec Oil 
Company, wrote to Thornburg stating that the new legislation was a ‘triumph for Shell, 
Standard and Gulf’. He alleged that these larger companies would be in a position to 
cease production in Venezuela once the one-sixth royalty became too burdensome and 
instead transport oil from their substantial reserves in the Middle East whereas the smaller 
companies, such as Pantepec, would be forced out of business. He stated that US 
government intervention was ‘certainly not clear to those not admitted to the inner circle 
in these negotiations’ and asserted ‘one must disregard, of course, the fiction that Mr 
Thornburg is not representing the State Department in this situation.’188 The allegation 
that Thornburg was ignoring the interests of the smaller companies in order to protect the 
multinational corporations would prove to be enduring. 
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 At the end of December 1942, certain US officials, among them Harold L. Ickes, 
were suspicious of Thornburg’s role in Venezuela and feared that he was manipulating 
US foreign policy to protect the interests of the large multinational oil companies. Ickes 
believed that Thornburg had placed himself in a ‘thoroughly contradictory position’ 
which could lead to a ‘very unpleasant scandal’.189 Thornburg wrote to Dean Acheson, 
the Assistant Secretary of State, challenging Ickes’ view of events, asserting that his aim 
had always been to create an atmosphere that would be conducive to successful 
negotiations.
 
To this end, he had successfully persuaded the large oil companies to 
disregard the advice of their lawyers who had argued that a legal case against the 
Venezuelan government would be successful. Moreover, he had convinced them to 
abandon their united front and accept a reduction in revenue of many millions of dollars a 
year. Thornburg pointed out that, during this process, it had been necessary to convince 
SOCNJ to remove Linam from his position, despite a lifetime of work for the company. 
In essence, he had persuaded the oil companies to accept ‘the public judgement that their 
ways in the past had not been the best’ while also the convincing the ‘highly inflamed’ 
Medina to abandon legal action. Thornburg also indicated that he suspected that the 
allegations made against him were a ‘personal attack’.190 
 Sumner Welles wrote to President Roosevelt, exonerating Thornburg of any 
wrongdoings. He stated that the Petroleum Adviser had realised an ‘important 
achievement’ having ‘handled the situation with tact and ability’ and argued that Ickes’ 
view of events could only be based on ‘insufficient and distorted information.’ 191 
Thornburg and Dean Acheson also met with Ickes in person in order to explain that 
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Thornburg’s actions were all at the behest of the State Department. 192  Thornburg’s 
suggestion that the criticisms were a politically motivated ‘personal attack’ was not 
groundless as Ickes felt that the role of Petroleum Adviser undermined his own position 
as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense. Indeed, Ickes was keen to ensure that all 
issues relating to the government’s petroleum policy came under his jurisdiction.193 He 
was particularly suspicious of Thornburg, stating in December 1941 that the Petroleum 
Adviser had ‘lost no time in trying to dig [himself] in so completely that [he] cannot be 
blasted out.’194 
 Such infighting was widespread within the Roosevelt administration due to the 
President’s deliberate habit of assigning the same task to multiple individuals or 
government agencies.
195
 Moreover, Harold Ickes argued that the State Department was 
plagued by factions and constituted the ‘weakest link’ in the Roosevelt administration.196 
The Secretary of the Interior held both Hull and Welles in low regard, believing that Hull 
had no control over his department and that Welles was ambitious and arrogant.
197
 He 
believed that the State Department had acted incompetently in its appeasement of Fascism 
prior to the war and wrote that ‘our State Department is not without responsibility, serious 
responsibility at that, for the dreadful situation in which the world today finds itself.’198 In 
April 1941, Ickes went as far as to write ‘Goddamn the Department of State’ in his diary 
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in reaction to the State Department’s appeasement of Japan. 199  Ickes’ attack on 
Thornburg’s role in Venezuela was, by extension, an attack on the State Department’s 
handling of the affair. Thus, it may well have been an attempt to discredit the State 
Department more generally and call into question its competency in handling the 
government’s oil policy. Welles’ forceful defence of Thornburg to the President was, 
therefore, also a defence of his own ability to manage US foreign affairs. 
In February 1944, Thornburg was served a subpoena to appear before the 
Supreme Court of New York and asked to give testimony in a case brought by a group of 
shareholders of the Creole Petroleum Company, which operated in Venezuela as a 
subsidiary of SOCNJ. The Creole shareholders felt that Thornburg, and by extension the 
State Department, had undermined their company’s interests by becoming unsuitably 
involved in the tax negotiations.
200
 Unfortunately for Thornburg, the idea that he was a 
tool of the major oil companies was persistent and ultimately led to his resignation from 
the State Department on 24 June 1943.
201
 Thornburg’s troubles were indicative of the 
often ambiguous, and at times uneasy, relationship between the US government and the 
oil industry. His resignation reveals that those groups with a financial stake in the oil 
industry were able to place considerable pressure on public officials who encroached 
upon their private interests.   
 
Conclusion 
Although intimate allies in their war against the Axis powers, the British and the US 
governments nevertheless held mutual distrust in matters relating to Latin America and 
the international oil industry. These tensions came to the fore in Venezuela as both 
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governments attempted to gain the support of privately-owned multinational oil 
companies for their divergent policies. Such support was of crucial importance in 
determining the success of these policies as the attitude of oil company executives was 
likely to dictate the outcome of negotiations with the Venezuelan government. Indeed, the 
British government’s over-arching oil policy was reliant on a state-private network that 
linked Whitehall with multinational oil companies such as Shell. As such, any challenge 
to the legal position of the oil companies in Venezuela not only threatened Britain’s 
access to vital wartime oil supplies but could also set a precedent that might undermine 
the entire system upon which British oil policy rested. Fearing that their wartime, and 
post-war, supplies of oil could be put at risk by Venezuelan nationalism, British officials 
sought to form a united front that would protect the oil companies’ operations and their 
own interests. However, the US government had formed its own, conflicting view of the 
situation. 
While the State Department pressured the oil companies to adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude in their negotiations with the Venezuelan government, this policy 
was not intended to oppose the interests of private enterprise but, rather, protect these 
interests by resolving the dispute before it escalated to the point of nationalisation. This 
approach formed part of the Roosevelt administration’s broader Good Neighbor policy 
which was designed to establish greater cooperation between the USA and Latin 
America. Such cooperation became especially important during the Second World War as 
the US government encouraged hemispheric solidarity as a means of defending against 
Axis aggression. Thus, regional politics played a pivotal role in shaping US attitudes 
towards the Venezuelan oil industry as the State Department sought to limit antagonism 
between US business interests and Latin American governments which might undermine 
pan-American unity.  
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US intervention in Venezuela was also informed by Washington’s experience of 
the New Deal which was now internationalised as the Roosevelt administration increased 
its role in private enterprise abroad as well as domestically. In particular, events in 
Venezuela can be viewed as a case study of the increasingly interventionist role played by 
the US government within the international oil industry, which came to resemble that of 
Britain. The actions of US policymakers serve as a precursor to the state-private sector 
collaboration that would come to full fruition following the Second World War while the 
New Deal interventionism that characterised the US government’s dealings in the oil 
industry would also influence its attempts to shape post-war international organisation. 
However, Whitehall officials were concerned that US ‘appeasement’ of the Venezuelan 
government would merely serve to encourage nationalisation of the oil industry while 
some perceived State Department policy as specifically designed to ensure US control of 
the Venezuelan oilfields at British expense.  
 Anglo-US disagreement was not settled by discussions between the two sets of 
officials but rather through the manipulation of private enterprise as the State 
Department’s ability to secure oil company support ultimately led to its success and 
British failure. Thornburg’s role as a mediator between the State Department, oil 
companies and Venezuelan government was crucial in achieving this outcome. Holding a 
monopoly of corporate backing was enough to ensure that US foreign policy aims could 
be achieved without the need for discussion or collaboration with Britain, creating a form 
of diplomacy by proxy. What this reveals is that a government’s ability to gain the 
support of private enterprise can become a vital instrument, and indicator, of power.
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Chapter Three 
Applying the Atlantic Charter to the Venezuelan Oil Industry, 1943-1944 
 
The bilateral Atlantic Charter demonstrated the hierarchy within international 
relations as Whitehall and Washington presented the rest of the world with the 
principles that would govern post-war politics and trade. Despite these grand designs, 
the conflicting interests of private enterprise, oil-importing countries and oil-
exporting countries undermined efforts to apply the Charter to the international oil 
industry. In particular, during 1944, the Venezuelan government demonstrated that it 
was possible to successfully challenge British and US interpretation and application 
of the document. Yet, concurrently, the Charter proved to be a valuable rhetorical 
device for private enterprise as Shell employed it to engineer diplomatic intervention 
in support of its private interests.  
In March 1944, the Venezuelan government published a resolution that was 
designed to compel oil companies to refine crude on the mainland rather than in the 
West Indies. Shell officials quickly denounced the policy and the resulting dispute 
brought to the fore the conflicting interests of oil-importing and oil-exporting 
countries. While the Venezuelan government sought to increase the revenue it gained 
from the oil industry, British and US officials were concerned by the ramifications of 
restricting the global movement of oil. In particular, the free trade principles written 
into the Atlantic Charter would become a central component of discussions 
surrounding the refinery issue. Subsequently, the British and US governments 
condemned Venezuelan policy in an effort to uphold their plans for post-war 
reconstruction and defend their global interests.  
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The Roosevelt administration had consistently promoted international free 
trade as a means of securing peace and economic stability in the post-war world. As 
part of this effort, US officials had fought to gain British support for these principles 
through the bilateral Atlantic Charter and Lend-Lease agreements. Thus, they felt 
compelled to intervene when Venezuelan efforts to place geographical restrictions on 
oil refining appeared to undermine their attempts to universalise free trade. For 
British officials, the Venezuelan government’s policy set a dangerous precedent that 
had the potential to seriously disrupt the international oil industry, and therefore, 
British oil supplies. By 1944, the British government had not yet fully committed 
itself to a policy of free trade but Whitehall officials were prepared to make 
reference to the Atlantic Charter when it was advantageous to do so. The ideals 
outlined in the Charter could be used to justifiably condemn the actions of foreign 
governments when British interests were threatened. Thus, Whitehall officials made 
use of the Charter in order to denounce a Venezuelan policy which had the potential 
to jeopardise their future oil supplies. This episode reveals the important role played 
by private enterprise within international relations as British and US officials 
collaborated with oil company executives to formulate, and carry out, policy.  
 
Interpreting the Atlantic Charter 
On 14 August 1941, the British and US governments released their Atlantic Charter 
which laid out ‘certain common principles’ that they professed to ‘base their hopes 
for a better future for the world.’ It declared a joint ambition to reshape international 
relations and bring about the ‘assurance that all the men in all lands may live out 
their lives in freedom from fear and want’. Although the Charter had been negotiated 
and written solely by British and US government officials, its broad policies were 
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apparently to be applied globally to the supposed benefit of ‘all of the nations of the 
world’.1 This illustrated the hierarchical nature of international affairs as the two 
‘great powers’ took it upon themselves to prescribe universal remedies that would 
cure the ills of a war-torn world. Yet the Charter’s principles were open to 
interpretation and, in practice, their universal implementation proved difficult. 
British and US officials struggled to reconcile the broad doctrines outlined in the 
Charter with their differing national interests and specific foreign policy aims.  
The Atlantic Charter’s guidelines for the reconstruction of post-war trade 
proved to be particularly contentious. The issue was covered by article IV of the 
Charter, which stated that the British and US governments would: 
endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to 
further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or 
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the 
raw materials of the world which are needed for their 
economic prosperity
2
 
 
Following the Charter’s publication, the implementation of international free trade 
remained a central wartime aim for US officials.
3
 By early 1944, policy-makers 
predicted that the post-war domestic economy would be unable to support the level 
of production necessary to achieve the Keynesian ideal of full employment and, thus, 
foreign markets would need to absorb surplus goods. Fearful of a return to economic 
depression, officials sought to ensure a global market for US manufacturing by 
promoting free trade and an open door policy.
4
 As such, the US government sought 
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to create international rules of behaviour which would make economic protectionism 
illegitimate.
5
  
These efforts formed part of a broad programme of post-war planning in 
Washington as international finance and governance were reorganised in the 1940s 
to largely US designs. Carlo Maria Santoro has rightly argued that, during the 
Second World War, US policy-makers had an ‘almost obsessive interest in the 
future’ as they developed plans for post-war international economics, trade and 
politics.
6
 Often US officials sought to form international bodies such as the United 
Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which would oversee 
international finance and diplomacy. At other times, the US government deemed it 
necessary to directly support overseas economies through Lend-Lease aid and, later, 
the Marshall Plan.
7
 As David Ellwood argues, the scope of these plans indicated that 
US policy-makers ‘thought comprehensively and consistently of their national future 
in terms of a new world order, rather than in the narrow, conventional language of 
geopolitical interests’.8 However, they found it difficult to reconcile the broad ideals 
outlined in the Atlantic Charter with the practicalities of the international oil industry. 
In January 1942, the Commercial Policy and Agreements Division of the 
State Department (CPAD) asked the Office of the Petroleum Adviser to produce an 
analysis of the relationship between the Atlantic Charter and the international oil 
industry. The CPAD felt that previous memoranda on the subject of foreign oil policy 
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had been too pessimistic in outlook and had omitted mention of the Atlantic Charter. 
Harry Hawkins, the Division’s chief, suggested that the ideals set out in the Charter 
had the potential to limit cut-throat competition and foster cooperation within the 
industry. He believed that it would be the role of the US government to ‘formulate 
and advocate policies now which are designed to bring about and maintain a better 
world order than the one which set the stage for the present war.’9 US officials’ 
general preoccupation with post-war planning stemmed from this desire to avoid 
repetition of the mistakes which they felt had led to the Second World War.
10
 CPAD 
officials’ faith in the US government’s ability to successfully construct international 
cooperation led them to reject the expert advice that told them that the post-war oil 
industry would be marked by intense competition. The principles outlined in the 
Atlantic Charter had become a totalising ideological conception of US war aims to 
which oil policy would necessarily need to conform. While the Charter was not 
legally binding it provided an, albeit vague, outline for US officials to use as a guide 
when formulating policy.
11
 
Petroleum Adviser Max Thornburg and his assistant, Walton C. Ferris, were 
informed that, in order be acceptable, their insights into the international oil industry 
would need to validate the US government’s free trade ideology. Both Thornburg 
and Ferris felt that the CPAD had failed to take into account tensions within the oil 
industry ‘which are not likely to disappear altogether at the end of this war’. 
Nevertheless, Thornburg informed Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Dean Acheson that ‘we shall do our best to formulate a program for the post-war 
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period which will be in conformity with the Atlantic Charter and at the same time 
command the necessary support from those upon whom implementation of such a 
program will depend.’ 12  By the middle of March 1942, Ferris had produced a 
memorandum which stated that the ‘United Nations, including the United States, 
stand committed to following certain general economic policies after the war which 
are broad enough to cover oil, but the specific meaning of which with respect to oil 
has not been publicly defined.’ Ferris believed that within the framework of the 
Charter ‘those in charge of the United States oil policy, both foreign and domestic, 
stand committed to work in their preparations for the post-war world.’13 Yet there 
were four main problems for US officials to solve if they were to apply the Atlantic 
Charter to the international oil industry. 
Thornburg and Ferris had been tasked with constructing a coherent foreign oil 
policy for the US government that conformed to the Atlantic Charter’s broad 
statements of principle. However, the first problem they encountered was the level of 
ambiguity written into the Charter, which had not been designed by Roosevelt or 
Churchill to be a specific set of legally-binding rules.
14
 In order for Thornburg and 
Ferris to complete their assignment, it was necessary for them to have a concrete 
understanding of how the document should be interpreted. With this in mind, 
Thornburg wrote to Sumner Welles, stating that: 
It seems to us that we must know whether the Atlantic 
Charter is to be accepted literally as a basic formula for 
adoption in whole when the war is ended; or whether it is to 
be regarded as desirable and ultimately achievable, but 
approachable in practice only though a  long evolutionary 
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process, i.e., “with due respect for their existing 
obligation”.15 
 
The issue of ‘existing obligations’ formed the basis of the second obstacle to 
applying the Atlantic Charter to the international oil industry. 
Between them, the governments of the USA, USSR and Britain controlled 
the global flow of oil and retained their individual national interests. Ferris pointed 
out that the Kremlin was unlikely to ‘defer to ideas from Washington or London as 
to the meaning of the Atlantic Charter in relation to any oil question in the region of 
its borders believed to affect its security.’ Similarly, he argued that the US 
government, ‘having worked out carefully through the years the basis of the Good 
Neighbor policy and its applications to American hemisphere economy’, would be 
unwilling to ‘accept proposals emanating from Moscow or London concerning Latin 
American oil resources, especially if those proposals were not acceptable to the Latin 
American countries concerned.’ Ferris went on to state that an ‘important part of the 
United States oil policy is its attitude towards oil producers in Latin America, which, 
under the Good Neighbor policy, does not countenance interference in the internal 
affairs of the American Republics.’ Equally, Ferris believed that the British 
government would bitterly resist any attempt by US policy-makers to apply an open 
door policy to the oil industries of Iran and Iraq.
16
  
Such exceptions were written into the Atlantic Charter as Ferris pointed out 
that ‘Article IV of the Atlantic Charter is far too general to bind anyone to anything 
in respect of oil’ and that ‘the reservation concerning existing obligations could be 
used to prevent almost any development which one of the United Nations 
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governments might deem undesirable for selfish reasons.’ 17  The Charter did not 
dispense with the individual national interests of Washington, Whitehall and the 
Kremlin nor did it outline a means of settling any dispute which arose between the 
three powers. Recognising this, Ferris wrote that it ‘seems inescapable that any 
effective measures to establish a world oil policy in accordance with the Atlantic 
Charter must be taken, in the first instance, by the United States, the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain, affecting oil resources within their borders or under their control.’ 
In the longer term, Ferris also suggested the creation of an international oil office, 
which would oversee the industry.
18
 This fit into a wartime pattern of US post-war 
planning leading to discussions with British and Soviet officials and, subsequently, 
to the creation of international organisations tasked with regulating post-war 
international relations.
19
 
 The third difficulty to overcome was the fundamental contradiction between 
free trade principles and the need to ensure that oil companies conformed to US 
foreign policy. A corporatist approach to oil policy abdicated substantial 
responsibility to private enterprise but oil company interests might not always 
harmonise with government aims. Indeed, the complete application of the 
government’s free trade principles would grant oil companies a great deal of 
autonomy to potentially undermine US foreign policy. Ferris stated that it would be 
‘an ill service to the cause of democracy for the major oil companies to make 
international contracts the net effect of which is to weaken the democratic group of 
countries, including the United States.’ His proposed solution was a system in which 
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the US government would only intervene in the oil industry when it was deemed to 
be of critical importance to the national good.
20
  
For Ferris, there was a direct correlation between the level of US government 
involvement in business matters and in international affairs. Both were needed if the 
US government was to ensure access to overseas sources of oil. Ferris suggested that, 
within the post-war international oil industry, ‘the participation of the United States 
would probably involve a development of the Government-industry collaboration 
now being established for war purposes.’ He went on to say that: 
After World War I, a somewhat similar industry-Government 
collaboration disappeared overnight, together with American 
interest and participation in world affairs in general. After the 
present war, however, one may be confident that the United 
States will realize that it cannot once more withdraw into 
isolationism, but will have to find practical ways of 
participating in world political and economic affairs.  
 
This reflected the US government’s desire to internationalise the New Deal as 
intervention in the domestic economy was translated into intervention at an 
international level.
21
 The Atlantic Charter was itself a means by which the US 
government could gain support for its vision of a post-war reorganisation of 
international politics and economics.
22
 Ferris predicted that the aim of government 
collaboration with the oil industry would evolve from ensuring the Allies’ oil 
supplies, to ensuring the application of US foreign oil policy.
23
 
 Thornburg also believed that the state-private sector collaboration was 
necessary if the oil industry was to conform to the Atlantic Charter. At a Military 
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Intelligence Service conference in April 1943, he argued that certain oil industry 
practices were in conflict with the tenets of the Charter, stating that:  
Highly selective discrimination has been shown in 
exploitation privileges and programs. Particular nations have 
been debarred from normal oil supplies. Particular exporting 
nations have been blocked from foreign markets. There are 
records of the nation’s share in the exploitation of its oil 
being less than should reasonably have been expected. 
National social welfare has sometimes been made subsidiary 
to foreign oil company interests.
24
 
 
For Thornburg, oil companies engaged in such behaviour in order to protect 
themselves from risk and remain in business over a long period of time. He believed 
that the need for such practices would be removed by the ‘establishment by 
government action and inter-government agreements of a framework of principles 
within which both private and government enterprise can operate jointly or 
competitively, but which limits or removes the necessity for practices which 
engender destructive forces’. If such collaborative regulation was put in place, 
Thornburg could ‘see the Atlantic Charter settling over and comfortably containing 
the oil industry without fundamental rearrangement of its parts.’25  
Yet even with the support of multinational oil companies, it would still be 
necessary for Washington to overcome a fourth difficulty: how to ensure that oil-
producing countries subscribed to the Atlantic Charter. Discussions surrounding the 
application of the Charter to the international oil industry serve to underline the 
hierarchical nature of international politics as US officials presumed to design post-
war structures and institutions that would not only govern the actions of their own 
government but the entire system of international relations. The leader of Acción 
Democrática, Rómulo Betancourt, brought this issue to the fore in an article he wrote 
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for the Venezuelan newspaper El País in January 1944. In response to the on-going 
discussions in the USA regarding the government’s relationship with oil companies, 
Betancourt wrote that ‘the most interesting aspect’ of the debate was the ‘lack of 
concern for the small countries which produce oil.’ He went on to argue that the 
interested parties in the USA: 
are thinking only from their own national viewpoint, a far cry 
from the beautiful promises contained in the Atlantic Charter. 
In reality, these debates are of tremendous importance to us. 
Our destiny and the future of Venezuela is at stake. It almost 
makes one despair to see how we continue to play children’s 
games with our heads in the sand, while the future of 
Venezuela, for generations to come, is being decided in the 
latitudes.
26
 
 
Yet because oil was of such importance to national security, Washington officials 
were not prepared to leave control of its distribution to the individual local 
governments of oil-producing countries.  
Article III of the Charter stated that the US and British governments aimed to 
‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they 
will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those 
who have been forcibly deprived of them’.27 This seemed to emphasise the authority 
of local governments to manage their own territory but the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter could be invoked in order to limit, rather than extend, the authority of 
governments to manage their domestic oil industries. Paul H. Alling, head of the 
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State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs, argued that an ‘international 
organization to control world petroleum matters’ was necessary as the governments 
of oil-producing countries might ignore ‘the enlightened policy envisaged by the 
Atlantic Charter.’28 As David Ellwood argues, when it came to post-war planning, 
the ‘New Dealers of wartime had the power and the will to make sure their ideas 
were the only game in town.’29  
This attitude reflected President Roosevelt’s fears that less-powerful 
governments might disrupt the post-war international order and provoke another 
worldwide conflict. These concerns led him to favour a hierarchical structure to 
international organisation with powerful governments taking on a paternalistic role 
in their relations with the less-powerful. He argued that post-war international 
organisation should be fashioned and led by ‘great powers’ which held a ‘moral 
prestige’ that was ‘an essential element in any successful system of international 
cooperation’.30  Indeed, Roosevelt went so far as to suggest a system he termed 
‘peace by dictation,’ through which all governments but the great powers be 
permanently disarmed.
31
 He rejected centralised control of foreign territory, 
especially if enforced militarily, but still felt that powerful governments could take 
on self-assigned responsibilities over a region. US officials saw their Good Neighbor 
policy as a successful exemplar of this latter approach which constituted a ‘spheres 
of influence’ conception of international organisation in all but name. 32  
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As late as mid-1943, members of the State Department were still unaware as 
to how the ideals set out in the Atlantic Charter would be applied to practical oil 
policy. The ambiguity and caveats deliberately written into the agreement made it 
difficult for US policy-makers to use the Charter as a guideline when faced with 
specific policy issues. Washington officials hoped that the Charter would have a 
positive effect on the running of the international oil industry but experts such as 
Thornburg and Ferris perceived problems with applying free trade to oil. Recognising 
the sovereignty of national governments, universalising free trade, and ensuring US 
access to overseas sources of oil were not always compatible. For Ferris and 
Thornburg, the solutions to these problems were inter-governmental agreement and 
state-private sector cooperation. This could take the form of an international body, as 
proposed by Ferris, while Thornburg’s suggestion of using Lend-Lease to develop 
the economies of oil-exporting countries would lead to direct intervention by the US 
government. Such solutions reflected the internationalisation of the New Deal that, 
ironically, also underwrote the Atlantic Charter. 
The mechanics of the international oil industry were not the only impediment 
to Washington’s efforts to implement the Atlantic Charter as US officials contended 
with Whitehall’s trade policies. Like their US counterparts, British officials had 
global perspectives and aspirations which led them to be apprehensive of universal 
free trade. With its formal empire, coupled with informal influence around the world, 
the British government aimed to maintain its position at the centre of international 
relations but US plans to reorganise international trade and finance placed this at 
risk.
33
 During negotiations surrounding the Atlantic Charter and Lend-Lease, the 
British government had ensured that the British Empire’s system of imperial 
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preference was protected from US attempts to universalise free trade.
34
 British 
reservations regarding the application of free trade continued on into 1944 and the 
Bank of England was particularly anxious to ensure that London remained an 
international financial centre. Bank officials aimed to strengthen international 
confidence in sterling but were concerned that US plans would lead to international 
dominance of the dollar.
35
 Trade was a particularly important issue for Whitehall 
officials who were rightly concerned by the British balance of trade deficit as, by the 
end of 1944, exports had dropped to one-third of their pre-war level.
36
 
Some members of the British government were cautiously in favour of trade 
liberalisation as a means of increasing British trade with areas outside of the formal 
empire but these ideas faced strong opposition from those who rejected any plan that 
would dispense with the established system of imperial preference.
37
 Churchill 
concluded at the beginning of March 1944 that there should be ‘[n]o abandonment of 
Imperial Preference unless or until we are in presence of a vast scheme of reducing 
trade barriers in which the United States is taking the lead.’38 In addition, on 21 April 
1944, he made it clear to Parliament that he was yet to commit Britain to an 
international system of free trade and, conversely, had ‘during my stewardship, 
safeguarded the structure of Imperial Preference’.39 British officials emphasised to 
their US counterparts that any change to imperial preference would need to be part of 
a broad system of international tariff reduction. However, while the Roosevelt 
                                                 
34
 Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, pp. 85-86. 
35
 NA, CAB 66/47, WP (44) 148, Lord Beaverbrook memorandum, 6 March 1944; Van Dormael, 
Bretton Woods, pp.130-132. 
36
 Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the 
Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford, 1956), pp. 178-179. 
37
 NA, CAB 66/47, WP (44) 121, ‘Discussions Under Article VII of The Mutual Aid Agreement, 
Report From The Committee On External Economic Policy’, 18 February 1944; NA, CAB 66/47, WP 
(44) 143, ‘Empire Economic Policy’ memorandum, 2 March 1944; NA, CAB 66/47, WP (44) 129, 
‘An Alternative Policy’ memorandum by Secretary of State for India Leo Amery, 23 February 1944; 
NA, CAB 66/47, WP (44) 138, ‘Imperial Preference’ Amery memorandum, 2 March 1944. 
38
 NA, CAB 66/47, WP (44) 145, note by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 3 March 1944. 
39
 House of Commons Debate, Vol. 399, c. 579, 21 April 1944. 
APPLYING THE ATLANTIC CHARTER TO THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
151 
 
administration favoured an international system of free trade, the implementation of 
this policy required the support of Congress which, in 1944, had yet to be attained.
40
   
Moreover, Whitehall still suspected that the US government sought to 
contravene the Atlantic Charter’s ‘open door’ doctrine by eliminating British trade 
with Latin America and, by spring 1943, these concerns had become so great that the 
War Cabinet chose to broach the issue with Washington.
 41
 On 9 July 1943, the 
British Embassy in Washington wrote to the State Department, asserting that the 
issue of trade ‘threatens to become an increasing embarrassment to Anglo-US 
relations.’ The document stated that the British government in particular ‘attach 
importance to the principle that no advantage in world markets shall accrue to either 
country at the expense of the other by reason of sacrifices made in the interest of the 
effective prosecution of the war.’42 The following day, Ambassador Halifax met with 
Cordell Hull and delivered a memorandum to the Secretary of State, which 
contended that:  
Concentration upon the war effort has had in the case of the 
United States of America the effect of disrupting 
international trade relations. In particular, exports of United 
Kingdom goods to Latin America have been most severely 
curtailed; in the case of some commodities they have 
practically ceased. But if, after the sacrifices of the war, 
British economic life is to be restored, British long-term 
commercial interests in Latin America will have to be 
maintained and developed. His Majesty’s Government feel it 
is of the highest importance that this development should 
take place with the understanding and sympathy of the 
United States Government. 
 
The document went on to state that: 
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There has at the same time been an increase in the activities 
of many United States agencies, both governmental and 
private, engaged in the promotion of United States exchanges 
with Latin America. This has given rise to an impression, 
however false, that there may be some desire on the 
American side to supplant British traders in their established 
and traditional markets, not only for the war period by 
permanently thereafter.
43
 
 
In their meeting on 10 July, Hull told Halifax that the US government would give the 
subject ‘the most careful attention’ but no further documents concerning this matter 
have been found in State Department files and it appears that Whitehall did not 
receive a reply to its concerns.
44
 Members of Parliament also sought guarantees 
regarding the future of British export trade with Latin America. On 27 July, Hugh 
Dalton, the President of the Board of Trade, was compelled to reassure the House of 
Commons that the British government ‘do not intend to disinterest ourselves in Latin 
America and that nobody has suggested that we should’. He went on to argue that, 
with regards to British trade with Latin America, there were ‘enormous possibilities 
of expansion’.45  
However, British officials valued their wartime alliance with the US 
government too much to risk escalating Anglo-US rivalry over Latin America into a 
prolonged diplomatic dispute. In particular, Winston Churchill placed great emphasis 
on the Anglo-US relationship and believed that it would be of central importance to 
British interests in the post-war world.
46
 Nevertheless, Whitehall concerns fit into an 
established dynamic as British officials remained wary of placing too much trust in 
their US counterparts regarding Latin American questions. In 1944, State 
Department Economic Adviser Herbert Feis contended that the ‘success or failure of 
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the United States and of Great Britain in harmonizing their trade policies and 
activities will affect decisively all other nations’.47 Yet, by spring 1944, the manner 
in which the Atlantic Charter would be applied to global trade and the international 
oil industry remained unclear due to practical considerations and competing national 
interests.  
  
Utilising the Atlantic Charter 
During 1944, the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the Atlantic Charter’s 
practical application came to the fore in Venezuela. The Charter had not eliminated 
the competing demands of oil-importing and oil-exporting countries nor had it 
abolished the authority of individual governments to legislate their national 
industries. The Venezuelan government retained the sovereign power to resist the 
free trade ideals that the Charter espoused and, consequently, undermine the interests 
of oil-importing Britain and the USA. At the same time, while the practical 
application of the Atlantic Charter had yet to be established in 1944, it remained a 
powerful rhetorical device. Shell was able to cite its broad principles to summon 
diplomatic assistance in defence of its private interests in the Venezuelan oil industry. 
In 1943, the vast majority of Venezuelan oil was processed at refineries 
owned by Shell and SOCNJ on Curaçao and Aruba respectively. While the 
Venezuelan government had long desired to increase the amount of refining done on 
Venezuelan soil this issue had not been resolved by the 1943 Hydrocarbons Law.
48
 
Originally, the draft law had included an article dealing with the transfer of refining 
to Venezuela but this had been completely unacceptable to both SOCNJ and Shell. 
Thus, after what Shell manager Barthold van Hasselt characterised as a ‘furious 
                                                 
47
 Herbert Feis, Sinews of Peace (New York, NY, 1944), p. 183. 
48
 NA, FO 371/34258/A1386, Gainer to FO, 6 February 1943. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
154 
 
battle’, the provision was removed.49 Nevertheless, within Venezuela, there was still 
popular desire for the oil companies to increase the amount of refining undertaken in 
the country and, during January and February 1943, the government made various 
proposals to the oil companies that would bring this about.
50
 Ultimately, SOCNJ and 
Shell were pressured into agreeing to increase their refining in Venezuela under 
threat of punitive legislation being enacted if they refused. Again Max Thornburg 
acted as an intermediary in negotiations between the oil companies and the 
Venezuelan government as State Department intervention in the oil industry 
continued.
51
 In mid-February, Shell and SOCNJ agreed to each erect a 40,000 barrel 
refinery in Venezuela no later than five years after the war’s end.52   
On 23 March 1944, the Venezuelan authorities notified the oil companies that 
they were prepared to receive applications for new exploration concessions.
53
 When 
the time came for the oil companies to make bids, the government once again 
broached the issue of refining. It published a resolution which stipulated that 
successful bidders would have to refine ten per cent of the oil produced from the new 
concessions within Venezuela and the remaining crude could not be refined within a 
territorial radius that included the West Indies. The resolution would prohibit 
SOCNJ and Shell from transporting oil from new concessions to refineries on Aruba 
and Curaçao, where the companies customarily processed Venezuelan crude. This 
refinery ‘banned zone’ also included Shell’s plant on the British colony of 
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Trinidad.
54
 SOCNJ had sufficient production and ample reserves under its existing 
concessions that it would be able to supply its refinery in Aruba indefinitely. 
However, this was not the case with Shell, whose oil fields had insufficient reserves 
to keep its Curaçao plant operating for more than a few years. The Shell 
management immediately objected to the new stipulations, arguing that the terms 
could be considered ‘in restraint of trade’ and ‘contrary to the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter’.55  
As a multinational oil company, the system of international trade could have 
a significant impact on Shell’s operations which required that oil be produced in one 
area, refined in a second country and then sold in a third. Such freedom was 
important as often the countries with rich oil fields were not the most significant oil 
consumers. Furthermore, it was of benefit to Shell to have oil production and 
refining in separate territories in order in order to dissuade governments from 
nationalising their domestic oil industries. It was, therefore, important to the 
company that as few restrictions as possible were placed on the global flow of oil.  
As Shell was involved in the production and refining of oil in numerous 
countries, the company’s management was concerned by the potential knock-on 
effect of any localised issue.
56
 The company’s operations would be significantly 
disrupted if the Venezuelan government’s refining ‘banned zone’ set a precedent for 
other oil-producing countries. Shell’s senior manager in Venezuela, Barthold van 
Hasselt, told the British Ambassador in Caracas, Donald St. Clair Gainer, that the 
Venezuelan government’s proposed clause would be an act of aggression, committed 
purely for political reasons, constituting a restraint of trade, the long-term 
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consequences of which no-one could foresee. He argued that the clause would not 
seriously affect his company but that it was chiefly objectionable from the point of 
view of international relations.
57
 It is possible that, by making references to the 
Atlantic Charter and international relations, Shell officials were deliberately framing 
their objections in such a way as to make them most pertinent to the broader 
concerns of British and US policy-makers.  
Frederick Godber of Shell met with SOCNJ executives in New York but 
discovered that they were not so averse to the Venezuelan clause. SOCNJ officials 
pointed out that the refinery question was still a highly political issue in Venezuela 
and, as the issue was a question of prestige for government officials, it was unlikely 
that they would withdraw the provision in its entirety. Rather than seeking to remove 
the proviso completely, SOCNJ desired a modification to the clause that would leave 
the company free to take crude from new concessions to Aruba providing that they 
refined an equivalent quantity of oil in Venezuela as replacement.
58
 Thus, SOCNJ 
executives felt that problem could be overcome and did not wish for diplomatic 
intervention.
59
 Shell official Frank J. Hopwood stated that the SOCNJ position was 
very different to that of Shell as the US company would likely need a considerable 
amount of oil sent to its US refineries on the Atlantic seaboard following the war. He 
argued that, as a consequence, Venezuelan efforts to limit the amount of crude sent 
to the West Indies ‘would not worry them [SOCNJ] unduly.’ 60  Unable to gain 
support for a hard-line stance from SOCNJ, Shell officials now sought the assistance 
of the British, Dutch and US governments.
 61
 Van Hasselt believed that the only 
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solution for Shell was to seek diplomatic intervention from a foreign government but 
argued that this would have to be ‘handled with the greatest diplomacy and tact and 
that if at any time [the] Venezuelan Government should find out that we had started 
this ball rolling it might be fatal for our future position in this country.’62 
In London, Maurice R. Bridgeman of the Petroleum Division (PD) told the 
FO that his division felt ‘very strongly’ that the new clause should be opposed. 
Bridgeman pointed out that the stipulation was an undesirable precedent 
economically, and wrote that in ‘wartime it is essential that our supply arrangements 
should be as flexible as possible.’ As such, it was ‘important that crude oil should be 
refined at whichever refinery is most suitable both from its geographical position and 
from the point of view of the quality of the products to be produced.’ 63 Britain had 
always been reliant on a range of overseas territories for its oil supplies but now 
Whitehall officials dwelt on the troubling possibility of precedents being formed 
within the international oil industry that would lead to undesirable legislation being 
enacted in oil-producing countries around the world.
64
 Britain was an imperial power 
with vast overseas interests and its government officials were accustomed to thinking 
in global terms. While the Venezuelan proposal would have no impact on the Second 
World War, it could create complications and difficulties for British oil supplies in 
any future conflict. As such, Bridgeman argued that a ‘restriction of this kind, 
particularly if it became a pattern which other countries might follow, would 
therefore be most undesirable.’65  
FO, PD and Shell officials were again working closely in order to construct 
and carry out policy. This mutually-beneficial collaborative effort involved sharing 
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information and opinion between British and Shell officials in Caracas and London. 
Such cooperation allowed Whitehall and Shell to align their policies and avoid 
undermining one another’s position in Venezuela. Yet British diplomatic 
intervention had the potential to damage, as well as aid, Shell’s case. Due to Shell’s 
close ties to the British government, any disagreement between the Venezuelan 
government and the FO would reflect badly on the oil company. This could 
potentially lead the Venezuelan government to enact some form of punitive 
measures against Shell in retribution. Therefore, it was important that Whitehall 
officials worked with their Dutch and US counterparts in order to ensure that one 
government did not take unilateral action that might adversely affect British 
interests.
66
  
The Netherlands government was arguably the most affected by the proposed 
Venezuelan policy as Aruba and Curaçao were both Dutch colonies. Since Shell was 
partly Dutch-owned and had close ties to the government, it was likely that Dutch 
officials would be receptive to Shell’s appeals for diplomatic assistance. After 
speaking with van Hasselt, the Dutch Minister in Caracas, Dr Arthur Methöfer, 
agreed that the proposed clause would be a restraint on the West Indies access to raw 
materials.
67
 Aruba and Curaçao had historically been a source of conflict between 
the Dutch and Venezuelans with the latter regarding the islands as terra irrendenta. 
The two governments had previously clashed over issues relating to tariffs and trade 
while there was also a history of Venezuelan political exiles taking refuge in the 
Dutch West Indies. In 1929, one such group of exiles had attacked a military post on 
Curaçao, seized the garrison’s weaponry, commandeered a ship and then travelled 
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back to Venezuela with the governor held hostage.
68
 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
Methöfer had, throughout his term in office, complained of a non-cooperative and 
often hostile attitude of Venezuelan officials towards the Dutch West Indies.
69
  
The US government’s hegemonic role in Latin America had the potential to 
greatly augment, or undermine, Shell’s hard-line response to the Venezuelan 
government. Consequently, it was also necessary for Shell officials to gain US 
support if they were to successfully prevent the Venezuelan government from 
persisting with the proposed regulation. Bridgeman contended that ‘the issue is not 
purely a commercial one, and we still feel that the principle involved is potentially so 
dangerous that the State Department should be urged to take more active steps to 
oppose it.’ 70  After discussing the issue with Whitehall, the Shell management 
decided to ask the US government to intervene diplomatically on the basis of broad 
trade principles.
71
 To support Shell’s approach, the FO asked its Washington 
embassy to contact the State Department ‘with a view to a prompt parallel 
diplomatic approach’ to the Venezuelan government. The telegram argued an Anglo-
Dutch approach alone ‘would inevitably be prejudicial to British commercial 
interests, since it is evident that United States oil companies are unlikely to take a 
firm stand without backing from [the] State Department.’ Furthermore, the matter 
was ‘urgent’ as bids for new concessions needed to be made before 29 April, and 
therefore, any diplomatic intervention would need to occur before this date.
72
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On 22 April, British Embassy staff in Washington raised the matter with 
Laurence Duggan, chief of the State Department’s Division of American Republics. 
Duggan was sympathetic to the British position and suggested that the US 
government might be prepared to make a joint diplomatic approach.
73
 Following 
their conversation with British officials, the State Department wrote to Corrigan, 
stating that the US government was ‘concerned lest an unfortunate precedent be 
established’ in Venezuela. State Department officials believed that, however legally 
permissible the Venezuelan demands were, the new regulation would conflict with 
the stable basis for future relations between the oil companies and the Venezuelan 
government. Moreover, the effect of the proviso appeared to be contrary to the US 
government’s established trade principles as ‘in the interests of expansion of 
international trade, practices which divert trade from its natural economic courses 
must be avoided, and that all forms of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce should be eliminated.’74  
Subsequently, the British, US and Dutch governments agreed that their 
embassy staff in Caracas should work together and approach the Venezuelan 
authorities in tandem.
75
 Shell had successfully instigated the formation of a united 
front made up of the three foreign governments with interests in the Venezuelan oil 
industry. Company and Whitehall officials worked particularly closely to formulate 
their plans and then cooperated to convince Washington to support their joint policy. 
This intimate relationship did not escape the notice of the US Ambassador in 
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Caracas, Frank P. Corrigan, who informed the State Department that his British 
counterpart was working ‘hand in glove’ with the Shell management.76 
By emphasising the broad trade issues at stake, rather than their own 
commercial interests, oil company officials linked their private concerns to those of 
Allied policy-makers. The Roosevelt administration was particularly focused on 
advancing the universal application of free trade which Shell officials argued was 
now put at risk by the unilateral action of the Venezuelan government. Consequently, 
the Atlantic Charter became a powerful means through which private enterprise 
could condemn local authorities and gain diplomatic support from powerful foreign 
governments. Shell’s ability to instigate a diplomatic episode involving four national 
governments demonstrates the significant agency and role of multinational 
corporations within international relations. 
 
Diplomatic Intervention 
Before US, British and Dutch officials were able to coordinate their efforts, further 
developments in Venezuela made Shell officials apprehensive of the possible 
ramifications of foreign intervention. After speaking with SOCNJ and Shell officials, 
the Venezuelan government modified the clause so that bidding for concessions was 
extended to 5 May. Moreover, the government agreed to SOCNJ’s suggestion that 
the oil companies be allowed to take crude from new concessions to the West Indies, 
providing that they refined an equivalent quantity of oil in Venezuela as 
replacement.
77
 The result of the modified resolution was to give the companies 
greater freedom in handling their production without ceding anything substantial.
78
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In his annual message to the Venezuelan Congress on 27 April, President Medina 
stated that the government was determined to obtain refining in Venezuelan territory 
and that every new concession would entail an obligation to refine some oil in 
Venezuela.
79
 Thus, the government unmistakably indicated its commitment to the 
new refining policy. 
Following Medina’s public proclamation, van Hasselt felt that it would be 
very difficult for the Venezuelan President to alter his stance on the refining issue. 
The Shell manager informed his superiors that, even if Medina withdrew the current 
proviso, the government might heavily increase future refining obligations at a later 
date.
 80
 Moreover, he was concerned that, even if diplomatic intervention was not 
traceable to the oil companies, Venezuelan officials ‘might nevertheless feel certain 
resentment against us old timers with refineries in West Indies’ and therefore, give 
preference to other companies in the bidding for concessions. He was aware that the 
Venezuelan authorities knew of the ‘close contact between the British Embassy and 
our industry’ and  he now viewed ‘intensive diplomatic steps with mixed feelings.’81  
British and US embassy staff also had doubts as to the advisability of 
diplomatic intervention. As the issue would only come into real effect in the post-
war era, Gainer felt that it would be difficult to urge strategic wartime considerations. 
He reasoned that the Venezuelan government would have ‘evidently thought out all 
implications and would probably reply that we should endeavour to prevent another 
war.’ 82  Corrigan informed the State Department that SOCNJ officials were 
concerned that diplomatic representations could affect their bid for new concession 
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since the Venezuelan government might conclude that the company had sought 
foreign intervention.
83
 Nevertheless, reflecting the importance Washington placed on 
free trade, the State Department replied that full weight should be given to liberal 
trade principles.
84
  
After consultation with Shell and SOCNJ executives, the British, Dutch and 
US ambassadors agreed to write to the Venezuelan government in tandem, stating 
their objections to its policy. At the specific request of the oil company officials, the 
matter would be dealt with on the broadest international lines and make no mention 
of the commercial issues at stake.
85
 It was important to the three foreign 
governments that their protestations did not lead Caracas to take retribution against 
the oil companies, who they relied on for their supplies of Venezuelan oil. The joint 
approach was, therefore, designed to support the companies’ interests in Venezuela 
without directly connecting them to diplomatic intervention.   
Corrigan delivered a message to the Venezuelan government, stating that: 
Aside from possible strategic considerations related to the 
successful pursuance of the war effort and continental 
defence, these stipulations appear to be inconsonant with the 
principles established by the United Nations as a basis for 
post-war reconstruction … The United States Government 
has, in the interest of the expansion of international trade, 
constantly worked to avoid the diversion of trade from 
normal economic channels and has urged the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in such trade, as well as the freedom 
of access by all nations to raw materials as a basis for post-
war reconstruction, as set forth and agreed upon by the 
United Nations in the Atlantic Charter.
86
  
 
Gainer’s telegram was very similar and argued that the new terms: 
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would seem to affect strategic necessities whereby the 
movement of oil and other war materials must be made as 
flexible as possible in order that such materials can be 
utilized to the best common advantage of the Allied effort. 
Furthermore, they would seem to establish a precedent to 
other nations owning raw materials and might provoke them 
to take measures which might seriously retard the post-war 
efforts for world collaboration, and cause trade to be diverted 
from its normal economic channels. All the efforts of His 
Majesty’s Government and of the United Nations are being 
directed towards avoiding discrimination, restraints upon 
trade and diversion of trade from normal channels, under the 
terms of the Atlantic Charter 
87
 
 
 US references to continental defence reflected Washington’s preoccupation with 
encouraging pan-American solidary as part of its wartime national defence 
strategy.
88
 In comparison, the British telegram made more explicit reference to the 
need to ensure the free movement of oil for military purposes. This was particularly 
important for the British government which relied on overseas sources of supply for 
its substantial oil needs and the international system of trade for many other vital war 
materials.
89
 As the economy of Dutch territory would be directly threatened by the 
clause, Methöfer, while using the same general arguments as Gainer and Corrigan, 
also included specific reference to the fiscal well-being of Curaçao and Aruba.
90
 
In addition, the US, British and Dutch telegrams all cited the Atlantic Charter 
and the Allies’ plans for post-war international organisation as a means of criticising 
Venezuelan policy. The Atlantic Charter empowered the British and US 
governments with the authority to act as self-appointed supervisors of global trade 
and this purview justified their intervention in the Venezuelan oil industry.  This 
dynamic highlighted, in Paul Kramer’s words, ‘asymmetries in the scale of political 
action’ as Caracas could not hope to reciprocate British and US interference in its 
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policy-making.
91
 From the US perspective, the Venezuelan government’s refinery 
policy appeared to be a clear-cut case of trade restriction that had the potential to 
create a worrying precedent. As Washington’s efforts to propagate free trade 
depended upon reciprocal agreements and international cooperation, a single 
government could potentially undermine its policy. Unlike their US counterparts, 
British officials gave little thought as to whether or not their oil policy was 
compatible with the Atlantic Charter. As Winston Churchill stated in February 1945, 
the British government believed that the ‘Atlantic Charter is a guide, and not a 
rule.’92 Yet even as a guide, Whitehall officials applied little of the Charter’s central 
tenets to their foreign policy during the 1940s as the principles of trade liberalism 
and self-government outlined in the document were incompatible with British 
imperial preference and colonial rule.  
In their criticisms of Venezuelan policy, Whitehall officials were willing to 
make reference to the Atlantic Charter because it was convenient to do so. Citing the 
Charter was a means of legitimising foreign intrusion into the politics of the 
Venezuelan oil industry and, by linking their objections to the wider aims of the 
Allies, British officials portrayed themselves as concerned internationalists rather 
than self-interested imperialists. Rather than a concrete plan for international 
economic regulation, the Atlantic Charter’s value to Whitehall lay in its ability to 
provide a rhetorical framework that the government could employ to further its own 
national interests. 
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The Venezuelan Response to Foreign Intervention 
The Venezuelan government was not a signatory to the Atlantic Charter nor the 
Declaration by United Nations which committed governments to support the 
‘common program of purposes and principles embodied in … the Atlantic Charter’.93 
However, it was a signatory of the declaration resulting from the 1942 pan-American 
conference in Rio, which stated support for both free trade principles and the 
Atlantic Charter specifically. Article XXV of the agreement stated that the ‘new 
order of peace must be supported by economic principles which will insure equitable 
and lasting international trade with equal opportunities for all nations’.94 Moreover, 
article XXXV was entitled ‘Support and Adherence to the Principles of the “Atlantic 
Charter”’. The actual wording of the article itself was rather noncommittal, simply 
stating that the signatories resolved to ‘take note of the contents of the “Atlantic 
Charter”’.95 However, during the course of the conference a stronger-worded article 
had been proposed, calling for the ‘wholehearted adherence to and the support’ of 
the principles contained in the Atlantic Charter. The inclusion of this article was 
supported by both US and Venezuelan officials but could not gain widespread 
approval, leading to the diminished article XXXV.
96
 
Therefore, the Venezuelan government had previously shown its support for 
the principles of trade liberalisation espoused by US policy-makers. If Venezuela’s 
new refinery legislation contradicted the Atlantic Charter, it did so by limiting the 
authority of the oil companies to refine oil anywhere in the world. This would 
benefit Venezuela’s economy to the detriment of Aruba and Curaçao and, therefore, 
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the legislation could be seen as protectionist. The Atlantic Charter’s imprecise 
wording could be interpreted as prohibiting any form of economic protectionism. In 
fact, its various articles were so far-reaching that British and US officials could 
invoke the agreement in a broad range of circumstances yet ambiguous enough to 
provide a great deal of interpretative flexibility. 
In response to the diplomatic representations, Dr Caracciolo Parra Pérez, the 
Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, defended the right of Venezuela to refine its 
own oil at least in part. However, the Minister also admitted that all nations should 
have access to raw materials and that it was generally desirable to avoid artificial 
restrictions on trade.
97
 British Ambassador Gainer reinforced his argument by stating 
that the Nazi government had persistently complained that Germany was being 
denied access to raw materials and had used this to justify the aggressive foreign 
policy that had culminated in war. His references to German aggression and the 
causes of the Second World War reflected a desire to frame British objections in a 
manner most congenial to Venezuelan officials. Focusing on international stability, 
rather than British oil policy, was a means by which Whitehall officials could 
deemphasize their vested interest in protecting Shell’s position in Venezuela. 
However, Gainer informed the FO that he would ‘be anxious to press the matter very 
much further for fear of harming the industry.’ 98  Evidently, he was aware that 
British intervention had the capacity to harm, rather than aid, Shell’s bargaining 
position in Venezuela. 
Indeed, on 9 May, the Venezuelan government suspended all applications for 
concession bids. Corrigan informed the State Department that this was due to 
Venezuelan officials’ annoyance with foreign intervention, which they believed had 
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been provoked by the oil companies. He reported that the Venezuelan government 
had expected such action from the British and Dutch governments but not from 
Washington.
99
 Venezuelan officials’ differing expectations of US and European 
policy reflected the aims, and established practice, of the Good Neighbor policy. The 
policy had made explicit the US government’s intention to refrain from military 
intervention in Latin America along with the broader rejection of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of Latin American countries.
100
  
While, there was no question of US military intervention in Venezuela, the 
question of interference was more ambiguous. Bryce Wood has described the US 
policy of non-interference thus:  
By giving up interference in domestic affairs, U.S. officials 
decided among themselves not to offer advice, exert 
economic pressures, or make shows of force to affect or 
influence local political issues.
101
 
 
However, Wood argues that, during 1943 and 1944, ‘the nonintereference aspect of 
the Good Neighbor policy underwent serious modifications’.102 While his analysis 
focuses on US government’s policy towards Argentina during these years, its 
intervention in Venezuela also appears to contradict the established non-interference 
policy.
103
 At the least, US criticisms of Venezuelan policy constituted unsolicited 
advice if not pressure. During negotiation of the new hydrocarbons law, the State 
Department had also intervened but on the behest of the Venezuelan government. 
The latest developments surrounding refining had led the US government to 
intervene on behalf of the multinational oil companies in opposition to, rather than in 
support of, Venezuelan policy. This, therefore, marked a change in the nature of US 
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intervention in Venezuela but, having worked towards the aim of trade liberalisation 
for so long, US officials felt compelled to act.  
Oil company officials were told that the Venezuelan government was 
exceedingly upset by the British, US and Dutch intervention, particularly since it had 
occurred almost immediately following Medina’s public address to Congress. In 
response, both SOCNJ and Shell officials denied instigating the diplomatic 
involvement.
104
 While this frustrated some Whitehall officials, it was not in British 
interests for the Venezuelan government to penalise Shell for its part in the affair.
105
 
Rodney A. Gallop of the FO was sympathetic to the oil companies’ position stating it 
was ‘clearly important for them to make the Venezuelan Govt. think that they had 
not inspired the representation’.106  
Subsequently, the Venezuelan Ministry for Foreign Affairs produced a 
memorandum for the US, British and Dutch, which contended that the government 
had the legitimate right to enact its policy and that it was unable to understand 
foreign objections. It pointed out that the oil companies already held concessions that 
covered an area of more than four million hectares and produced nearly 600,000 
barrels of oil daily. This production had no limitations placed on it and was more 
than sufficient to supply the maximum capacity of all the refineries in the banned 
area. The Ministry argued that the provision, therefore, would not obstruct 
international commerce or have any effect on the Allies’ war effort. 107  The 
memorandum also made reference to the declaration resulting from the 1942 Rio 
Conference. In particular, the Venezuelan government highlighted article XXV of 
the agreement, which stipulated that ‘[c]ollective security must be founded not only 
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on political institutions but also on just, effective, and liberal economic systems’ and 
claimed that:  
It is an imperative necessity for the countries of America to 
increase their productive capacity; to secure, from their 
international trade, returns which will permit them 
adequately to remunerate labor and improve the standard of 
living of workers; to protect and preserve the health of their 
peoples and develop their civilization and culture
108
 
 
Caracas argued that a system which prevented a country from manufacturing its raw 
materials could not be described as just, effective and liberal while it also reasoned 
that unnecessary intermediaries, in the form of Curaçao and Aruba, were detrimental 
to the efficiency and promptness of trade.
109
 
 In its memorandum, the Venezuelan government did not place itself in 
opposition to either the Charter or free trade but instead argued that their policy was 
compatible with both. However, it was also keen to reassert its sovereign right, as a 
national government, to dictate policy relating to Venezuela’s natural resources. The 
ambiguous wording of the Atlantic Charter made it difficult in practice to define 
exactly what constituted access ‘to the trade and to the raw materials of the 
world’.110 Therefore, it was possible for Caracas to claim support of liberal trade 
while simultaneously forming policies that appeared to contradict those principles. 
The British government was guilty of greater policy contradiction with its system of 
imperial preference and Atlantic Charter claim to ‘respect the right of all peoples to 
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choose the form of government under which they will live’ while simultaneously 
ruling over an extensive formal empire.
111
 
On 22 May, Corrigan met with President Medina who reassured the US 
Ambassador that the Venezuelan government aimed to support the Allies’ war effort 
and post-war planning. In light of these assurances, Corrigan told the State 
Department that he wished to reply to the Venezuelan memorandum in order ‘to 
terminate the exchange so as to encourage the Government to proceed with 
negotiations that are now at a standstill.’112 A drawn out discussion over the legal 
technicalities of Venezuelan policy would, in all likelihood, end in impasse, which 
would not help the oil companies, whose application for concessions would continue 
to be delayed as long as the diplomatic dispute lasted. Corrigan reported to 
Washington that officials from various oil companies had unanimously told him that 
the resolutions would have no particular effect within ‘the next fifteen or twenty 
years, a period during many things can happen and many changes will occur in the 
government of Venezuela’. Since the material interests of the US companies were 
not affected, he felt it best to conclude dialogue with the Venezuelan government so 
that the oil companies’ applications for concessions would be processed.113 
 State Department officials spoke with Whitehall representatives in 
Washington who pointed out that the best policy might be to merely acknowledge 
receipt of the Venezuelan reply and to wait until the companies had secured their 
concessions before entering into further discussion. Both British and US officials 
agreed that it was important to dissociate the oil companies from any further 
diplomatic intervention.
114
 If the Venezuelan government were to conclude that 
                                                 
111
 Ibid. 
112
 NARA, DS 831.6363/1664, Corrigan to Hull, 22 May 1944. 
113
 NARA, DS 831.6363/1673, Corrigan to Hull, 23 May 1944.  
114
 NA, FO 371/38796/AS2699, Halifax to Caracas Embassy, 19 May 1944.  
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
172 
 
diplomatic intervention had occurred at the behest of Shell or SOCNJ, the oil 
companies’ position in the country would almost certainly be prejudiced in some 
way. Such a development would not be in the interests of the British, US or Dutch 
governments. 
 
State Department officials were also concerned by the implications for the 
rest of Latin America and feared that other governments in the region might now 
contemplate placing similar restrictions on raw materials.
115
 Since instituting its 
Good Neighbor policy, the US government had sought to improve its relations with 
Latin America and promote pan-American cooperation. Part of this strategy entailed 
encouraging trade within the Americas in accordance with the US government’s 
wider aim of liberalising international trade.
116
 The independent actions of the 
Venezuelan government now jeopardised US plans for Latin America, and indeed 
the world, as a whole. 
 While the State Department considered its options, Gainer sent an initial 
reply to the Venezuelan memorandum. He stated that the British government did not 
wish to debate the legality of the Venezuelan policy but wanted to point out that it 
‘seemed to be opposed to certain principles which the United Nations had 
established for the post-war period’.117 Methöfer subsequently sent his own reply, 
which differed from the British response in that it reiterated the Dutch government’s 
concerns regarding the specific area affected, whereas Gainer’s reply had only 
referred to the international economic implications.
118
 This reflected the Dutch 
government’s anxiety regarding the effect of Venezuelan policy on the fortunes of 
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Aruba and Curaçao, whereas British officials focused on the broader issue of 
protecting their access to overseas sources of oil. 
US officials were finding it difficult to balance their various interests. 
Corrigan told British embassy staff that he would not have been willing to challenge 
a policy to which President Medina had publicly committed himself had he not been 
instructed by the State Department to do so.
119
 In order to secure their aim of 
universal trade liberalisation, State Department officials believed it necessary to 
object to Venezuelan policy but, at the same time, they did not want to instigate a 
drawn-out disagreement between US oil companies and the Venezuelan government. 
As the US government sought to ensure its access to overseas sources of oil, it was 
not in its interests for the Venezuelan authorities to delay, or even cancel, SOCNJ’s 
application for new concessions.  
In a linked point, T. J. Anderson, the commercial secretary at the British 
Embassy, could not ‘resist inference that independent producers in United States are 
being encouraged to seek overseas sources in order to reconcile them to official 
policy of conservation of oil reserves in United States.’120 Indeed, Washington’s 
efforts to ensure that US companies gained access to foreign oil fields was in fact 
partly motivated by the desire to conserve domestic reserves.
121
 Therefore, Anderson 
doubted that Washington would ‘harden in its attitude’ towards the Venezuelan 
policy and believed it ‘much more likely’ that the US government would ‘seek to 
extricate itself so that by sustaining even a veiled protest [the] British and Dutch are 
likely to be left in [the] lurch.’122 Once again, British officials questioned the State 
Department’s willingness to condemn Latin American governments and, 
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consequently, did not feel that a hard-line stance in Venezuela would gain US 
support. Concurrently, they feared that their unilateral criticism of the Venezuelan 
government would undermine British interests in the country, to the benefit of 
Washington. This response from the British government to Venezuelan policy must 
be understood within the wider context of Anglo-US rivalry in Latin America and 
the oil industry. This dynamic assisted the Venezuelan government as it made British 
officials less likely to condemn its policies or undertake any intervention unilaterally. 
Britain and the USA were reliant on multinational oil companies to produce, 
refine and transport their supplies of Venezuelan oil. While their relationship with 
private enterprise enabled the British and US governments to influence events in 
Venezuela, it also compelled them to safeguard oil company operations. This 
dynamic provided the Venezuelan government with a means to protect its own 
interests and limit foreign intervention in the oil industry. British and US officials 
placed particular importance on the companies’ bids for concessions as they sought 
to ensure that Shell and SOCNJ respectively were able to increase their Venezuelan 
production. Consequently, the Venezuelan government’s authority to delay or stop 
these concession applications became a means through which it could influence 
British and US policy.  
 
The Episode Comes to a Close 
Their compulsion to safeguard oil company operations would lead the British and 
US governments to prioritise the local issue of concession bids rather than the global 
issue of free trade. On 2 June 1944, Corrigan informed the State Department that the 
Venezuelan government would not grant any new concessions until it had received a 
satisfactory statement from Washington. He reported that the US oil companies had 
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reacted to this news with ‘grave concern’ as the uncertainty made them unable to 
plan their future operations.
123
 As such, the Ambassador recommended that the State 
Department, by ‘a brief expression of our satisfaction and thanks’, end dialogue with 
the Venezuelan government. Corrigan was fearful that, due to the legalistic 
arguments made by the Venezuelan government, discussions could be ‘almost 
endless’. He believed that the provisions had no immediate practical effects and any 
problems that arose could be ‘reserved for future discussions in general regional or 
world petroleum matters.’124 
 State Department officials agreed that they did not want to engage in a long 
discussion with the Venezuelan government that might jeopardise the concession 
negotiations but they also informed Corrigan that the liberalisation of trade ‘was 
extremely important at all times’. Indeed, they argued that the issue was ‘doubly 
important at present’ as the Venezuelan government’s actions might ‘establish 
precedents entirely contrary to the principles of post-war policy with respect to 
international trade set forth in the Atlantic Charter, to which the Venezuelan 
Government itself has expressed adherence.’ Yet the State Department was aware 
that the Venezuelan government ‘apparently has taken the position that the granting 
of further concessions is conditional upon the acceptance by this Government of the 
unsound principles embodied in the restrictive provision.’125 
 With this in mind, State Department officials asked Corrigan to inform the 
Venezuelan authorities in writing that the US government deemed ‘the liberal trade 
principles set forth in the Atlantic charter to be of fundamental importance’ and 
viewed the proviso as ‘a restriction of trade and a discrimination against a specified 
geographic area’. The State Department was less concerned with the specifics of the 
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case but felt that Venezuelan policy was ‘inconsonant with sound international 
commercial policy’ and could establish an ‘unfortunate precedent’. Washington 
officials also asked Corrigan to tell the local authorities in conversation that the US 
government did not seek to maintain the status-quo regarding refining of Venezuelan 
oil. However, they directed the Ambassador to point out that the Venezuelan 
government’s restrictive policy seemed unnecessary as the oil companies had already 
committed to increasing the amount of refining done on the mainland following the 
war’s end. State Department officials also told him to indicate that Venezuelan 
interests could be negatively affected if other governments enacted similarly 
restrictive legislation and asked him to express ‘the strong hope’ that Venezuelan 
officials would reconsider their policy.
126
  
At the same time, the State Department instructed Corrigan to inform the 
Venezuelan government that, due to the urgent war-need to rapidly increase 
petroleum production, Washington did not wish to place any obstacle in the way of 
the concessions negotiations. Moreover, Corrigan was authorised to use his own 
judgement and ‘take such action as you feel advisable so that the companies’ 
negotiations can go forward.’ 127  Thus, while Washington officials restated their 
conviction to free trade, they ultimately prioritised the resumption of the concession 
negotiations.  
Since coming to power in 1933, the Roosevelt administration had promoted 
free trade through bilateral treaties, pan-American conferences, the Atlantic Charter 
and Lend-Lease agreement. Concurrently, the government had increasingly 
intervened in the international oil industry to secure the USA’s supplies of foreign 
oil. In Venezuela, these critical concerns clashed as the need to protect the oil 
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company’s bids for concessions conflicted with the aim of ensuring the free 
movement of raw materials around the world. Max Thornburg and Walton C. Ferris 
had predicted that such clashes would occur during their earlier struggles to apply 
the vague principles of the Atlantic Charter to the practical operations of the 
international oil industry. The two men had proposed solutions to limit conflict 
within the oil trade but, nevertheless, the Venezuelan government retained the 
sovereign power to apply restrictive legislation over the movement of its country’s 
oil. Ultimately, the political and economic interests of the oil-exporting Venezuelan 
government differed from those of the oil-importing British and US governments. 
 British officials sought to bring about the resumption of the oil companies’ 
applications for concessions while maintaining their opposition to Venezuelan policy. 
On 13 June, Gallop, Gainer and Starling met with Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes and 
John Helier Le Rougetal of the FO’s General Department along with Frederick 
Godber, Frank J. Hopwood and Frederick J. Stephens who represented Shell. The 
Shell representatives made it clear to Whitehall officials that their operations were 
not unduly inconvenienced by the new decree. They were also anxious that their 
concession applications should not be delayed and feared that they might be granted 
to rival companies. Shell executives did not wish for the British officials to alter their 
attitude but did hope that they could press the Venezuelan government to 
disassociate the principle of refining from the allocation of new concessions. 
Starling, as head of the PD, attributed great importance to the strategic aspect 
of the question of principle. He argued that while the Venezuelan government 
wished to concentrate refining in the country, British oil policy had always been to 
scatter the industry, not to concentrate it. As Britain relied entirely on imports for its 
supplies of oil, it was in Whitehall interests for the oil industry to be dispersed 
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among various countries. The more concentrated the oil industry became, the more 
power was placed into the hands of host governments and so, for the British, it was 
preferable for oil production and refining to take place in separate countries. Starling 
felt that it would be very serious if other Latin American countries, such as 
Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, followed the Venezuelan example. While he did not 
think that Whitehall could press the Venezuelan government to withdraw the decree, 
he did want British officials, in concert with the US government, to take other action 
that would deter Venezuela from continuing the policy. 
Starling went so far as to state that one day the British government might 
have to treat Venezuela as it did Iran and send an army there in time of war. While 
the British government had placed troops in Curaçao and Aruba, this had been to 
protect oil refineries from Axis attack. It appeared that Starling was now projecting 
the future possibility of placing troops in Venezuela in order to force the local 
government to supply Britain with oil. This would constitute an aggressive act of 
gunboat diplomacy and it is highly unlikely that the US government would 
countenance any such action that would contradict the Monroe Doctrine and the 
general aims of the Good Neighbor policy. Starling’s position in the PD made him 
well aware of the British reliance on oil imports which may explain why he deemed 
use or threats of force to be a justifiable means of securing British access to 
Venezuelan oil during a time of war. 
Conversely, Gallop believed that British officials should show sympathy with 
the Venezuelan government’s desire to increase refining in the country and proposed 
that British officials could suggest that their ‘legitimate aspirations might be satisfied 
in some way which did not prejudice the position of other Powers.’ Le Rougetal 
agreed, although Starling felt that such an approach would be too appeasing. The 
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group decided that the question should first be explored with the State Department 
and a joint telegram produced that, as Gallop stated, ‘would need careful drafting 
since it must at one and the same time safeguard our position of principle and placate 
the Venezuelan President sufficiently to induce him to dissociate the question of 
principle from that of pending concessions.’128 
Therefore, there was a range of opinion among British policy-makers 
regarding how they should approach the issue. These varied from the hard-line 
position taken by Starling, to the more accommodating policy advocated by Gallop. 
All officials agreed, however, that any British action needed to have the support of 
the US government. Without such support, British interests in Venezuela and, by 
extension, those of Shell would be placed at risk. Whitehall and Shell interests 
largely corresponded as both parties sought to protect the company’s position in the 
country and ensure diplomatic intervention did not jeopardise its application for 
concessions. British policy-makers, therefore, felt it vital to separate the broader 
issue of the free movement of oil from Shell’s bid for concessions. However, it was 
in the Venezuelan government’s interests to use their authority over concession 
applications to pressure Washington and Whitehall to withdraw their intervention. 
Meanwhile, on 14 June, Corrigan complied with the State Department’s 
instructions, informing President Medina in person that, while sympathising with 
Venezuelan ambitions, the US government ‘considered the liberal trade principles 
set forth in the Atlantic Charter to be of fundamental importance’ and viewed the 
decree as being ‘inconsistent with sound international trade policy.’ Medina told 
Corrigan that the decree was not part of a long-term policy and only related to the 
currently negotiated concessions. He assured the US Ambassador that his 
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government would not adopt a policy in contradiction with the Atlantic Charter and 
stated that the granting of concessions could continue if the Venezuelan government 
received a telegram from Washington as they had from the British and Dutch 
governments.
 129
  
Later the same day, Corrigan wrote to Dr Roberto Picón Lares, the 
Venezuelan Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, along the lines suggested by the 
State Department.
130
 Corrigan stated that the State Department attached 
‘fundamental importance’ to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and appreciated 
the Venezuelan government’s assurances that the new resolutions did not imply a 
departure from support of the Allied war effort and post-war planning.
131
 
Subsequently, on 19 June, President Medina issued orders for the granting of 
pending concessions and Corrigan informed the State Department that the ‘oil 
company officials are now giving a sigh of relief.’ He also reported that the 
companies believed that the overall impact of the diplomatic intervention had been 
positive, as it had ‘made the Venezuelan Government realize that it must not forget 
the existence of certain basic principles.’132 In reality, the Venezuelan authorities had 
used their local authority effectively to gain British and US acceptance of their 
‘banned zone’ policy albeit with the alteration suggested by SOCNJ. 
In response, British officials were again worried that the independent actions 
of the State Department had undermined their interests in Venezuelan oil. Anderson 
argued that it was ‘unfortunate that the delivery of the United States reply leaves the 
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British and Dutch position in the air.’133 Starling’s desire for the British government 
to maintain a hard-line position would be untenable without State Department 
support as the Caracas authorities might then cancel Shell’s bids for concessions and 
grant them to US firms. Anderson informed the FO that the ‘rival United States 
companies are alive to the advantage afforded them by the deadlock between the 
Venezuelan Government and Shell’.134 
Whitehall and Shell officials were already concerned that the Anglo-Dutch 
company might now receive prejudicial treatment from the local government. Van 
Hasselt told Anderson that he felt that there was a real danger that the Venezuelan 
government could proceed with most concessions applications and leave those of 
Shell in abeyance pending the receipt of a conciliatory message from Whitehall.
135
 
Similarly, Richard H. S. Allen of the FO’s South American Department felt that it 
was still not quite clear whether the US companies would ‘not in practice get 
preferential treatment’ in view of the fact that Washington had been the only 
government to send a conciliatory statement to Caracas.
136
 In fact, while Gainer’s 
earlier reply to the Venezuelan memorandum was only intended to be an interim 
statement, Caracas officials had interpreted it as a mollifying response. It soon 
became clear that Shell’s bid for concessions would be processed along with those of 
the US companies. Consequently, British and US officials agreed that no further 
action would be necessary and the issue came to a close.
137
  
The Venezuelan government had effectively resisted foreign pressure to 
separate the issue of the ‘banned zone’ from the question of Shell’s pending 
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concession applications. It was only when Caracas was satisfied that Whitehall and 
Washington would not persist with their objections to the ‘banned zone’ that the oil 
companies’ applications were processed. In August 1944, concessions were allocated 
on the basis that at least ten per cent of oil from new production would be refined in 
Venezuela and that the remainder would be refined outside of the Caribbean area.
138
 
Caracas had, therefore, demonstrated that it was possible for oil-producing countries 
to use their local powers to resist British and US governance of world trade. As 
Herbet Feis would later write, the principles of the Atlantic Charter ‘proved 
vulnerable to circumstance.’139 
 
Conclusion 
This episode demonstrates the importance of state-private networks within 
international relations as Shell used its links with national governments to instigate 
diplomatic intervention in defence of its private interests. The Atlantic Charter was 
particularly valuable to Shell in this regard as it allowed the company to contend that 
Venezuelan policy simultaneously hindered its own operations and undermined the 
Allies’ plans for post-war reconstruction. The subsequent diplomatic incident fitted 
into a pattern of Anglo-US intervention in Venezuela as Whitehall sought to 
engineer a multilateral approach with Washington. British officials were not 
prepared to engage in a dispute with the Venezuelan government without State 
Department support for fear of prejudicing their own, and Shell’s, interests in the 
country. They consistently considered Anglo-US rivalry when formulating policy 
and were unwilling to allow SOCNJ to gain an advantage over Shell in Venezuela. 
                                                 
138
 NARA, DS 831.6363/8-844, Joseph Flack, Chargé d'Affaires to Venezuela, to Hull, 8 August 1944; 
NARA, DS 831.6363/8-944, Flack to Hull, 9 August 1944. 
139
 Herbert Feis, Chuchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought 
(Princeton, NJ, 1957), p. 22. 
APPLYING THE ATLANTIC CHARTER TO THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
183 
 
As such, their multilateralism was a means through which they could protect the 
British government’s interests in the international oil industry.  
The Venezuelan policy was objectionable to British officials primarily 
because it placed limits on the global flow of oil. Such restrictions were an 
inconvenience at best and dangerous at worst, for the British government which 
relied upon constant supplies of foreign oil. If the policy set a precedent, this would 
increase the power of oil-producing countries to dictate the movement of oil around 
the world and decrease the ability of companies to refine crude wherever they 
wished. Such a development could disrupt Britain’s supplies of foreign oil, which 
would be especially problematic during time of war when free access to oil was most 
important. However, in discussions with the Venezuelan government, British 
officials framed their objections around the Atlantic Charter which provided a more 
principled justification for diplomatic intervention. 
Unlike their Whitehall counterparts, US officials had a long-held conviction 
to propagate free trade and had advanced their cause through agreements with the 
British and Latin American governments. As we have seen, from 1933, Latin 
America provided a testing-ground for the internationalisation of the New Deal as 
the Roosevelt administration took a leading role in pan-American organisation. 
Subsequently, the Atlantic Charter constituted a US effort to export its pan-American 
policy, globalise the New Deal and universalise basic principles to govern post-war 
international re-organisation. The advancement of free trade was a central 
component of these endeavours and, thus, the State Department disregarded the 
Good Neighbor policy’s principle of non-interference to contest Venezuelan efforts 
to restrict the movement of oil. Therefore, both British and US officials 
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contextualised the refining issue within their wider foreign policy concerns in a 
manner which reflected their global perspectives and aims 
Yet the political economy of oil could still undermine the Atlantic Charter 
and so in Venezuela, as elsewhere, it ‘proved vulnerable to circumstance.’ 140 
Ultimately, while they re-stated their commitment to the Charter in correspondence, 
US officials were not prepared to jeopardise the oil companies’ operations in 
Venezuela. As Washington became increasingly invested in Venezuelan oil it was 
compelled to protect oil company interests from the actions of the local government. 
As a consequence, US official prioritised the companies’ concession applications 
over the principles of free trade that they had consistently championed. The state-
private network which now formed the basis of both British and US oil policy could, 
therefore, constrain Whitehall and Washington intervention in oil-exporting 
countries. 
Venezuelan officials’ authority to grant concessions provided them with the 
agency to limit foreign interference in their policy-making but, nevertheless, we 
should not underestimate the hierarchical and asymmetrical nature of international 
relations. The Atlantic Charter outlined the policies with which British and US 
officials hoped to bring about ‘a better future of the world’.141 As such, it embodied 
their claim to represent the general interest of all governments and justified their 
self-assigned supervision of international relations. As we have seen, the Venezuelan 
government had challenged this claim and successfully placed limitations on British 
and US governance of the international trade in oil. Nevertheless, while the Allies 
were not all-powerful, they influenced global events to a degree which was 
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unachievable to the Caracas government. Despite their setback in Venezuela, British 
and US officials still intended to supervise the post-war international oil industry. 
 
 186 
 
Chapter Four 
 Asymmetries of Influence, 1944-1945 
 
Between 1944 and 1945, British and US officials negotiated an Anglo-American Oil 
Agreement that they hoped would safeguard their interests in the international oil industry.  
The accord was designed to ensure that both countries had access to the world’s oil while 
simultaneously preventing cut-throat competition between multinational companies. For 
the US government, the agreement was a means of applying the Atlantic Charter to the 
international oil industry while British officials hoped that an arrangement, approved by 
industry and government figures, could prevent rivalry over oil creating tensions within 
Anglo-US relations. Yet, while an understanding was ultimately reached, the agreement 
failed to pass through the US Congress and was, therefore, never put into practice. 
Nevertheless, the negotiations reveal the attitudes of both sets of officials towards their 
role within the international oil industry 
 Although Venezuelan officials were not invited to take part in the discussions, 
they maintained the sovereign power to grant concessions and enact legislation affecting 
oil production in their country. Thus, while Venezuelan officials did not have the 
international influence of their British and US counterparts, they held the capacity to use 
their local authority and leverage over company officials to undermine severely foreign 
interests in their country’s oil industry. This power was brought to the fore as Aruba and 
Curaçao continued to foster conflict between British and US officials and the Venezuelan 
government. Despite the asymmetrical nature of this triangular relationship, the 
Venezuelan government was able to use its power over the country’s oil industry to its 
advantage. Between 1944 and 1945, the hierarchical nature of decision-making within the 
international oil industry was revealed as global and local factors intersected in Venezuela.  
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The Anglo-American Oil Agreement 
While no single company held a monopoly over the international oil trade during the 
1940s, the industry was led by seven large corporations that would later become known 
as ‘the Seven Sisters’. This group was comprised of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 
Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, the 
Standard Oil Company of New York, and Texaco. Thus, the oil industry was dominated 
by British and US capital as Anglo-Iranian was a British company, Shell was owned by 
British and Dutch interests while the remaining ‘sisters’ were all US corporations.1 By the 
summer of 1943, oil company executives on both sides of the Atlantic desired an Anglo-
US commercial understanding with a view to avoiding the overproduction and price wars 
that were likely to result from unrestrained competition between their firms.
 2
 In other 
words, company officials sought to form a government-backed cartel. Indeed, Basil R. 
Jackson, an Anglo-Iranian official based in Washington, felt that the US government 
needed to clarify its interpretation of anti-trust laws before industry officials could plan to 
cooperate.
3
  
 By the beginning of 1944, US and British officials had both come to the 
realisation that an element of cooperation would best serve their interests. The creation of 
the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC) signalled the US government’s intent to 
participate directly in the international oil industry and British officials were concerned 
that this move would disrupt their interests in the Middle East.
4
 M. T. Fleff of the 
Treasury argued that the PRC would ‘greatly increase the danger of international oil 
supplies being influenced by purely political considerations’ which ‘in turn might stiffen 
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the nationalist tendencies’ of oil-producing countries and ‘make the position of industrial 
countries like the U.K. very difficult’.5 This was a point not unnoticed by PD official 
Harold Wilkinson, who argued that it would be disastrous for British oil supplies if PRC 
operations expanded unchecked.
6
 The PD was particularly anxious to maintain Britain’s 
pre-eminent position in Iran and saw a settlement with the US government as a means of 
ensuring their future access to the Middle East’s oil. More broadly, FO officials perceived 
cooperation in the oil industry as part of a larger plan for post-war Anglo-US economic 
collaboration and collective security.
7
 They hoped that an Anglo-US agreement would 
prevent competition between oil companies leading to diplomatic conflict between the 
British and US governments.
8
 
 PD officials were confident that they would be able to outmanoeuvre their US 
counterparts during negotiations while the FO hoped that US expansion into the oil 
industries of the Middle East would lead Washington to support British efforts to exclude 
the USSR from the region.
9
 This reflected the common belief among Whitehall officials 
that their superior diplomatic skills would enable them to shape US policy to serve British 
interests. In the spring of 1944, Alan Dudley of the FO wrote a memorandum entitled 
‘The Essentials of an American Policy’ in which he argued that: 
in the long run, the nature of the relationship does compel national 
collaboration between ourselves and the Americans, no matter 
what friction may occur. And it should be noted that more often 
than not this means that the Americans follow our lead rather than 
we follow theirs. … If we go about our business in the right way 
we can help to steer this great unwieldy barge, the United States 
of America, into the right harbour.
10
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With regard to this memorandum, the historian John Saville has argued that it ‘would be 
difficult to find a more illiterate statement of the relations between Britain and 
America’.11 John Charmley has similarly characterised such attitudes as delusional and 
condescending but, nevertheless, British officials often perceived themselves as mentors 
to their US counterparts.
12
 This paternalistic view of Anglo-US relations was summarised 
by Harold Macmillan at the end of 1942 when he stated that British officials were 
‘Greeks in this American empire’.13 However, US officials had their own policies and 
were not prepared to be led by their British counterparts.  
For Washington, the negotiations provided an opportunity to gain British support 
for a system that would serve the USA’s long-term interests in the oil industry.14 State 
Department officials hoped that an Anglo-US oil agreement would be a means of 
propagating the international system of free trade and equal access to raw materials that 
had been outlined in the Atlantic Charter.
15
 Gaining British support for an open door 
policy would enable US companies to expand their operations in the Middle East and 
secure the region’s oil supplies for the US government’s future military needs. 16  
Moreover, Washington sought to limit both Soviet and British authority in Iran by 
utilising US-owned oil companies as agents of its international influence.
17
 
 The various concerned parties shared a desire for an Anglo-US understanding, but 
had different goals in mind. As Fiona Venn argues, ‘the main impulse towards 
negotiations was concern about the intentions of the other, rather than feelings of mutual 
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support’.18  During discussions on the desired oil agreement these concerns provoked 
conflict between the two parties.
19
 As Michael B. Stoff argues,  
such acrimony was characteristic of negotiations on many 
troubled issues between the two allies in the first few months of 
1944. Sterling-dollar balances, occupation currency policy, the 
Jewish refugee problem, policy toward Argentina, preliminaries to 
Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods – all became matters of 
serious discussion.
20
  
 
In this sense, their intimate wartime alliance did not prevent British and US policy-
makers from frequently clashing over policy between 1941 and 1945. This reflected the 
rivalry that existed between the two governments as they sought to secure their 
independent, sometimes conflicting, national interests. Some of the most serious 
divergences were in relation to trade, economics and British imperialism as US officials 
pressed the British government to end imperial preference and make sterling 
convertible.
21
  Negotiations over Lend-Lease demonstrated that Washington was not 
above leveraging British reliance on its financial support to gain commitments to a post-
war liberal trading system.
22
 Thus, US efforts to ensure that the oil industry worked on an 
open door basis formed part of an overarching strategy to persuade British officials to 
subscribe to liberal economic principles.  
 Delegates from both countries attended a two-week long preliminary meeting in 
April/May 1944, which was followed by another two-week long meeting in 
July/August.
23
 Anglo-US oil discussions focused on the Middle East but British officials 
requested that the negotiations also dealt with Latin America: if US officials were to 
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intrude upon their preponderance in the Middle East, Whitehall hoped to ensure that 
British firms had greater access to Latin American oil fields.
24
 Therefore, the British 
government’s strategic interest in securing access to the world’s oil complemented the 
overarching aim of British policy in Latin America, which was to increase Anglo-US 
cooperation in the region.
25
 In fact, at the highest level, British policy was to encourage 
Anglo-US cooperation with Randall Bennet Woods describing Winston Churchill as ‘that 
relentless exponent of Anglo-American partnership’.26 Churchill strongly believed that 
international security depended on the nature of the post-war relationship between the 
‘Big Three’ of Britain, the USA and Soviet Union. As he sought to contain Soviet 
influence, Churchill believed that the British and US governments shared a common 
interest in maintaining a balance of power in Europe.
27
 British officials were aware that 
the US government would play a formative role in the post-war world and sought to 
shape its policy to support British interests.
28
 
 Indeed, the British government had consistently, albeit not always successfully, 
sought a bilateral response to developments in the Venezuelan oil industry. British 
officials hoped to use the negotiations to secure protection against South American 
expropriation, which they had experienced in Mexico and sought to avoid in Venezuela.
 29
 
As a means to secure against this, the British government sought a joint Anglo-US 
obligation to uphold concessions granted to oil companies by oil-producing countries.
30
 
However, US officials deemed that this would be tantamount to a military alliance and 
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they were not prepared to police the oil industry in potential contradiction to the Good 
Neighbor policy.
31
  
 This conflicting position reflects the differing perspectives of British and US 
officials on events in Venezuela. As we have seen, Whitehall was willing to take a hard-
line response to Venezuelan policy when it contradicted British interests but US officials 
were more hesitant to confront Caracas. The US government’s broader policy towards 
Latin America was governed by the principles of the Good Neighbor policy and, as such, 
it was cognizant of the regional ramifications of conflict with Venezuelan officials. 
Whitehall was often frustrated by the US approach and felt that Washington’s policy 
towards Latin America undermined British interests in the Venezuelan oil industry. 
 Despite the disharmony that characterised the discussions, on 8 August, the two 
governments were ultimately able to reach an understanding.
32
 The resulting Anglo-
American Oil Agreement established an open door principle to the international oil 
industry thereby ending discriminatory access to oil-producing regions.
33
 This resolved 
US criticisms of British efforts to exclude US companies from the Middle East as well as 
British complaints that the US government was seeking to prevent British expansion in 
Latin America.
34
 In October 1942, Harold Wilkinson, who served as both the President of 
Shell’s US marketing subsidiary and the British government’s Petroleum Representative 
in Washington, had charged the State Department of conspiring to remove Shell from 
Venezuela.
35
 At the same time, the 1944 agreement upheld concessions already granted 
and precluded companies from interfering with each other’s acquired rights. Furthermore, 
it established a Joint Petroleum Commission that would oversee world oil production in 
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order to ensure that international demand was met.
36
 This international commission was 
consistent with broader Anglo-US efforts to establish organisations that would govern 
post-war international relations.
37
 
 The discussions also made clear that the British officials enjoyed a closer and 
more cordial relationship with oil executives than their US counterparts. The British 
government included oil company officials as delegates during the first round of 
negotiations whereas US oil executives merely acted as advisors and observers.
38
 
Whitehall planned to appoint three company executives and only one civil servant as 
British representatives on the eight-person Joint Petroleum Commission. Conversely, 
Cordell Hull recommended that the US be represented solely by government officials 
with company executives acting merely in an unofficial advisory role.
39
  
 Yet the negotiations were marked by a distinct lack of discussion or consultation 
with outside stake-holders. Despite its position as the single largest oil-exporter in the 
world, and a vital source of fuel for the Allies, Venezuela was not represented at the 
discussions. In contrast, Shell’s interests in Venezuela and elsewhere were represented by 
Frederick Godber who served as a British delegate in the first round of negotiations 
alongside Sir William Fraser of Anglo-Iranian.
40
 Godber was a strong proponent of an 
Anglo-US understanding, which was perhaps guided by Shell’s experience of Anglo-US 
conflict in Venezuela and Mexico.
41
 Godber and his Shell colleague, Jean Baptiste 
August ‘Guus’ Kessler Jr., explicitly argued that the concerns of oil-producing countries 
were of secondary importance to the interests of Britain and the USA. They were, 
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therefore, opposed to incorporating the governments of those countries into the 
agreement.
42
 Despite its vital role in the war effort, the Soviet Union was not included in 
the discussions although British and US officials hoped to complete a tripartite agreement 
with the Kremlin at an unspecified later date.
43
  
 The agreement pledged that oil company operations should produce ‘sound 
economic advancement’ which reflected a New Deal conception of the primacy of public 
welfare in the workings of the economy.
44
 British and US officials hoped that this would 
make concessions more secure, host governments more stable and prospects for peace 
greater. However, the pledge did not suggest a minimum royalty rate and British officials 
ensured that its wording did not imply that royalties gained by oil-producing countries 
had, up to that point, been too low. The multinational oil companies were therefore happy 
to comply.
45
 Nevertheless, the discussions focused on the needs of oil-importing countries 
as the onus was placed on ensuring a stable environment within which the oil companies 
could operate and export oil. The notion that the economies of oil-producing countries 
could be best served by nationalised industries or domestically-owned companies was 
never contemplated. British and US policy was based on control of oil production by 
multinational corporations with which they could cooperate and collaborate. US officials 
were concerned that the exclusionary nature of the discussions could cause other 
governments to view the resulting agreement as dictatorial and they were keen to arrange 
promptly an international conference to produce a multilateral agreement. However, this 
was vetoed by the British who wanted the Anglo-US arrangement to undergo a trial 
period before further international agreement was reached.
46
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 This international conference never took place. The Oil Agreement failed to pass 
through the US Congress due to opposition from the domestic oil industry. Independent 
firms in the USA were concerned about a possible influx of cheap foreign oil and feared 
that the agreement would lead to greater federal and foreign intervention in the industry.
47
 
US and British officials met again in September 1945 with the aim of producing a revised 
version of the agreement that would be more amenable to Congress.
48
 This conference 
remained exclusive to British and US officials and the Venezuelan government had to 
rely on news services for updates on the negotiations. As the talks came to a close, 
Venezuelan officials were forced to request further information from the State 
Department through the US Embassy in Caracas.
49
 Over the course of the negotiations, 
Truman had become US President following Roosevelt’s death while in Britain the 
Labour Party had formed a new government after securing victory in the 1945 general 
election. Yet neither of these changes in political leadership affected the negotiations or 
the governments’ oil policies. The modified agreement that British and US officials 
produced remained unacceptable to Congress and, as a consequence, neither version of 
the Anglo-American Oil Agreement was put into practice.
50
 
 The Anglo-American Oil Agreement ended in failure, but the negotiations still 
shed light on the attitude of British and US officials towards the international oil industry 
and their role within it. The fact that the world’s major multinational oil companies, 
which held the most important concessions in the richest oil fields in the world, were 
primarily owned by British and US interests was vitally significant. Not only were the 
British and US governments best placed to secure access to the world’s oil supplies but 
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they were also in a position to mould the mechanics of the international oil industry to 
best serve their needs. Moreover, had the Joint Petroleum Commission come into being, it 
would have been managed entirely by British and US government officials and oil 
company executives. In theory, the agreement only affected the British and US 
governments and their associated oil companies but the extent of Anglo-US domination 
of the international oil trade meant that, in practice, the principles outlined in the 
agreement could not fail to affect the industry as a whole. This was reminiscent of the 
universal declarations made in the Atlantic Charter that established a post-war settlement 
for the world, despite being constructed solely by British and US officials. 
 Indeed, only those oil companies with links to Britain and the USA played a role 
in discussions. The importance of state-private networks was demonstrated by the 
exclusive opportunity to engage in such far-reaching discussions aimed at amending the 
international oil industry in its entirety. A seat at the table was itself evidence of influence, 
as well as a means of exercising it. Moreover, the scuppering of the agreement by the 
USA’s domestic oil industry demonstrates that US oil companies were not a 
homogeneous bloc with shared aims and priorities.   
Despite their far-reaching nature, Anglo-US negotiations overlooked the local 
authority of oil-producing countries. The Venezuelan government, despite presiding over 
the world’s highest oil exports, was not invited to discussions. While Whitehall and 
Washington sought to oversee the international oil industry, the Venezuelan government 
held the power to grant concessions and regulate national production. As demonstrated by 
the earlier refining ‘banned zone’ controversy, the Venezuelan government was willing 
and able to circumvent Anglo-US agreements such as the Atlantic Charter. Indeed, it had 
its own interests in the international oil industry which did not necessarily correspond 
with the aims of Whitehall and Washington. British and US officials certainly played an 
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important role in shaping the international oil industry at a macro level, but at a micro 
level, they still had to contend with the local authority of individual national governments. 
These different perceptions and priorities came to the fore in discussions surrounding the 
expansion of a refinery on the island of Curaçao.  
 
Construction at Curaçao 
During the course of negotiations over the new hydrocarbons law, Shell had promised the 
Venezuelan government that it would not increase the output of its refinery at Curaçao.
51
 
Prior to the passing of the 1943 law, the US and British governments had already directed 
Shell to construct a distillation plant at Curaçao capable of handling 26,000 barrels of 
crude oil per day for the production of light aviation gasoline as a wartime emergency 
measure. From 1941, the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) and the Foreign 
Operations Committee worked within the US government to ensure that all foreign 
refining facilities operated at maximum efficiency and were used to the utmost advantage 
for the Allied war effort. This involved providing materials and equipment for the 
construction, maintenance, repair and operation of overseas refineries.
52
  
These US agencies operated alongside the United Nations supply programme, 
which was formed in 1943 as a joint Anglo-US venture to coordinate the two 
governments’ oil supplies. By the middle of the year, British and US officials had come 
to the realisation that such a world-wide oil supply programme was necessary to meet the 
rapidly increasing needs of their joint war machine. The supply programme was 
developed within PAW and was established in part by Stewart P. Coleman, head of the 
economics department of SOCNJ. Of particular importance to the Allied war effort was 
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100-octane fuel and, by the end of 1943, its production had increased fourfold since early 
the previous year.
53
 War placed great demands on raw materials and equipment which led 
the Allies to consider carefully their priorities when allocating supplies for the oil 
industry.
54
  
It was not until April 1944 that Shell was granted permission to gain the two 
thousand tons of equipment from the USA needed for the Curaçao expansion.
55
 Yet, by 
July 1944, the company had still not informed Venezuelan officials of the development 
and John Loudon, the local Shell manager, was anxious about their reaction to the news. 
Shell managers had feared that informing the Venezuelan government of the refinery 
expansion during discussion of the hydrocarbon law or the refining ‘banned zone’ would 
have weakened their negotiating position in those instances. They had preferred to wait 
until their plans for building new refineries in Venezuela had been completed in the hope 
that this good news would counteract the Venezuelan government’s displeasure at the 
construction on Curaçao. Loudon had already informed President Medina of the good 
news and could no longer withhold the bad news because material for the refinery 
expansion had arrived at Curaçao and construction had begun. Such developments would 
not long escape the notice of the Venezuelan Consul on the island. The dispute over the 
refinery ‘banned zone’ had demonstrated that Venezuelan officials were prepared to delay 
granting concessions if they were displeased by oil company behaviour.
56
 It was possible 
that they might take similar action upon hearing of the construction at Curaçao, and 
Loudon was particularly anxious that this should not happen.
57
 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., p. 5; Charles Sterling Popple, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in World War II (New York, 
NY, 1952), pp. 297-298. 
54
 Frey and Ide, A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, pp. 263-264. 
55
 NARA, DS 831.6363/8-544, Flack to Hull, 5 August 1944; NA, FO 371/38797/AS4190, Anderson to FO, 
1 August 1944; NA, FO 371/38797/AS4316, MFP to Washington Embassy, 9 August 1944. 
56
 NARA, DS 831.6363/1684, Corrigan to Hull, 20 June 1944. 
57
 NA, FO 371/38797/AS4325, Anderson to FO, 12 August 1944; NA, FO 371/38797/AS4190, Anderson to 
FO, 1 August 1944.  
ASYMMETRIES OF INFLUENCE 
199 
 
 As in previous episodes, the Venezuelan government had the power, and potential 
motivation, to affect Shell’s operations in the country adversely. Loudon’s fear of the 
Venezuelan response was emblematic of the adversarial, rather than collaborative, 
relationship that characterised the oil companies’ relationship with the government 
throughout the 1940s. The aims of the multinational corporations were often directly at 
odds with those of the national government. In the case of the Curaçao refinery, Shell’s 
interests centred on responding to the Allies’ wartime need for oil, which it would profit 
from financially. Its perspective of the oil industry was international and the company 
was not particularly disposed to serve the national aims of the Venezuelan government. 
Yet Shell’s fears demonstrate the power held by the Venezuelan government to disrupt 
severely the oil company’s interests and, by extension, those of Whitehall.  
 In order to fuel their war effort, the British and US governments obtained oil from 
various locations around the world. The global scale of this endeavour necessitated 
coordination between British, US and oil company officials. To this end, government 
bureaucracies were created and industry personnel recruited to manage the Allies’ oil 
supplies.
58
 It was this same problem of supply and demand that the Anglo-American Oil 
Agreement’s Joint Petroleum Commission would have been tasked with solving in the 
post-war world. British and US officials’ experience of total war on a global scale gave 
them the experience, expertise and confidence necessary to coordinate the flow of oil 
during peace time. Yet it was the unique local particulars of the Venezuelan oil industry 
that now caused problems for Shell and, consequently, for the Allies. 
 British and US officials perceived the oil industry in global terms and viewed 
Venezuelan production within this context. They based their decision to extend the 
Curaçao oil refinery on its importance to their worldwide war effort rather than local 
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considerations of how the expansion project might affect the aspirations of the 
Venezuelan government. The Venezuelan government was, however, occupied with its 
own national interests and viewed the Dutch West Indies as a direct rival: the more oil 
that was refined at Curaçao, the less oil would be refined on the mainland. These different 
perspectives reveal how the global priorities of the British and US governments could be 
at odds with the local considerations of oil-producing countries such as Venezuela. 
Caracas’ local authority, for example in the granting of concessions to companies such as 
Shell, was a powerful tool that could be used to discipline private interests.  
On 28 July 1944, Loudon presented a memorandum explaining Shell’s position to 
the Venezuelan Development Minister (Ministro de Fomento), Dr Gustavo Herrera, 
whose response indicated that he took a very serious view of the matter.
59
 He said that 
President Medina would also be disturbed about the new construction project, which 
might lead him to stop all of Shell’s pending concession schemes.60 Herrera told Loudon 
that this was the first time he had heard of the development and that Washington had not 
given his government any prior notice. The Minister stated his surprise at the attitude of 
the US government, which he felt had practically committed itself to ensuring that all 
future refinery expansion in the Caribbean area for Venezuelan crude would be built in 
Venezuelan territory. He was especially critical of PAW, whose officials he felt were not 
sufficiently cognizant of the Venezuelan government’s political concerns. Thus, once 
more British, US and Shell officials were drawn into a dispute with Venezuelan officials 
over the refining industry. 
 Loudon emphasised that the decision was outside of Shell’s control and told 
Herrera that his company would have preferred to build the extension in Venezuela but 
the urgent necessity of additional refinancing capacity for war purposes required that the 
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expansion take place on Curaçao. The Shell manager said that, while he appreciated that 
the issue was a delicate subject politically, the refinery development could be justified on 
the basis that it would give important direct assistance to the war effort. He added that it 
was bad luck that the expansion had to take place on Curaçao and not at another refinery 
belonging to another company. The Minister told the Shell manager that he would let him 
know of any further developments once he had reported the matter to President Medina.
61
 
 On 29 July, Loudon wrote to Godber, stating his hope ‘that the President who, 
alas, is rather prone to take quick action will realise that our group in the interests of the 
war effort could have followed no other helm and that the Government should accept [the] 
Curaçao expansion in the proper spirit.’ Regardless of the Venezuelan government’s 
reaction, Loudon was convinced that informing the Minister was the correct move. He 
argued that if Shell had ‘coasted along without frankly telling them what the position 
was’ Venezuelan officials would have brought up the matter in due course as the 
construction on Curaçao was obvious. The company ‘would then have been accused of 
bad faith in not having advised the Government previously and acted in accordance with 
new spirit whereby there is more direct contact and understanding between the 
Government and industry.’62  
The ‘new spirit’ that Loudon referred to was the cooperation that industry officials 
hoped would come from the fact that the 1943 hydrocarbons law had settled various 
Venezuelan grievances. However, there had been no real sign of this cooperation during 
the controversy surrounding the refining banned zone, which had highlighted the 
conflicting aims of the Venezuelan government and multinational oil companies. 
Moreover, other than general references to promoting ‘sound economic advancement’ of 
oil-producing countries, the Anglo-American Oil Agreement focused on supplying 
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demand rather than supporting the aims of oil-exporting countries. As the agreement was 
based upon the needs of Britain, the USA and multinational oil companies, the rights and 
priorities of oil-exporting countries were secondary to the requirements of the oil-
importing countries.  
 After his meeting with the Development Minister, Loudon went over the details of 
the conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires T. J. Anderson and also informed the 
US Chargé d'Affaires Joseph Flack in a very general manner of what had taken place.
63
 It 
was in Shell’s interests to inform Whitehall of the possibility of an oncoming dispute with 
the Venezuelan government as such prior warning gave British officials an opportunity to 
form a pre-emptive policy and offer the company diplomatic support. It was important for 
Shell to maintain a close relationship with the British government as its diplomatic 
intervention could aid the company in disputes around the world. However, in his 
conversation with Flack, Loudon left out mention of PAW and Shell’s concessions 
problems but did express his concern that the Venezuelan government might raise the 
issue with British and US officials. His decision to withhold information from the US 
government reflected a concern that it might pass on news of Shell’s concession problem 
to US oil companies. These rival firms could potentially use Shell’s dispute with the 
Venezuelan government to gain additional concessions, or other benefits, for 
themselves.
64
 This reflected the distrust and rivalry that existed between British and US 
interests in the oil industry in Venezuela and internationally.  
Such conflict manifested itself in the attitudes of both government and oil 
company officials in Venezuela and had also prompted discussion of the Anglo-American 
Oil Agreement. As the choice to extend the refinery was a joint Anglo-US undertaking, 
no single government could take full responsibility nor reverse the decision. The irony 
                                                 
63
 NA, FO 371/38797/AS4125, Anderson to MFP, 29 July 1944. 
64
 NA, FO 371/38797/AS4325, Anderson to FO, 12 August 1944.  
ASYMMETRIES OF INFLUENCE 
203 
 
was that the two governments had effectively pooled their resources for the war effort but 
remained competitive rivals in relation to commercial relations and post-war access to 
foreign oil. As a result, the British and US governments could arrange to extend the Shell 
refinery on Curaçao in tandem while simultaneously coming into conflict regarding their 
separate policies towards the Venezuelan oil industry.  
 Frederick Godber, managing director of Shell, informed Loudon that the 
expansion was unavoidable since the new equipment could only work in conjunction with 
plants already operating in Curaçao, which did not exist in Venezuela. Moreover, various 
service facilities existed on the island that would facilitate swift construction, whereas, in 
Venezuela, Shell would need to build from a bare site on deep water. Godber suggested 
that Loudon inform Herrera that in cases of this kind, when the company was taken into 
official confidence concerning issues of high strategic importance, Shell was bound to 
observe secrecy and so experienced ‘grave difficulty in deciding when we may with 
propriety divulge such information.’ He also recommended that Loudon tell the 
Venezuelan authorities that practically all of the materials and equipment for construction 
had been sent from the USA to the United Kingdom, where the plant was originally to be 
located. It was only after the plant had been partially erected in the UK, that the British 
and US governments decided that construction be moved to Curaçao.
65
 Loudon feared 
that the Venezuelan government would not welcome news that Shell had been taken into 
the confidence of both the British and US governments, while the Venezuelan 
government had not. Thus, he felt it to be ‘far preferable’ that the British and US 
governments, rather than Shell officials, explain to the Venezuelan authorities why they 
had not been informed about the Curaçao project sooner.
66
  
                                                 
65
 NA, FO 371/38797/AS4125, MFP to Caracas Embassy, 2 August 1944.  
66
 NA, FO 371/38797/AS4125, Caracas Embassy to MFP, 3 August 1944.  
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
204 
 
 Again, the Venezuelan government used the threat of delaying or cancelling 
Shell’s concession applications in an effort to gain assurances from foreign governments. 
In general, the British and US governments held much more political, economic and 
military power than Venezuelan officials. This was reflected as they, along with oil 
company officials, took self-assigned responsibility for redesigning the mechanics of the 
international oil industry through the Anglo-American Oil Agreement without outside 
assistance or support. Moreover, the Oil Agreement itself was only a part of broader 
Anglo-US efforts to design post-war international politics, finance and trade.
67
 That 
neither Washington nor Whitehall had informed the Venezuelan authorities of the 
construction at Curaçao is also indicative of the hierarchy of decision-making within the 
oil industry and international relations more generally. Yet the agency of Venezuelan 
officials demonstrates that neither British, US nor oil company officials could count on 
the governments of oil-producing companies simply to acquiesce to their overarching 
plans. That the Venezuelan government did not see British and US war aims as an 
apposite reason to extend the refinery at Curaçao is demonstrative of this point. Moreover, 
the Venezuelan government’s sovereign ability to grant concessions enabled it to wield a 
great deal of leverage over British, US and oil company officials.  
 
Concessions and Assurances 
At the end of July 1944, Shell was informed that the Venezuelan government had chosen 
to delay its pending applications for concessions, which were of great importance to the 
company. Herrera told Loudon that President Medina was taking the matter up in 
Washington and that if he found that the Curaçao development originated from PAW, and 
not Shell, the company’s pending concession would probably be allowed to continue. He 
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said that this would take a few weeks and impressed on Loudon the importance of 
avoiding diplomatic intervention of any kind in the meantime.
68
 The Shell manager 
agreed that diplomatic steps would only lead to additional difficulties.
 69
 As demonstrated 
in previous episodes, Shell’s close ties to the British government could at once be a 
blessing and a curse.  
Shell’s ability to prompt British intervention in Venezuela could provide it with 
helpful assistance during disputes with the local government but company managers were 
aware that Venezuelan officials did not appreciate such diplomatic intervention in their 
country’s domestic affairs. Consequently, at various points, Shell actively dissuaded 
British officials from intervening on its behalf for fear of provoking a Venezuelan 
backlash. In fact, Loudon felt it ‘of vital importance to our interests that [the] authorities 
in Washington … absolve our group of all responsibility’ for the decision to expand the 
Curaçao plant.
70
 Shell officials were concerned that their dealings with the British and US 
governments would provoke a dispute with the Venezuelan authorities that would 
prejudice their operations in the country and, consequently, they sought to distance 
themselves from the decision to expand the Curaçao refinery. This concern over 
Venezuelan perception of events demonstrates the power held by Venezuelan officials to 
severely disrupt the company’s operations. 
 Godber suggested that the British government should try to persuade the State 
Department to make a joint Anglo-US statement that would indicate that the decision to 
increase the overall refining capacity at Curaçao had only recently been finally agreed.
71
 
British officials in Washington were told that both the State Department and PAW were 
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prepared to assure the Venezuelan government that the plans for the Curaçao 
development had been taken at the highest strategic level by the Allies in the general 
interests of war requirements. The British Minister in Washington Sir Ronald I. Campbell 
reported to the FO that the ‘Americans, however are inclined to regard the whole thing as 
a storm in a teacup and do not anticipate that [the] Venezuelans will approach them’.72 
However, on 12 August, Anderson wrote to the FO stating that ‘I am afraid that 
the storm in a teacup idea is wishful thinking.’ Originally, at Loudon’s request, Anderson 
had not informed the US Chargé d’Affaires that Shell’s application for concessions had 
been delayed. However, he now urged Loudon to take the US Embassy into his 
confidence so that it might inform the State Department of Shell’s problem. Anderson 
told Loudon that the issue was being handled at the highest level and that US officials 
could be trusted to exercise the utmost caution. Loudon consented to Anderson’s appeal, 
despite the risk that news of Shell’s difficulties might reach its competitors who could 
then use the knowledge to their commercial advantage. Having reviewed the situation 
with Loudon, Anderson reported to the FO that, in the event that President Medina 
remained unconvinced by Shell’s explanation and chose to retaliate, the company could 
lose out on a number of important concessions in Venezuela.
73
  
Shell’s hesitance to bring US officials fully into confidence is understandable as 
Anglo-US competition also consistently shaped Whitehall’s perceptions of developments 
in the Venezuelan oil industry. In response to Anderson’s report, Allen at the FO wrote ‘I 
wish I shared his apparently complete confidence in the caution and discretion to be 
expected of the State Dept. and U.S. Embassy in a matter where U.S. commercial 
interests might stand to gain considerably!’74 Allen’s statement reflected the feeling of 
many FO officials that the US government was deliberately impeding British interests 
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throughout Latin America.
75
 Reflecting the intimate nature of the British government’s 
relationship with Shell, Anderson’s report was passed on to George Leigh-Jones, a 
managing director at the company.
76
 
On 14 August 1944, Loudon met again with Dr Gustavo Herrera and asked 
whether there had been any developments in regard to the Curaçao refinery expansion. 
Herrera informed the Shell manager that the Venezuelan government was waiting for a 
reply from its Ambassador in Washington who had been instructed to make a 
representation and voice the government’s displeasure.77 He said that it was absolutely 
essential for his government to make a protest in order to prevent future expansion to 
refineries in the West Indies and he told Loudon that Shell’s application for concessions 
would be delayed until Caracas had heard from its Embassy in Washington.
78
 Loudon 
reiterated that the expansion should be regarded purely as an emergency war measure and 
was a matter of high strategy that had been decided upon by the British and US 
governments. He argued with the Minister at great length in an unsuccessful attempt to 
convince him that the issuing of concessions to Shell had nothing to do with the refinery 
expansion at Curaçao.  
Loudon felt that the Venezuelan officials’ delay in issuing Shell’s concessions 
was ‘a weapon which they might wish to hold in reserve in case they are dissatisfied with 
the answers received to their Washington approach’.79 He also had the impression that the 
Venezuelan government wished to use the refinery expansion ‘to their advantage in order 
to extract some promise from the U.S. authorities that Shell will be able to construct the 
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Refinery in Paraguaná at a relatively early date.’80 He contended that this ‘would give full 
kudos to the President for not only negotiating refinery agreements but also starting with 
early construction before expiration of his term.’81  The Paraguaná refinery referred to 
was the plant that Shell had agreed to build in Venezuela within five years of the war’s 
end. Anderson agreed with this interpretation, informing the FO to this effect.
82
  
On 14 August, Loudon informed Joseph Flack, the US Chargé d’Affaires, that 
Shell’s concession applications had been delayed due to the construction at Curaçao.83 
Flack subsequently told the State Department that ‘it is possible that the Venezuelan 
attitude, in this matter, derives in part from the uncertainty which appears to prevail in 
official Venezuelan quarters about the participation of Venezuela in international 
petroleum discussions’.84 Since the Venezuelan government had not been invited to take 
part in negotiation of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement it instead made use of its local 
authority to safeguard its interests in the oil industry. Venezuelan officials’ power to 
delay concessions became a useful tool that could be employed in attempts to extract 
assurances from foreign governments and oil companies. Thus, while the British and US 
governments sought to reorganise the international oil industry at a global level, these 
efforts could be undermined by the local power of the Venezuelan authorities. 
At the end of August, the Venezuelan Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Arturo 
Lares, approached the State Department Petroleum Adviser, Charles Rayner, who said 
that the Curaçao refinery expansion was entirely a war measure for which the British and 
US governments were responsible.
 85
 Concurrently, Lares wrote to Cordell Hull, 
emphasising his government’s constant efforts to ensure that the majority of Venezuelan 
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oil be refined in Venezuela or directly exported to consumers. He pointed out that this 
policy had been clearly explained to the State Department and that the Caracas 
government did not believe that the pre-existing refineries in the West Indies should be 
removed. However, he affirmed that his government did feel that any additional refining 
facilities, built for the purpose of refining Venezuelan crude, should be constructed in 
Venezuelan territory. Lares went on to state that Shell’s pledge to build a refinery at 
Paraguaná implied that the company would not seek to increase refining facilities in the 
West Indies. He argued that the decision to expand the refinery at Curaçao went against 
the spirit of that agreement and the wishes and purposes of the Venezuelan government, 
which had received sympathetic approval from the State Department. The letter also 
asked for assurances from the US government that they would aid in expediting the 
obtaining of the materials necessary for construction of the Paraguaná refinery.
86
  
In order to construct the proposed refinery at Paraguaná, Shell would require 
materials and equipment from the USA and therefore needed assurances from the US and 
British governments that the necessary supplies would be made available. Given that 
Shell would need to purchase these supplies in US dollars, the company also required 
permission for this expenditure from the British Treasury. Such assurances would mean 
that Shell would be unable to resort to vague promises and claim that war necessity and 
pressure from the US and British governments was delaying the project. Lares asserted 
that if Shell proved to be uncooperative, the Venezuelan government would not grant the 
company new concessions.
87
 This stands as another example of the Venezuelan 
government’s ability to use their authority to grant oil concessions as leverage over both 
oil companies and foreign governments. 
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The State Department responded to the Venezuelan government, affirming that 
the ‘Government of the United States is fully aware of, and in sympathy with the 
aspiration of the Government of Venezuela to increase refining capacity on Venezuelan 
soil.’ The telegram further stated that the US government would ‘make every effort, 
subject, of course, to military requirements’ to make available the materials necessary for 
the construction of refineries in Venezuela. With respect to the proposed installation of 
refining equipment in Curaçao, Washington emphasised that this ‘accessory equipment’ 
was dependent upon facilities already present on the island. The State Department 
therefore highlighted that, in order to utilise the proposed new equipment in Venezuela, it 
would first be necessary to engage in a much larger and lengthier project. The telegram 
concluded that due to the ‘urgent need for additional supplies of 100-octane aviation 
gasoline and Navy special fuel oil’ the Curaçao expansion was justified by ‘its immediate 
and direct assistance to the war effort.’88 
Following the State Department telegram, the Venezuelan government asked 
Loudon to produce a memorandum confirming Shell’s plans to construct a 50,000-barrel 
refinery at Paraguaná. After discussion with the Shell head office, Loudon presented the 
Caracas authorities with a document confirming that the company’s plans to establish a 
new refinery in Venezuela were well advanced. The memorandum also affirmed that 
Shell had begun negotiations with the British and US governments in the hopes of 
obtaining the necessary equipment and materials for the project efficiently. However, it 
pointed out that that the company had not yet received the necessary permits from the 
Allied powers. The memorandum explained that, while Shell was making every effort in 
this regard, it was a situation beyond the company’s control.89 
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On 4 September, Loudon spoke with President Medina in person, who told the 
Shell manager that, although he hoped that a satisfactory solution could be found, the 
Curaçao refinery expansion had made a very disagreeable impression upon the 
Venezuelan government. Loudon told Medina that, while he appreciated Venezuelan 
concerns, the expansion was purely a war emergency matter and completely outside of 
Shell’s volition. He reported to Godber that, ‘it is evident that the President takes a 
serious view of the matter’ and that it was doubtful that Shell’s concession applications 
would be granted until the ‘refinery matter has been thrashed out.’90 Venezuelan officials’ 
frustration with Shell may not have been justified or, indeed, even genuine. However, 
their assertion that they had been wronged by the construction at Curaçao was enough to 
worry Shell officials. In order to avoid recriminations, they felt the need to pacify the 
Caracas authorities by giving assurances regarding the proposed refinery at Paraguaná. As 
such, the Venezuelan government was able to make further steps towards their ultimate 
aim of increasing refining on the mainland.  
On 6 September, Loudon met with Gustavo Herrera and handed him Shell’s 
memorandum regarding the Paraguaná refinery. Loudon asked the Minister about the 
delay in Shell’s application for concessions but reported to Godber that he was only able 
to extract ‘vague indications.91 Indeed, US Ambassador, Frank P. Corrigan, felt that ‘both 
the Minister of Fomento and his Government always ask for a quid pro quo. In this case, 
in return for desisting from making any great to-do over the Curaçao amplification, it is 
seeking to exact a definite commitment as to the date when construction will be 
undertaken at Paraguana [sic].’ Moreover, Corrigan felt that there was a ‘political aspect 
to the matter’ as President Medina‘s domestic political position ‘would unquestionably be 
better buttressed’ if construction of new refineries in Venezuela were well under way 
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before his present presidential term expired.
92
 This political pressure was then transferred 
to Shell, along with the British and US governments, who were now expected to make 
assurances regarding the Paraguaná refinery. British and US officials had considered the 
extension of the Curaçao refinery in terms of broad war aims, but the decision could 
conceivably have a substantial impact on Venezuelan domestic politics. This affected 
Shell’s relationship with the Venezuelan government, and potentially undermined the 
company’s position in the country. 
The verticality of state-private networks needs to be considered in analysis of the 
oil industry, as various actors had the ability to influence events in Venezuela but in 
different ways and with varying magnitudes. The British and US governments had the 
capacity to form overarching, top-down policies such as the Anglo-US Oil Agreement 
and the United Nations supply programme to govern and manage the international oil 
industry. However, these policies could potentially create conflict with the governments 
of countries, such as Venezuela, whose economies relied on exports of oil. While 
Venezuelan officials had no formal authority over the Anglo-US Oil Agreement or the 
United Nations supply programme, they were still able to influence significantly 
developments within their own country’s industry. Thus, Shell officials had to engage 
with both the needs of the British and US governments as well as the ambitions of the 
Venezuelan officials. It was necessary for Shell, as a multinational oil company, to tackle 
both these macro and micro issues that developed within the international oil industry. 
Yet, as was the case with the Curaçao refinery, the requirements of oil-exporting and oil-
importing countries could be at odds.  
Having received Shell’s memorandum, Herrera asked the company to gain 
assurances from both the British and US governments that the necessary materials for 
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construction of the Paraguaná refinery would be allocated as soon as possible.
93
 On 20 
September, the Development Minister told Loudon that suspension of Shell’s concession 
applications would only be lifted on receiving approval from the US government for the 
plant. He felt that, as the British and US governments had obligated Shell to extend the 
Curaçao refinery, it was only fair that they both should now approve the refinery at 
Paraguaná. He intimated to Loudon that the Venezuelan press might soon learn of the 
Curaçao
 
expansion and that his government wanted to counteract this news by 
announcing the Paraguaná project.
94
 Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, having recently arrived 
in Caracas as the new British Ambassador, met with Herrera who told him that he was 
entirely satisfied with the explanation given in Washington for the Curaçao expansion. 
Nevertheless, the Minister also made it clear that getting the Paraguaná project underway 
would help end the delay Shell’s concession applications.95 
Loudon was concerned that any delay in the issuing of Shell’s concessions ‘is 
liable to be quite dangerous. The present time appears to be of vital importance to the 
future of our group in this country since all good prospective acreage will probably be 
given out under concession within the next 60 days.’ He hoped that approval for the 
Paraguaná project could be obtained as he believed that this ‘was the only way out of the 
present impasse’. 96  At the beginning of October, Loudon told the Venezuelan 
Development Minister that Shell was doing everything possible to obtain approval in 
principle for the Paraguaná project from both the British and US governments. Loudon 
was concerned that Shell’s problems were becoming ‘rather noticeable’ and that it was 
‘becoming almost impossible to keep it secret’, which Loudon considered to be ‘an added 
urgent reason for a quick solution’. Shell officials did not want the other oil companies to 
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know that the Venezuelan government had postponed finalising the company’s new 
concessions. If the US firms did learn of Shell’s dispute with the Venezuelan government 
they might attempt to exploit the situation to gain advantage for themselves at Shell’s 
expense.
97
 Moreover, Loudon was also concerned that ‘although the Government does 
not wish to discriminate against us, the matter is always at the backs of their minds’ 
which could influence the number of concessions granted to Shell ‘in the face of stiff 
competition’ from SOCNJ who, he argued, ‘will be willing to pay any price.’98 
By 7 October, the British Treasury had given approval in principle to the 
Paraguaná refinery project and preliminary site work could begin.
99
  FO officials hoped 
that the US government would grant similar approval and that, when war conditions 
permitted it, necessary materials for construction would be made available.
100
 Harold 
Wilkinson of the PD hoped that the preliminary work would ‘act as a token of good faith 
with the Venezuelan Government’. 101  Rayner told British officials that he entirely 
sympathised with the Venezuelan government’s wish to make a public announcement 
about development of the Paraguaná project and felt confident that the State Department 
would be able to give the desired assurances.
102
 Indeed, by 21 October, Loudon informed 
British Ambassador Ogilvie-Forbes that he considered the matter to be closed and that 
Shell’s concessions would be published without abnormal delay.103 
By 1945, British and US officials had become accustomed to thinking and acting 
in global terms, which was reflected in their efforts to organise the post-war international 
oil industry. Indeed, the Anglo-US Oil Agreement was itself part of a series of far-
reaching negotiations between the two governments regarding post-war international 
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organisation.
104
 While British and US officials worked towards ensuring their access to 
the world’s oil, the Venezuelan government focused on the local goal of increasing the 
level of oil refining done in its territory. Despite the limited scope of their international 
influence, Venezuelan officials were nonetheless able to use their authority over 
concession applications to gain important assurances from the Allied powers. As 
multinational oil companies provided Britain and the USA with their oil imports, 
Washington and Whitehall needed to ensure that their worldwide operations were 
protected from the actions of local authorities. In particular, due to their interests in 
ensuring the steady production of Venezuelan oil, British and US officials acted to protect 
Shell’s position in the country and agreed to make guarantees regarding the Paraguaná 
refinery project.  
 
Sterling Oil 
The Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the discussions surrounding the refinery 
expansion at Curaçao demonstrated the discrepancies between the aims of oil-exporting 
and oil-importing countries.  Moreover, as the Oil Agreement failed to pass through the 
US Congress, the potential for conflict between the US and British governments within 
the international oil industry persisted. In particular, an important issue raised in the 
Anglo-US negotiations had been the British government’s right to discriminate against oil 
sold in US dollars.
105
 Whitehall sought to protect its dollar reserves by ensuring that the 
British mainland and Empire were supplied with oil which could be paid for in sterling 
but US officials argued that this undermined their free trade policies. In the end, British 
and US officials agreed to disagree and decided that the Joint Petroleum Commission 
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would settle the dispute at a later date.
106
 However, as the Commission was never formed, 
the issue remained unresolved.  
As the Japanese government offered its surrender to the Allies in August 1945, 
Venezuelan oil production reached an all-time high of 965,329 barrels per day. Yet, at the 
same time, oil company officials speculated as to how their operations would be affected 
by the end of the war.
107
 The British and US governments were not only interested in the 
amount of oil produced in Venezuela but also which currency was used to purchase it. All 
oil in international trade was sold for sterling or dollars and, as sterling would only 
become convertible in 1947, the ratio at which each currency was used had knock-on 
effects for trade more broadly.
108
 As Britain was entirely reliant on foreign oil for its 
needs, the purchase and sale of oil could have a significant impact on British currency 
reserves.
109
 Indeed, on 27 January 1944, a PD memorandum contended that ‘[o]il is our 
most valuable overseas commodity. Our foreign exchange largely depends on it.’110 Thus, 
the government sought to ensure that the oil industry was used to promote sterling and 
protect its dollar resources. This strategy became particularly important as Britain faced, 
in the words of John Maynard Keynes, a ‘financial Dunkirk’ by the close of the war.111 
To bring this about, Whitehall officials, especially those in the Treasury, hoped to sell 
sterling oil in dollar areas and limit dollar oil from being sold in the sterling area.
112
 
                                                 
106
 Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, pp. 173-175; Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 69.  
107
 NARA, DS 831.6363/8-2845, Thomas J. Maleady, First Secretary of US Embassy in Caracas to 
Stettinius, 28 August 1945.  
108
 NA, BT 11/1465, Minutes of the 15th Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on South and 
Central America, 21 August 1940; NA, BT 11/1465, ‘Venezuela’ memorandum by Interdepartmental 
Committee on South and Central Amerrica, 17 August 1940. 
109
 NA, T 191/146, Lucius Perronet Thompson-McCausland Assistane Adviser of the Bank of England to D. 
H. Robertson, 17 March 1944. 
110
 NA, T 161/1195, ‘Anglo-American Oil Policy’ memorandum by the Petroleum Division for the 
Chairman of the Oil Control Board, 27 January 1944. 
111
 NA, CAB 129/1, CP (45) 112, Keynes memorandum ‘Our Overseas Financial Prospects’, 14 August 
1945; L. J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London, 2002), pp. 60-64. 
112
 Stoff, Oil, War and American Security, pp. 165-166; ‘Anglo-American Oil Talks’, The Manchester 
Guardian, 19 September 1945, p. 4; NA, T 161/1195, ‘Note of a Meeting on Oil Held in the Financial 
Secretary’s Room’, 14 July 1944; NA, T 161/1195, SDW to Thomas Padmore, 18 July 1944; D. H. 
Robertson to M. R. Bridgeman, 12 May 1944; NA, T 231/43, Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley to Sir 
ASYMMETRIES OF INFLUENCE 
217 
 
 However, SOCNJ managers in Venezuela were concerned by the prospect of this 
policy being applied to their oil production. On 9 October 1945, the US Embassy in 
Venezuela reported that, if the British government insisted on paying for oil at Aruba in 
sterling, this would curtail refinery production of Venezuelan oil on the island by as much 
as 125,000 barrels a day. This reduction in refining would have a knock-on effect for the 
Venezuelan oil industry which would subsequently reduce production of crude. 
Whitehall’s policy to discriminate against dollar oil might also force the abandonment of 
the exchange agreement between the Standard Vacuum and Anglo-Iranian oil companies. 
The two corporations had an arrangement whereby Anglo-Iranian delivered oil produced 
in Iran to Standard Vacuum in the Far East and, in return, Standard Vacuum delivered an 
equivalent amount of Aruban oil to Anglo-Iranian in the UK. The end of this agreement 
would lead to a further reduction of output at Aruba of 25,000 barrels per day.
113
 US 
Ambassador, Frank P. Corrigan reported to the State Department that, therefore, the 
British government’s plans would reduce SOCNJ’s Venezuelan production by one-third, 
which amounted to one-sixth of all the country’s overall oil output. 
 Corrigan argued that these ‘British efforts may verge on economic warfare’, as 
Whitehall sought to promote sterling oil from British or Anglo-Dutch sources. US 
officials were well aware of the Venezuelan government’s dependence on revenue from 
the oil industry and Corrigan reported that ‘of course’ Caracas would expect to have its 
interests defended by Washington in any ‘squeeze play’. He felt that ‘American prestige 
here will suffer if we are not able or prepared to support our mutual interest.’114 The 
currency issue stretched beyond matters relating to oil as the US government sought to 
create a post-war monetary order that was built around the dollar. The formation of this 
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new international financial system required multilateral agreement to reduce restrictions 
on trade and currency exchange. Consequently, British and US officials collaborated 
closely during the war to develop the post-war international economic framework that 
became known as the Bretton Woods system.
115
  
The Bretton Woods agreement also highlighted the asymmetrical power 
relationship between the British and US governments as Whitehall was relegated to the 
junior partner in post-war economic planning.
 116
 As Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argue, 
Bretton Woods ‘substantiated the shift from sterling to the dollar as the core international 
currency’. 117  However, British policy-makers still attributed great importance to 
maintaining the viability of sterling as an international currency and hoped that the 
international oil industry would play an important role in achieving this aim.
118
 Yet 
British discrimination against the dollar in the oil industry contradicted the liberal and 
dollar-focused international economy that US officials envisaged. Conflict over currency 
had the potential to create discord in the triangular relationship between the British, US 
and Venezuelan governments. In fact, by the end of the 1940s, the British balance-of-
payments crisis led the British government to intensify its policy of dollar discrimination 
in the oil industry, much to the displeasure of US officials.
119
 In the shorter term, the 
currency issue was side-lined as dramatic political upheaval in October 1945 became the 
central issue of Anglo-US relations in Venezuela. 
  
                                                 
115
 Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods. 
116
 Panitch and Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, pp. 73-77. 
117
 Ibid., p. 76. 
118
 Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East, pp. 35-48. 
119
 Ibid., pp. 59-79; Martin Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain 1945-1951: Economic Planning, 
Nationalisation and the Labour Governments (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 55-61; Painter, Oil and the American 
Century, p. 162; Larson, Knowlton and Popple, New Horizons, pp. 706-711; Philip Williams, Hugh 
Gaitskell: A Political Biography (London, 1979), pp. 184-187; Catherine R. Schenk, ‘Exchange Control 
and Multinational Enterprise: The Sterling-Dollar Oil Controversy in the 1950s’, Business History, Vol. 38, 
No. 4, pp. 23-25; David S. Painter, ‘Oil and the Marshall Plan’, The Business History Review, Vol. 58, No. 
3 (Autumn 1984), p. 362; NA, CAB 129/36, CP (49) 176, ‘Oil and Dollars’ memorandum by Minister of 
Fuel and Power Hugh Gaitskell, 18 August 1949. 
ASYMMETRIES OF INFLUENCE 
219 
 
Conclusion 
During the Second World War, British and US officials worked closely to coordinate the 
fuel supplies so vital to the Allied war effort. However, this collaborative effort did not 
preclude conflict between the two governments from arising in matters relating to oil. 
Indeed, as military conflict demonstrated the importance of oil to national security, 
Washington and Whitehall sought to secure their, often competing, interests in the post-
war oil industry. The Anglo-American Oil Agreement was designed to limit this rivalry 
but its failure to gain the approval of Congress meant that its principles were never put 
into practice. Moreover, negotiation of the agreement itself brought to the fore the 
suspicions and rivalries that existed within Anglo-US relations. British officials hoped to 
steer US policy to benefit their own interests but Washington officials had their own plans 
for the post-war world.  
In particular, Washington policy-makers sought to ensure that US goods and 
businesses would have unrestricted access to the world’s markets.120 Indeed, one of the 
more significant issues that remained unresolved by the Oil Agreement’s failure was 
British discrimination against oil sold in dollars. US fears that this discriminatory policy 
would be applied to Venezuela were indicative of Washington’s broader effort to promote 
the dollar as the foremost international currency. For Whitehall officials, such 
discrimination was an important component of their efforts to preserve British dollar 
reserves and maintain sterling’s prominence within international finance. Yet while 
British and US officials had global perspectives and ambitions, the Venezuelan 
government had its own local aims and powers. 
Multinational oil companies such as Shell could find themselves caught between 
the competing demands of oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. While they 
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were able to call upon Whitehall to safeguard their interests, Shell officials were 
also cognizant of the Venezuelan government’s ability to obstruct their operations. 
The Venezuelan government could therefore tuse its power to cancel Shell’s 
concession applications to gain assurances from Whitehall and Washington 
regarding the Curaçao and Paraguaná refineries. Because of their corporatist oil 
policies, British and US officials were compelled to defend the interests of 
multinational oil companies in order to protect their fuel imports. In this respect, 
the state-private network upon which their foreign oil policy relied, came with 
responsibilities as well as benefits for the British and US governments. 
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Chapter Five 
Venezuelan Oil and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1948 
 
Between 1945 and 1948, the political situation in Venezuela underwent dramatic change. 
A 1945 revolution overthrew President Medina and brought to power a coalition 
government led by the social democratic Acción Democrática (AD) party. Just three years 
later, after introducing democratic elections to Venezuela, the AD government was itself 
overthrown as a military coup installed a decade-long dictatorship. Yet throughout this 
turbulent period in Venezuelan politics, the principal concerns of British and US officials 
remained fundamentally unchanged. Following the end of the Second World War, 
ensuring that oil production continued undisturbed remained the focus of their 
Venezuelan policy. Concurrently, Whitehall and Washington responded to the new 
conditions of post-war international politics and, in particular, the emerging Cold War. 
The rapidly evolving geopolitical climate affected their respective attitudes towards 
Venezuela as the danger of Axis attacks on oil production was replaced by the perceived 
threat of communist sabotage. Such a change reflected the disintegration of the wartime 
tripartite alliance and the western powers’ mounting suspicions of Soviet foreign policy. 
At the same time, the communist peril, like the previous Axis threat, failed to put an end 
to Anglo-US rivalry as both sets of officials sought to protect their independent interests.  
 As the Second World War came to an end, Whitehall officials were aware that 
Washington and the Kremlin were economically, politically and militarily stronger than 
the British government. Nevertheless, as Washington sought to consolidate its dominant 
position in Latin America, Whitehall continued its attempts to extend British influence in 
the region and limit US hegemony. The Cold War re-contextualised this effort as officials 
in London feared that the formation of bipolar blocs, led by the two superpowers, would 
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diminish British power. For the British and US governments, local and global concerns 
intersected in Venezuela as their existing oil policy became imbued with Cold War 
concerns. 
  
US Perceptions of Latin America 
The period immediately following the end of the Second World War was characterised by 
international uncertainty as governments tried to discern their position in the emerging 
post-war constellation of power. Melvyn P. Leffler argues that ‘[v]acuums of power 
coupled with almost universal political and social turmoil bred economic uncertainties 
and reinforced strategic anxieties, already heightened by new technological 
developments.’ 1  As part of this post-war stocktaking, Whitehall and Washington re-
considered their relationship with Latin America and the region’s role in world politics. 
Broadly speaking, the US approach to Latin America developed along lines already 
established prior to the outbreak of the Second World War as Washington promoted free 
trade and hemispheric solidarity. However, US officials subtlety modified this policy in 
response to their changing economic priorities and the beginnings of superpower rivalry. 
At the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace in Mexico 
City, US officials sought to ensure pan-American cooperation and US economic 
dominance in Latin America. The conference produced the Act of Chapultepec on 3 
March 1945, which reaffirmed the notion that an attack on one American state was an 
attack on the region as a whole.
2
 With Latin American support, US officials further 
suggested that the United Nations Charter should include a passage stating that the right 
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to ‘self-defense against armed attack shall also apply to understandings or arrangements 
like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec’.3 Fearing the formation of regional blocs, 
British officials redrafted the section of the Charter to remove any specific reference to 
Chapultepec while maintaining the right to collective self-defence and, subsequently, US 
and Latin American officials accepted this compromise.
4
  
US policy-makers’ attitude towards Latin America was coloured by their broader 
concerns regarding international organisation and rivalry with the Soviet Union. 
Washington endeavoured to legitimise and formalise its hegemonic role in Latin America 
within post-war international organisation while simultaneously ensuring that the Kremlin 
was unable to secure a free hand in Europe.
5
 On 8 May 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson put this in starkly imperial terms when he stated that ‘I think that it’s not asking 
too much to have our little region over here which never has bothered anybody’. He 
stated that hemispheric solidarity had ‘developed over the decades’ since its origins in the 
Monroe Doctrine and argued that it was ‘an asset … and I don’t think it ought to be taken 
away from us’.6 In this sense, Washington’s existing policy of building pan-American 
solidarity, which had previously been designed to help safeguard the Americas from Axis 
attack, was re-purposed to serve the US government’s post-war interests.  
 Historians disagree about the extent to which, in the immediate post-war years, 
and throughout the Cold War, Latin American officials encouraged Washington to take a 
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leading role in the Western Hemisphere to protect the region from Soviet incursions and 
communist uprisings.
7
 Regardless, as Roger R. Trask argues, while not appreciated at the 
time, the compromise over the Act of Chapultepec ‘later provided a partial foundation for 
the regional response of the United States to the assumed threat of “international 
communism” and the Soviet Union.’8 J. Tillapaugh agrees, contending that the Act of 
Chapultepec ‘did become the excuse for cold war ‘‘pactomania,” but its authors did not 
intend or foresee that development.’9 The threat posed by communism in Latin America 
would soon have a direct impact on both US and British perceptions of the Venezuelan 
oil industry. Even so, whether by invitation or not, US dominance certainly did not 
preclude Latin American officials from resisting US economic policy.   
 As a central component of its post-war policy towards Latin America, Washington 
sought to consolidate the USA’s economic dominance in the region. Indeed, the US 
government’s post-war economic policy in Latin America remained largely consistent 
with that which had originally formed during the Great Depression. Roosevelt had 
initially sought bilateral tariff reduction with Latin American governments as a means of 
opening up markets for US products thereby helping to bring the domestic economy out 
of the Depression. From the Good Neighbor policy through to the end of the Second 
World War, Washington had built on this approach by promoting hemispheric free trade 
and overseeing the relationship between private enterprise and Latin American 
governments.
10
 Following the end of the war, the Depression remained in the 
consciousness of US policy-makers who, in line with Keynesian thinking, sought to avoid 
the overproduction and high unemployment that had characterised the economic crisis of 
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the 1930s.
11
 If this was to be achieved, US industry required export markets for its 
goods.
12
 
Latin America, with its less-developed industries and close proximity to the USA, 
continued to be seen as an obvious market for US manufactured goods, an outlet for 
capital investment, and source of strategic raw materials. Assistant Secretary of State 
William L. Clayton outlined this policy in what became known as the ‘Clayton Plan’.13 
Due to the armed forces’ reliance on gasoline, oil was one of the most important raw 
materials for the US government to secure. US capital had already invested heavily in the 
Venezuelan oil industry and, during the war, Washington had intervened to protect the 
operations of multinational oil companies in the country. As we have seen, since 1941, 
the issue of Latin American ‘economic nationalism’ had been central to US and British 
policy towards the Venezuelan oil industry and created conflict between the various 
interested parties. These issues were not limited to Venezuelan oil but, in the immediate 
post-war period, they continued to inform the US government’s overarching policy 
towards Latin America.  
However, the US government’s post-war response to economic nationalism lost 
its earlier reformist character. In 1933, a combination of internationalist idealism and 
economic pragmatism had led to the formation of the Roosevelt administration’s free 
trade programme for Latin America. This project to liberalise pan-American trade 
persisted throughout the Depression and Second World War, during which time 
Washington endeavoured to extend free trade to the global post-war economy. While US 
officials were concerned that Latin American economic nationalism would lead to the 
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expropriation of US business interests, their response to this threat was imbued with the 
Good Neighbor policy’s principles of pan-American cooperation. Consequently, its New 
Deal approach to state-private sector relations led the Roosevelt administration to 
intervene in the operations of multinational companies to ensure that Latin Americans 
were given ‘a share’ of the wealth their industries produced.  
Following the end of the Second World War, US officials put greater emphasis on 
the need for the region’s governments to organise their economies in such a way as to 
encourage an influx of foreign private capital.
14
 While both approaches towards Latin 
America were designed to safeguard US interests from economic nationalism, the earlier 
policy had put the onus on multinational corporations to alter their behaviour. Alan 
Brinkley has identified a similar change in the government’s domestic New Deal 
programme as, by the end of the war, macroeconomic fiscal policy became the focus of 
US liberalism rather than ‘direct intervention in the day-to-day affairs of the corporate 
world.’ 15 Within this perspective, the period 1933 to 1945 saw the rise and fall of the 
hemispheric New Deal. 
 The Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and 
Peace reflected the US government’s new approach as it set out stipulations designed to 
encourage free trade while discouraging economic nationalism and state-ownership of 
industries. In particular, the Act included an ‘Economic Charter of the Americas’ that set 
out various liberal economic principles. The original draft of the Charter was written and 
submitted by US officials but after intervention by Latin American officials various 
caveats were added to the final version. Indeed, several Latin American governments 
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sought protectionist policies for their countries’ developing industries.16 Yet despite the 
changes made to the Economic Charter, the Act’s overriding liberal economic character 
remained in place.
17
 All of this was pertinent to the Venezuelan oil industry, but of 
particular relevance was the reaffirmation of ‘the principle, consecrated in the Atlantic 
Charter, of equal access to all classes of raw materials’.18 Indeed, it was this aspect of the 
Atlantic Charter that had caused a dispute over the oil trade between the Venezuelan, 
British and US governments a year earlier.  
Ensuring free access to Venezuelan oil was of most benefit to the developed 
industries and military of the USA. Immediately following the conference in Mexico, the 
local US Ambassador, George S. Messersmith, contended that his government had not 
only succeeded in ‘consolidating our position in this Hemisphere, but in strengthening 
it.’19 He argued that the ‘carrying through of many of the obligations in these economic 
resolutions by the other American Republics is of very primary importance to us because 
I think we have stopped the flood of restrictive measures which some of them were 
planning.’20 Yet as historian Gordon Connell-Smith has stated, the Act ‘contributed little 
towards a solution of Latin America’s economic and social problems. But it underlined 
the basic divergence of interests between the United States and Latin America in the 
economic field.’21 This divergence of interests had been evident in past conflicts between 
the US and Venezuelan governments regarding the oil industry and would continue into 
the post-war period. 
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 Indeed, the same liberal economic philosophies that the US government applied to 
pan-American organisation were also imbedded in its independent post-war economic 
policy towards Latin America. In order to be eligible for US loans, it was necessary for 
Latin American governments to repay outstanding debts and organise their economies to 
encourage direct foreign investment. Yet, while seeking to liberalise Latin American 
economies, the US government did not impose the same loan conditions on European 
governments.
22
 These economic policies assisted US businesses which benefitted from 
reduced tariffs on exports and increased investment opportunities while they consigned 
Latin American countries to subsist as providers of raw materials for US manufacturing. 
Such economic liberalism was already at the centre of US policy towards the Venezuelan 
oil industry as Washington consistently discouraged nationalisation, promoted the free 
movement of oil internationally and supported US direct-investment. In the case of 
Venezuela, and Latin America generally, conflict focused on the extent to which Latin 
American governments were free to resist this economic model. 
 
British Perceptions of Latin America 
In the immediate post-war years, British policy towards Venezuela remained dominated 
by the issue of oil supplies but, like their US counterparts, FO officials placed this within 
their broader attitudes towards Latin America as a whole. In March 1945, Victor Perowne, 
head of the FO’s South American Department, wrote an internal paper entitled ‘The 
Importance of Latin America’. This memorandum set out the region’s importance to 
Britain as a source of raw materials, a major block for overseas investment, and an 
‘indispensable’ market for British exports. Indeed, Perowne noted that most Latin 
American countries had a ‘purchasing power hardly paralleled elsewhere.’ As the Second 
                                                 
22
 Jon V. Kofas, The Sword of Damocles: U.S. Financial Hegemony in Colombia and Chile, 1950-1970 
(Westport, CT, 2002), p. 7; Kofas, Foreign Debt and Underdevelopment, p. 28. 
VENEZUELAN OIL AND THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR 
229 
 
World War drew to a close, British policy-makers increasingly perceived their relations 
with Latin America in terms of post-war international organisation. Rather than being 
simply advantageous, maintaining and expanding the British role in Latin America was 
increasingly perceived as an important aspect of post-war policy. Perowne pointed out that 
Latin American governments would collectively exert influence over the creation, and 
running, of the post-war world order. Thus, he felt it was ‘desirable that our influence with 
these countries should be as great as possible.’  
 Yet Perowne was also aware that throughout the region ‘national feeling is strong 
and intensifying in the political and economic spheres’ as Latin Americans were 
becoming ‘increasingly aware, individually and as a group, of their consequence, and are 
determined to exploit it’. This had particular relevance to the Venezuelan oil industry as 
economic nationalism remained an ever–present threat to British interests. Whitehall 
officials sought to ensure that such ‘national feeling’ did not lead the Venezuelan 
government to increasingly interfere in Shell’s operations in the country. The most 
serious outcome of intensified national feeling would be nationalisation of the 
Venezuelan oil industry which would place British access to the country’s oil supplies in 
doubt.  
 Thus, Perwone argued that the British government could ‘no longer afford to 
dismiss them [Latin Americans] merely as inconvenient and rather ridiculous dagoes 
living at the world’s end.’23  Perowne’s statement is suggestive of the low-esteem with 
which British officials usually held Latin Americans, both as individuals and collectively. 
His self-aware use of the derogatory term ‘dago’ indicates that there existed, among the 
British, a commonly-held racialised view of Latin Americans as a largely homogeneous 
group holding a set of shared traits. This was reflected in Perowne’s earlier 
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characterisation of Latin American countries as the ‘lusty, young nationalistic republics of 
the sub-continent’.24 Patronising generalisations of Latin Americans like these help to 
explain British officials’ later perception of developments in Venezuelan politics, which 
they often put down to political inexperience. 
 The principal aim outlined in Perowne’s memorandum was the extension of 
British, and limitation of US, influence within Latin America. In the case of the 
Venezuelan oil industry, Washington and Whitehall had previously come into conflict 
over their distinct and conflicting policies. Thus, British officials perceived themselves to 
be in competition with their US counterparts over influence in the country. Perowne 
conceded that the ‘geographical proximity and the tremendous economic and military 
strength of the United States, taken with the pan-American set-up, undoubtedly confer on 
the “Colossus of the North” a special authority’ over Latin America. Consequently, he 
felt that the region’s governments ‘will often be found to “march” at the American 
behest’. He argued that while the British government ‘should naturally not conspire 
against, but rather co-operate with, the United States in the Western Hemisphere, it is 
certainly not to our advantage that United States domination there should become 
absolute or exclusive.’ Thus, Perowne felt that the British government had to pay closer 
attention to Latin America in order to avoid the region becoming part of ‘a close or 
private hemisphere under United States tutelage’. His use of the word ‘tutelage’ 
infantilised Latin Americans and is indicative of the hierarchical view with which 
Perowne, and other FO officials, perceived international relations.  
 Paul A. Kramer uses the term ‘imperial’ to refer to ‘relations of hierarchy, 
discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.’25 Perowne depicted an imperial 
rivalry between the British and US governments as each sought to maintain a hierarchy of 
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influence in their relations with Latin America. Such ‘influence’ denoted the capacity for 
British and US officials to exert pressure over Latin American governments to act in a 
way most compatible with British or US interests. Perowne’s examination of how the 
British government might increase its influence in Latin America was, therefore, 
characteristic of his role within the diplomatic services of an imperial power. US and 
Soviet policy-makers also sought to secure the strategic and economic interests of their 
respective governments in what was an uncertain and volatile post-war world.
26
 As 
Leffler argues, such ‘Great Power expansionism was endemic in the international 
environment that existed after World War II.’27  
 British and US policy-makers could extend their influence with Latin America by 
increasing the economic and political links with the region, which could then be used as 
leverage. This necessarily produced a hierarchical relationship as British and US officials 
sought to exercise power over Latin American governments. This was particularly 
important in Venezuela, where the local government had the potential power to disrupt 
British access to such a vital resource as oil. Any influence Whitehall officials had over 
the Venezuelan government was potentially useful in mitigating this threat and ensuring 
that Shell was able to operate unimpeded. These efforts also formed part of a competitive 
rivalry between Whitehall and Washington officials who endeavoured to defend their 
respective countries’ access to the world’s oil.28 Perowne felt that his government was not 
‘unfavourably placed for making our influence felt’ in Latin America due to Britain’s 
historic political, economic and commercial ties with the region. He also argued that 
Latin American governments would wish to increase their ties with Britain ‘as a possible 
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political and economic counterweight to an unduly preponderant United States.’29 Such a 
dynamic was inherently competitive: as British and US policy-makers sought to extend 
their own influence in Latin America this necessarily limited the influence of the other.  
 The rise of the USA and Soviet Union as post-war superpowers had further 
implications as well as opportunities for British policy in Latin America. In a 
supplementary minute to his memorandum, Perowne wrote that: 
As I see it, the chief consequence of the war, from our point of 
view, will be that we shall have exchanged a more or less direct 
threat to our independence from Germany, Italy, and Japan for an 
even direr, if less immediate threat from Russia and the U.S.A. 
 
That a senior FO official felt that the threat posed to Britain by the post-war USA was 
more severe than the war with the Axis powers is startling. Yet Perowne could justify this 
by pointing out that the USA and USSR held ‘infinitely greater actual and potential 
strength’ militarily, economically and politically than Britain. Perowne went on to tell his 
FO colleagues that ‘[w]e must therefore neglect nothing which can help in any way to 
mitigate this threat.’30 For the British government, the onset of the Cold War not only 
meant the threat of communist expansion around the world but also that British ability to 
influence world events would be severely diminished by the formation of a bi-polar 
structure to international relations.  
 In July 1945, this same point was made by Deputy Under-Secretary of State Orme 
Sargent in an influential memorandum entitled ‘Stocktaking after V.E. Day’. 
Commenting on British relations with the USA and USSR broadly, he argued that: 
in the minds of our big partners, especially in that of the United 
States, there is a feeling that Great Britain is now a secondary 
Power and can be treated as such, and that in the long run all will 
be well if they – the United States and the Soviet Union – as the 
two supreme World Powers of the future, understand one another. 
It is this misconception which it must be our policy to combat. 
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The danger for Whitehall officials was that their interests would be suppressed by the 
power and influence of the USA and USSR. Thus, Orme Sargent called for the formation 
of a ‘tripartite system’ that would see the British government enrol Western European 
countries and the Dominions into a third power bloc.
31
 
The future of British foreign relations had been a source of tension between FO 
and military officials since 1944 when the British military began to formulate post-war 
contingency plans. Military officials felt that only the US government could be safely 
assumed to be a post-war ally and believed that the Soviet Union was the greatest 
potential threat to British interests. Conversely, from 1942 until the spring of 1945, the 
tripartite alliance between the British, US and Soviet governments was a linchpin of FO 
policy. FO officials argued that Germany was the most likely post-war threat to British 
interests and feared that contingency plans which characterised the USSR as a potential 
enemy held the danger of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.
32
 Indeed, in their analysis 
of British interests in Latin America, FO officials focused on rivalry with the USA, rather 
than the Soviet Union. It is significant that neither Perowne nor those FO officials who 
commented on his memorandum raised communism as a potential threat to British 
interests in the region. 
Up until the spring of 1945, FO officials worked under the assumption that the 
wartime tripartite alliance would continue following the conflict’s end.33 The USSR had 
no major historic links to, or strategic interests in, the US-dominated Western Hemisphere. 
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Indeed, Latin American governments had, on the whole, been slow to establish 
diplomatic contact with the Soviet Union. This antipathy appeared mutual when, at the 
San Francisco conference in April 1945, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav 
Molotov dismissed Latin American countries as US satellites. Similarly, in one meeting, 
Molotov labelled Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ezequiel Padilla Peñaloza as a US 
puppet, The 1940 murder of Leon Trotsky by Soviet agents in Mexico presumably did 
little to engender trust between Latin American officials and the Kremlin.
34
 
It was the US government, rather than the Soviet Union, which had seemingly 
sought to limit British interests in Latin America during the war. Even if FO officials had 
predicted an end to the tripartite alliance, there would have been little reason to suspect 
that Latin America would become a source of conflict between the British and Soviet 
governments. It was the USA that held a hegemonic position in Latin America and 
appeared to be the greatest challenge to British interests in the region.
35
 This was 
particularly relevant to Venezuela as the country’s oil industry was dominated by British 
and US competing interests. Venezuelan oil was a crucial concern for both governments 
and Whitehall officials had previously felt that Washington was working to undermine 
their position in the country.
 36
 
 For Perowne, the post-war situation imbued Latin America with greater import 
than before and he began to perceive the region through the lens of competing US and 
Soviet blocs. Describing the US and Soviet governments, he wrote that: 
Each has a group of satellite states whose policies it will direct or 
influence, and by whose needs and wishes its own policies must, 
to some extent, be influenced. It behoves us, therefore, to seek to 
establish and maintain with these satellites the closest relations 
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possible, in order indirectly to influence the policies and actions 
of their principals. 
 
Thus, Perowne contended that British officials could steer US policy by exerting 
influence over Washington’s Latin American ‘satellites’. He argued that British policy-
makers should focus their efforts on Latin American countries rather than on Eastern 
Europe as they were more important in themselves, Britain’s direct interests there were 
greater, and Latin American governments enjoyed greater freedom of action than the 
Soviet satellites.
37
  
 In response to Perowne’s views, John H. Leche, the Minister to the Central 
American Republics, wrote that there was an ‘obvious desire’ throughout Latin America 
to see British commercial interests compete with the ‘virtual monopoly’ enjoyed by US 
business. Although he pointed out that the British ‘must of course avoid being played off 
against the Americans’.38 FO officials saw themselves as rivals to their US counterparts 
but were aware that this could potentially place Latin American governments in a position 
of power. Latin American officials could potentially encourage a ‘bidding war’ between 
the British and US governments as each power competed for influence in the region. In 
all likelihood this would lead the British either to surrender the region to the USA or, 
alternatively, to ‘outbid’ US officials by giving greater concessions to Latin American 
governments. This imperial perspective of Anglo-US relations with Latin America saw 
British officials competing with Washington for economic interests and political 
influence in the region, while simultaneously seeking to maintain a hierarchical 
relationship with Latin American governments. 
 Sir David Victor Kelly, British Ambassador to Buenos Aires, felt that ‘[w]hile the 
Americans are admittedly not popular, we must beware of relying on this as sufficient to 
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regain our lost ground, let alone increase our exports over pre-war level.’ He argued that 
as the British government had been ‘standing back’ during the war, US officials had used 
this as an opportunity to increase their links with Latin America. He felt that by a ‘really 
enormous’ propaganda campaign the US government had managed ‘to educate the taste 
of the Latin American consumer on their own lines.’ He believed that ‘Latin Americans 
are tending unconsciously to think and feel like Americans regarding their living 
conditions.’ For Kelly, this US influence on Latin America ranged from ‘breakfast foods, 
house and office furniture, clothes for men and women, cars, aeroplanes, radio sets, all 
kinds of machinery, and also books and scientific techniques.’ 39  
 Kelly was describing the import not just of material goods but also of US culture 
and lifestyle. This ‘Americanization’, as it has been termed, has been analysed at length 
by historians studying the USA’s post-war relationship with, and influence on, the rest of 
the world.
40
 However, it should be noted that the USA’s cultural exchange with Latin 
America was not a one-way process emanating from the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’, 
despite what the term ‘Americanization’ would problematically imply. Instead, such 
foreign-local cultural exchanges were, and continue to be, two-way processes of 
negotiation, resistance and adaptation.
41
 Nevertheless, it would be disingenuous to deny 
that that the foreign-local cultural exchange between the USA and Latin America was an 
unequal encounter, skewed towards US interests. To acknowledge the asymmetry of this 
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relationship is not to undermine the agency of Latin Americans and to render them as 
passive recipients of US culture.  
 The problem for British officials was how to compete with the export of US 
culture and goods into Latin America in order to increase Britain’s own trade with the 
region. Leche argued that British business should reduce its investment in Latin American 
public utilities, so that it might avoid ‘political headaches’.42 This was a suggestion that 
Perowne had made to the PD directly following negotiations over the 1943 hydrocarbons 
law.
43
 As Latin American governments sought increasingly to intervene in the operation 
of their public utilities, including the oil industry, British control of these industries had 
the potential to create conflict. However, F. C. Starling, the director of the PD, had firmly 
rebutted Perowne’s suggestion in 1943 and there was no reason to think that he had since 
warmed to the idea.
44
  
 Kelly argued that while there was ‘theoretic agreement’ about the importance of 
British commercial interests in Latin America, this was not reflected in British action. He 
conceded that this was partly due to limitations placed on the British government by the 
war.
45
 Similarly, in March 1945, Anthony Eden stated that, in relation to British policy 
towards Latin America, ‘we might have wished to assert ourselves had it been possible.’46 
During the war, the British government focused its national economy on the war effort 
which hindered the level, and type, of British exports to Latin America.
47
 However, Kelly 
also argued that the press and business interests were partly to blame along with officials 
in government departments outside the FO who had little genuine interest in Latin 
America. He had been shocked by the ‘elementary ignorance (outside the Foreign Office) 
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of South America, and lack of interest or desire to learn’. To illustrate his point, Kelly 
reported that very ‘important and responsible persons’ in Britain had asked him what was 
the capital of Buenos Aires and other uniformed questions. He concluded by stating that: 
we shall need a very big effort to regain our position, let alone to 
improve it, and that I have seen here sadly small evidence that the 
effort has, outside the Foreign Office, even begun. Until such an 
effort is made here, our Missions in South America will be 
making bricks without straw.
48
 
 
 Snow shared Kelly’s ‘disheartened feelings at the small interest taken at home in 
the Latin American countries.’ Yet he pointed out that Latin American countries were 
‘large producers and large buyers, and to that extent will be an essential link in the 
working of world trade on multilateral lines.’ Moreover, he felt that ‘much more is at 
stake than bilateral relations’ between Britain and Latin America. On this, he agreed with 
Perowne’s suggestion that the British government could potentially use its relationship 
with Latin America to influence the actions of the US government.
49
 Since 1941, British 
officials had spoken of the importance Latin America would play in the post-war world as 
a political bloc and of the potential ability of Latin American governments to influence 
US policy. Despite the end of the Second World War, Whitehall official’s overarching 
policy towards Latin America remained largely unchanged as they aimed to increase 
British interests and influence in the region.  
 However, the emerging Cold War did place this strategy within a new context and 
gave it renewed importance. The perception that the world was becoming divided into US 
and Soviet spheres of influence altered British attitudes towards international relations 
and Latin America in particular. It was becoming increasingly clear that, in the post-war 
world, Britain would find it difficult to compete with the two superpowers economically, 
politically or militarily. Nevertheless, British officials were not ready to relinquish their 
                                                 
48
 NA, FO 371/45012/AS1599, Kelly minute, 21 March 1945.  
49
 NA, FO 371/45012/AS1599, Kelly minute, 17 May 1945.  
VENEZUELAN OIL AND THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR 
239 
 
country’s position as a major world power nor were they prepared to allow Latin 
American economies to be totally dominated by the USA. Increasing British influence in 
Latin America became more, rather than less, important for FO officials. Thus, as the 
Second World War came to an end, both US and British officials sought to maintain, and 
extend, their links with Latin America. British policy-makers in particular viewed Anglo-
US relations in the region as a rivalry and sought to limit Washington’s hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the emerging Cold War and the threat of communism 
would increasingly shape the views of British and US officials. As Venezuelan oil 
remained a crucial interest of both the British and US governments, political 
developments in the country took on great importance. 
 
The October Revolution 
British and US officials responded to dramatic political upheaval in Venezuela with 
approaches that reflected international and regional considerations as well as their local 
stake in Venezuelan oil. On 19 October 1945, the Venezuelan Acción Democrática (AD) 
party, supported by young military leaders, overthrew the Medina regime. The AD leader, 
Rómulo Betancourt, became President of a provisional revolutionary Junta composed of 
four AD members, two military officers and an independent politician. After seizing 
power, the new government promised to institute a new Venezuelan constitution and 
democratic politics.
50
 In the days immediately following the revolution, a Shell official in 
Venezuela named Lomax wrote to his superior, Sir Frederick Godber, in London stating 
that he was ‘quite worried about the situation since for quite some time to come it is 
unlikely that Constitutional Government can be formed and civil war is not unlikely but I 
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am hopeful that any disturbances will not interfere too much with our operations.’51 
Prolonged disruption to oil production in Venezuela would not only be detrimental to the 
companies’ operations but would also be contradictory to British and US government 
interests in the country.  
 British and US attitudes towards the change in government were defined by the 
overriding importance of ensuring access to Venezuelan oil. As such, the views of oil 
industry executives once again shaped the policies of Whitehall and Washington. On 22 
October, Arthur T. Proudfit of SOCNJ, Bradburd of Gulf and John Loudon of Shell had a 
cordial meeting with Betancourt and several Venezuelan cabinet officers. With regards to 
the government’s oil policy, the new Venezuelan Development Minister (Ministro de 
Fomento) Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso said that he would be satisfied by strict adherence to 
the 1943 hydrocarbons law.
52
 US Ambassador Frank P. Corrigan told the State 
Department that oil company executives felt the need to be realistic and accept the new 
government’s authority. Other foreign interests adopted the same attitude as 
representatives from the banking and merchant sector also visited Betancourt. Local oil 
executives believed that the government would be ‘realistic’ and refrain from altering 
existing law and contracts. However, Corrigan reported that oil executives felt that, as AD 
derived much of its support from labour, the new government would need to ‘pay off such 
support and that oil companies must expect to foot [the] bill.’ Thus, oil company officials 
argued that it would be wise immediately to concede every reasonable demand rather than 
have the Venezuelan government force measures upon the industry at a later date.
53
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Indeed, Lomax believed that the companies needed to ‘take a progressive and reasonably 
co-operative attitude towards these demands in order to ensure industrial peace’.54 
Following discussion between the new government and oil industry officials, 
Lomax reported to Godber that although it was ‘too early to give a definite opinion’, he 
was ‘inclined to believe’ that the new government would not adjust the 1943 law. 
Nevertheless, he reported that ‘there are many other ways and means whereby they can 
extract more money from us’. Thus, he felt it would be ‘helpful’ if the British and US 
governments ‘would endeavour to obtain some more definite assurance from the 
Provisional Government to the effect that it will observe the present existing contracts 
and tax laws which were negotiated on the understanding of durability’. As with previous 
appeals for diplomatic assistance, Lomax pointed out that a ‘simultaneous approach in 
this respect by both Governments is essential’ as ‘it would be dangerous if the British 
Government took such a stand on its own accord.’55  
Again Shell officials looked to the British and US governments to help secure 
their position and interests in Venezuela. And again they were concerned that any 
unilateral intervention by British officials would lead the Venezuelan government to 
prejudice Shell in comparison with the oil company’s US competitors, Gulf and SOCNJ. 
From the perspective of Shell officials, any diplomatic intervention therefore needed to be 
a coordinated Anglo-US approach. Indeed, for Shell, it would be preferable for the British 
government to take no action rather than to intervene without US support. For their own 
part, British government officials had been taken by surprise by the revolution. In the 
previous spring, Christie, an FO official, had written that AD ‘seems to be a sound and 
honest political party’ and appeared ‘to have a considerable future.’56 Yet following the 
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party’s seizure of power, Christie admitted that AD had ‘not previously been considered 
as having revolutionary tendencies’ by the FO.57  
Despite Christie’s positive opinion of AD, the existence of British colonies in the 
Caribbean created the potential for conflict between the British government and 
Venezuelan officials. Prior to the revolution, in May 1945, AD had passed a convention 
resolution that approved the ‘active participation of Venezuela in the solution of the 
problems connected with the European colonies in America, especially Aruba, Curacao 
[sic] and Trinidad, adjacent to our coasts.’ Trinidad was a British colony while facilities 
on Aruba and Curaçao refined the majority of Venezuelan crude and, thus, were also of 
vital importance to British oil interests. The British Ambassador in Caracas, Sir George 
Ogilvie-Forbes, felt that while this ‘unwelcome reference’ to European colonies in the 
Caribbean should not be ‘considered as an immediate demand’ he felt ‘it would be 
equally a mistake to overlook this sign of an irredentist trend in Venezuelan political 
thought.’58 The Empire had shown its value to Britain throughout the Second World War 
and while the conflict had been an enormous drain on the British economy, this only 
emphasised the importance of maintaining and developing British colonial possessions.
59
  
In full agreement with this belief, the Labour government, which replaced the 
Churchill-led coalition in July 1945, came to power seeking to develop the British 
Empire’s strategic and economic capacity.60 Yet the Atlantic Charter, which became part 
of The Declaration by United Nations, had committed the British government to ‘respect 
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’. As 
Churchill repeatedly stated that the Charter did not apply to the British Empire, this 
formed part of what Lloyd C. Gardner has rightly described as the ‘inherent 
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contradictions between the Wilsonian worldview as expressed in the Atlantic Charter and 
what Big Three requirements demanded.’61 These contradictions applied just as much to 
the British desire to maintain the Empire as they did to Soviet designs on Eastern 
Europe.
62
  
It was against this backdrop that Christie felt that the AD’s anti-colonial 
convention resolution ‘demonstrates that this otherwise commendable body has a serious 
snag from our point of view’ and felt it ‘unfortunate that this sort of thing should occur.’63 
In addition to possessing territory in the Caribbean, Britain also held a colony on the 
South American mainland in the form of British Guiana. This colony had a disputed 
border with Venezuela as Caracas had historically made territorial claims to the Guayana 
Esequiba region. This conflict had theoretically been resolved by international arbitration 
in 1899 and successive Venezuelan governments had not formally disputed the border. 
However, the Venezuelan press continued to periodically criticise British possession of 
Guayana Esequiba.
64
 Thus, the existence of British colonies in the Western Hemisphere 
had the potential to foster territorial disputes with, as well as anti-colonialism in, 
Venezuela. Both of these issues could create tensions between AD and Whitehall, 
potentially placing British oil interests in Venezuela at risk.  
 Following the revolution, British officials were also concerned by AD’s political 
ideology. In the spring of 1945, Christie had described AD as ‘a sound and honest 
political party’, but he now characterised it as ‘an extreme socialist doctrinaire party’. 65 
Christie’s comments are indicative of the way in which Whitehall’s evolving attitude 
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towards the Soviet Union affected its perception of the Venezuelan oil industry. In 
January 1945, Christie had stated that Venezuelan anti-communism was ‘the normal sort 
of reaction to be expected from the clerical and right wing elements of any country in 
which the Conservatives have not been flung violently into the same bed as the 
Communists by the assault of a common enemy.’66 The British-US-Soviet alliance had 
been vital to the Allied war effort and FO officials had hoped that this tripartite coalition 
would continue into the post-war period.
67
 Thus, Christie had argued that ‘Venezuelans, 
in their attitude to the Communists, are about four years behind us and we should judge 
them accordingly.’ 68 However, by the time of the Venezuelan revolution in October 1945, 
the British attitude towards the Soviet Union had begun to change.  
Their experience of the Second World War led both British and US officials to be 
wary of ‘appeasement’ and, thus, the lesson of Hitler was played out in Stalin. When, in 
the months following the end of the War, the Soviet Union appeared to follow an 
expansionist foreign policy, Whitehall and Washington were disposed to feel 
threatened.
69
 Neither British nor US policy-makers felt that the Kremlin posed a direct 
military threat but did worry that the Soviet Union could undermine their international 
influence by offering a communist solution to the peoples of the devastated belligerent 
nations and the impoverished colonies. In July 1945, Orme Sargent argued that, while it 
was doubtful that Stalin sought further territorial expansion, the Soviet Union might well 
attempt to create ‘an ideological Lebensraum’ around its borders.70  Thus, communist 
ideology and revolutionary upheaval, rather than military might, were the dangers posed 
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by the Soviet Union to the British and US governments.
71
 Whitehall and Washington had 
consistently perceived Venezuelan nationalism as a threat to their interests in the oil 
industry, and the potential for communist-inspired uprisings in the country now gave this 
danger a new international dimension. 
During 1945, the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San 
Francisco and the First Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London exposed 
tense disagreement between Soviet officials and their US and British counterparts.
72
 At 
the same time, Washington and Whitehall became increasingly concerned by Soviet 
foreign policy as, by October, the Kremlin had prevented free elections in Eastern Europe, 
sought military bases in Turkey and made claims to the Turkish provinces of Ardahan and 
Kars.
73
 Yet of most immediate concern to Whitehall officials was the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union to British interests in the Middle East and, in particular, the oil fields of 
Iran.
74
 Whitehall reacted with trepidation when, in the autumn of 1945, the Kremlin 
placed itself in opposition to the Iranian government by supporting separatist movements 
in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Soviet troops remained in Iran as per the 1942 Tripartite 
Treaty and the Kremlin demonstrated an unwillingness to have them leave.
75
 As the 
Middle East linked the Mediterranean to Asia, the British government saw its dominance 
in the region as a vital component of its global influence and ability to project power. 
Moreover, as the Persian Gulf was a crucial source of oil for both Britain and the USA, 
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Washington supported British domination of the Middle East in order to secure its own 
strategic interests.
76
 Thus, Soviet behaviour in Iran alarmed British and US officials and 
reinforced their fears that the Kremlin harboured expansionist ambitions that jeopardised 
their own international power.
77
 These overarching geopolitical concerns subsequently 
informed British and US policy towards Venezuela and its oil industry. 
Misgivings regarding Soviet policy affected British perceptions of left-wing 
political movements more generally. Consequently, now that Christie viewed AD as ‘an 
extreme socialist doctrinaire party’ he argued that it was ‘quite clear that whoever gains 
from the new state of affairs, the foreign oil companies may be the losers.’78 Similarly, 
Richard H. S. Allen of the FO’s South American Department felt that ‘it is somewhat 
disquieting that the head of the new Government, Sr. Romulo Betancourt, should be a 
person described in our Personalities Report as “an unscrupulous, Communistic agitator, 
who was expelled from Venezuela in January 1937”.’ 79  In fact, the description of 
Betancourt in the FO’s 1945 ‘Report on Leading Personalities in Venezuela’ went on to 
state that the AD leader was ‘by far the most dangerous opponent of capital in Venezuela 
and, though a fanatic, is not without ability’.80 Yet this FO report failed to take into 
account Betancourt’s own political evolution from communist to social democrat 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s.  
By 1939, Betancourt was arguing that Venezuela needed investments of foreign 
capital but that this should be regulated in order to improve the living-conditions of the 
Venezuelan people and prevent their exploitation. He contended that nationalisation of 
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the Venezuelan oil industry was unviable but asserted that workers’ pay should be raised 
and revenues from oil used to develop other areas of the economy.
81
 Thus, to describe 
Betancourt as a ‘communist agitator’ and ‘dangerous opponent of capital’ in 1945 
demonstrated the FO’s lack of diligence in following his political leanings, in updating 
their records, or both. Indeed, the FO had used the same description of Betancourt in its 
reports on leading Venezuelan personalities for years.
82
 As Betancourt was a leading 
political figure in Venezuela this was an oversight on the part of the British Embassy staff 
in Caracas tasked with writing these reports.  
Furthermore, the way that the term ‘communist’ was used by British officials was 
ambiguous and was not necessarily used to refer to an ideologue. Indeed, Christie of the 
FO felt that the word ‘in its normal sense, at any rate for Venezuela’ was ‘a synonym for 
any irresponsible mob agitator.’83 As British relations with the Soviet Union began to 
deteriorate, the idea of mob agitators in Venezuela took on greater geopolitical 
significance. As numerous reports highlighted the growth in hostile Soviet propaganda, 
British and US policy-makers feared the spread of Soviet influence through communist 
subversion.
84
 
Allen’s concerns regarding the new Venezuelan leadership led the FO official to 
feel that ‘this is not very reassuring, and we certainly need show no particular 
empressement to recognise the new Government.’ Despite, his misgivings regarding 
Betancourt’s political views, Allen felt that revolution had ‘gone, on the whole, smoothly, 
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for such things, and the new Government now seems to be firmly in the saddle for the 
time being’. British officials’ attention quickly turned to ensuring the uninterrupted flow 
of oil and, again, their policy towards Venezuela was largely directed by this strategic raw 
material. Allen argued that in view of ‘the great importance’ of British oil interests in 
Venezuela it would be desirable to mention to the Venezuelan Ambassador in London 
‘the importance attached by H.M.G. to proper guarantees for the safeguarding of these 
British interests.’85   
Despite Shell’s reservations regarding a unilateral British approach, Allen argued 
‘that it could only be helpful for the Venezuelan Ambassador to be told informally of the 
importance we attach to this matter’.86 F. C. Starling, head of the PD, emphasised to the 
FO ‘the serious effect on our oil position if there were any interference in the operations 
of British oil companies in Venezuela.’ He told Allen that his division would wish to 
support any step which the FO could take to impress upon Caracas the importance of this 
point.
87
 On 26 October 1945, the Venezuelan Ambassador, Andrés Rodriquez Azpúrua, 
called on Whitehall to request British recognition of his new government. Sir Neville 
Montague Butler, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, took the opportunity to 
emphasise that Venezuelan oil had made a great contribution to the war effort and was of 
particular importance to British and European oil supplies. He said that the 1943 law was 
intended to ensure stability in the Venezuelan oil industry but that the British government 
was now apprehensive that this might be disturbed. Rodriquez replied that the 
government would respect the law but this did little to reassure British officials.
88
   
Butler felt that ‘Romulo Betancourt, has been in the past so hostile to the oil 
industry’ that it would be justified for Whitehall and Washington to gain guarantees from 
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the Venezuelan government ‘that it intends to maintain that stability in the oil industry’ 
by respecting the 1943 law. He pointed out that: 
We should not be demanding an assurance as a condition of 
recognition; we should be informing ourselves as to the new 
Government’s intentions. The Ministry of Fuel here asked us to 
do this, and Betancourt’s record justifies it.89 
 
Consequently, the FO wrote to Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to the USA, stating 
that: 
it seems to us most desirable to secure if possible from 
Venezuelan authorities, prior to recognition, satisfactory 
assurances regarding United States and British oil interests in 
Venezuela, perhaps in the sense of confirmation of late 
Government’s declared intention as regards giving stability to the 
oil industry 
 
However, British officials were also keen to point out that any diplomatic contact would 
need to be done in concert with the State Department as a ‘parallel approach to the 
Venezuelan authorities’.90  
Whitehall consistently sought to forge a joint Anglo-US approach to any issue 
relating to Latin America but this strategy was ultimately contradictory. British officials 
recognised that the USA held a dominant position in Latin America but they sought to 
expand their own influence in the region as an alternative to US hegemony. Concurrently, 
in order to protect Britain’s access to foreign oil, Whitehall generally sought to maintain a 
hard-line stance in support of Shell and in opposition to Venezuelan economic 
nationalism. However, US officials had a vested interest in encouraging pan-American 
cooperation as a means of safeguarding their political, economic, and security interests in 
the region as a whole. These regional concerns had led to the formation of the Good 
Neighbor policy and made US officials hesitant to engage in lengthy public disputes with 
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the Venezuelan government.
91
 At the same time, Whitehall officials’ feared that their 
unilateral intervention in Venezuela would lead the local government to discriminate 
against Shell, thereby placing British oil supplies at risk. Thus, Washington could largely 
ignore British views regarding Venezuela and formulate its policy independently, safe in 
the knowledge that Whitehall officials would ultimately feel compelled to follow the US 
lead. 
 On the US side, Corrigan informed the State Department that there was ‘no reason 
to believe that our interests are adversely affected’ by the change in government and, by 
25 October, the State Department had decided that there appeared to be ‘no threat to the 
hemisphere nor any pro-Axis inspiration in the Venezuelan Junta revolutionary 
movement’.92 By the morning of 27 October, Washington decided to recognise the new 
Venezuelan government in view of the fact that it was in control of the country and had 
announced its intention to fulfil its international obligations.
93
 On the evening of 27 
October, the State Department instructed Corrigan to present a note to the Venezuelan 
authorities on 30 October, which would grant recognition to the new government.
94
 
 However, on the same day that the US government chose to recognise the 
government, oil industry executives expressed concerns regarding the new Venezuelan 
leadership. While the local managers of the foreign oil companies were satisfied by the 
Venezuelan government’s attitude, Gulf executives in the US were unconvinced.95 On the 
morning of 27 October, Charles W. Hamilton and James Frank Drake, the Vice President 
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and President of Gulf respectively, urged the State Department to obtain reassurances 
from Betancourt that existing concessions and the basic principles of the 1943 law would 
not have to be renegotiated.
96
  In addition to his position at Gulf, Drake was also a 
member of the Petroleum Industry War Council, making him a highly influential figure.
97
 
While the State Department did not anticipate any infringement of the 1943 law, US 
officials felt that requesting further guarantees was justified and in the interests of the 
industry. Consequently, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes asked Ambassador Corrigan 
to gain assurances from Betancourt, stating that the ‘matter is very urgent’ and should be 
dealt with before recognition was extended.
98
  
In response, Corrigan informed the State Department on 28 October that he was 
concerned that requesting such assurances before extending recognition would give the 
impression that Washington’s attitude was being influenced by the oil companies. The 
State Department’s desire to gain assurances from the Venezuelan government had in fact 
been inspired by oil company officials. Therefore, Corrigan argued that any diplomatic 
approach along those lines ‘might well produce [a] reaction unfavourable to [the] 
industry.’ He stated that Betancourt was fully cognizant that Venezuela’s position in the 
post-war international oil industry depended on its ability to compete with lower-cost oil 
from the Middle East and was ‘astute enough’ to realise that AD’s hopes of implementing 
its economic and social programme depended upon oil revenue. As such, he argued that 
there was ‘every reason’ to expect that Betancourt would treat the oil companies with ‘kid 
gloves’. He therefore asserted that ‘it is not deemed advisable or necessary’ to approach 
the government when ‘sufficient assurances already have been given by it that [the] 1943 
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law will be respected.’99 Moreover, later the same day, he informed the State Department 
that Pérez Alfonso had produced a signed statement for the Oil and Gas Journal in which 
he reaffirmed the government’s intention to respect the 1943 law.100  
The State Department endeavoured to safeguard the legal rights of the oil 
companies in Venezuela and, therefore, would be reassured by commitments from the 
new AD-led government that the 1943 hydrocarbons law would be respected. However, 
as Corrigan pointed out, the Venezuelan authorities could react negatively if it seemed 
that Washington was using recognition as leverage to gain such assurances. As a 
consequence, delaying recognition might harm US-Venezuelan relations and have 
detrimental consequences for the oil companies. Thus, the US government’s reliance on 
private enterprise for its supplies of foreign oil led to conflicting views of how the State 
Department could best protect company operations. It appears that Corrigan’s telegrams 
to Washington had some effect as Flack subsequently spoke with various oil executives to 
reassure them that the State Department had received encouraging information from 
Venezuela.
101
 Moreover, he told James M. Greer of Gulf that Washington was not 
prepared to use the attaining of a commitment from the Venezuelan leadership as a quid 
pro quo for recognition. Instead, he explained that the State Department had decided to 
ask Corrigan to thank Betancourt for his guarantees in order to ‘tie down the various 
assurances made’ by his government.102  
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On 27 October, Ogilvie-Forbes reported to the FO that the provisional government 
‘are young and well-intentioned but inexperienced and while [the] position is not very 
stable there is no alternative regime in sight and we must be prepared for a restless 
year.’103 Two days later, he reported that AD were showing ‘indications of weakness and 
also some doubt is expressed how long Democratic Action Party can carry on without 
quarrelling with the military who put them in.’ Thus, Ogilvie-Forbes argued that ‘this 
haste’ in recognising the Venezuelan government was ‘regrettable’ but felt that it was ‘a 
matter in which we have no alternative but to follow the United States.’104 When the US 
government recognised the new Venezuelan government on 30 October, Whitehall 
immediately followed suit.
105
  
Despite their recognition of the Venezuelan government, British officials were not 
optimistic about future developments. Perowne wrote that he was ‘not at all happy’ about 
the new government nor sure of its good intentions.
106
 On 5 November, Betancourt freely 
assured Ogilvie-Forbes that his government would respect its obligations concerning oil 
and other matters before adding that his government would welcome visits from British 
contractors and other trade representatives with a view to developing commercial 
relations.
107
 Yet, in response, Christie stated that ‘[e]verything that Sr Betancourt says 
should be taken with a grain of salt.’108 Robert H. Hadow, Counsellor of the British 
Embassy in Washington, added to Whitehall concerns when he contended that State 
Department officials were unwilling to put any pressure upon the new Venezuelan 
government and felt ‘that Betancourt is a good boy and must be encouraged in every way’. 
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Joseph Flack had told Hadow that Pérez Alfonso’s statement in the Oil and Gas Journal 
was a sufficient guarantee and could be used later if the government changed its attitude 
toward the oil companies. Flack added that he had spoken with US oil company officials 
who were satisfied by the assurances they had received, and with the general situation in 
Venezuela. Hadow reported that:  
In short, it is I think clear that the U.S.G. [US government] 
intends to give Betancourt the “Green Light”. … Events will 
doubtless show how far American optimism is justified; but it 
would in any case be unwise, in view of the present attitude of 
U.S. officialdom, to risk penalisation of our companies on the 
ground that they alone were distrustful of the intentions of the 
new Venezuelan Government.
109
 
 
As was customary, British officials prioritised the interests of Shell when 
formulating their policy towards Venezuela but, again, their actions were largely dictated 
by the attitude of the State Department. Whitehall officials desired formal assurances 
from the government that the oil companies’ established legal position would be 
respected but only felt able to make a diplomatic approach with State Department support. 
Yet US officials were unwilling to offer such support and were confident that Betancourt 
would not interfere in the companies’ operations. Once Washington recognised the 
Venezuelan government, FO officials felt compelled to do likewise and were not prepared 
to press the issue for fear that Shell would be the victim of reprisals to the benefit of US 
firms. Once again, Whitehall’s unwillingness to act unilaterally allowed US officials to 
undermine its hard-line position.  
While Christie admitted that it was ‘too early to lay down any definite opinion on 
the new Venezuelan Government’ he feared that State Department officials were ‘being 
rather woolly minded’ and ‘more than usually naïve in their treatment of the Betancourt 
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regime. I only hope they prove to be right.’110  He wrote that if the State Department 
‘expects a Liberal, or even a stable, regime from this unholy combination they would, like 
the Duke of Wellington’s friend, “believe anything.”’111 Allen argued that the issue was a 
‘very much of a moot point’ and stated that ‘solemn promises’ extracted from a post-
revolutionary government seeking recognition would not prevent the same government 
‘from proceeding against foreign interests later on when they feel their position to be 
secure - if they decide that it is to their advantage to do so’. 112  Perowne felt that 
Venezuela had ‘a completely lopsided internal economy, and no real political experience’ 
and pointed out that ‘a little time back, the Americans regarded the new Venezuelan 
provisional President, Romulo Betancourt, as a most dangerous agitator’. Thus, he 
concluded that it was ‘far too soon to think of patting ourselves on the back at the change 
of regime.’113   
Other British officials were more optimistic. James Dalton Murray of the FO felt 
that it was arguably in US interests to encourage the new government and ‘definitely 
undesirable to make it feel it is suspected of a tendency to welsh.’114 The British official 
felt that it ‘seems that on the whole we can regard the developments in Venezuela without 
alarm, if not indeed with satisfaction’. 115  Ogilvie-Forbes pointed out that ‘Romulo 
Betancourt used to be associated with the Communist Party but he is now anti-
Communist, and this is a revolution of the Middle Class.’ He stated that:  
The local representatives of the Big Three Oil Companies, 
including Shell, are satisfied with the assurances given by 
Betancourt and there is no need for panic. The new Government’s 
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position is not nearly strong enough to upset this industry, so vital 
to Venezuela.
116
 
 
The FO’s B. M. Beves argued that AD were ‘fully alive’ to the ‘menace from’ 
communists and pointed out that there was ‘no anti-British feeling, and the Democratic 
Action Party have made surprisingly favourable undertaking and gestures of oil 
companies.’117  
The British perception of Venezuela’s new government was almost entirely 
shaped by AD’s policy towards the oil industry and its attitude towards communism. 
These issues were linked as Whitehall feared that Betancourt’s supposed communist 
sympathies might lead him to challenge the established rights of the multinational oil 
companies. For British officials, the worst-case scenario would be for the AD government 
to nationalise the oil industry and expropriate company property in a repeat of earlier 
events in Mexico. In particular, British officials focused on safeguarding Shell’s 
operations due to the company’s close links with Whitehall and central role within British 
oil policy. They were also increasingly concerned by the threat posed by communism at 
an international level as, by the time of the Venezuelan revolution, the Soviet Union 
appeared to be making inroads into the Middle East. For Whitehall officials, communist 
subversion in Venezuela was just a small part of a worldwide communist threat. However, 
it would be US officials, rather than the British, who would be most alarmed when the 
Junta sought to extract additional money from the oil companies. 
 
A New Tax 
Although the Venezuelan government had stated its intention to abide by the 1943 
hydrocarbons law, on 2 January 1946, it made public an extraordinary levy on 1945 pre-
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tax net profits. Taxpayers whose total net profits amounted to more than Bs 800,000 
would, in addition to their normal taxes, be charged 6% on profits between Bs 800,000 
and Bs 1 million, 10% between Bs 1 million and Bs 1,400,000, 15% between Bs 
1,400,000 and Bs 2 million and 20% on all profits in excess of Bs 2 million. The 
government stated that the purpose of the tax was to finance developments in agriculture, 
industry, low-cost public housing, and the creation of a merchant marine.
118
  
The different ways the British and US Embassies reported this to their home 
governments resulted in the two governments pursuing alternative policies. Ogilvie-
Forbes told the FO that he was ‘reliably advised’ that the tax would affect only oil 
companies ‘actually exporting or refining in Venezuela for domestic markets, namely 
Standard Oil Company, New Jersey’s local company, that of Sinclair, and certain Shell 
units.’ He reported that the measure was not universal and that the ‘chief victims’ would 
be local manufacturers of beer, tobacco, sugar, and electricity along with ‘notorious 
profiteers who enjoy certain favours from the late regime and took advantage of United 
States and Venezuelan trade control; also certain public works contractors who were 
privileged.’ The British Ambassador also reported that the affected oil companies 
‘consider that they have no grounds for protest’, given that neither their concession 
contracts nor the 1943 law safeguarded them from the tax. Moreover, he argued that 
‘since they did not object to the first act of the revolutionary government assuming 
executive power, they cannot contest the constitutionality of its enactments.’ He felt that 
it would be difficult to oppose the tax ‘on grounds of justice, morals, or international 
usage’ and that ‘its aims at palliating are very real.’ The Ambassador noted that SOCNJ 
had recently given wide publicity to the vast profits of its Venezuelan operations, which 
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had attracted public curiosity and comment.
119
 This report led the FO’s John C. W. 
Bushell to ‘judge from the enumeration of “chief victims” this seems a well-considered 
tax’.120 FO officials seemed more interested in the prospect of selling ships for the new 
merchant marine than the tax’s impact on the oil industry and, therefore, did not 
protest.
121
 
While British officials viewed the new tax as a relatively unimportant, reasonable 
and isolated policy, their US counterparts reacted very differently. State Department 
officials felt that the tax indicated that the Venezuelan government was instigating a turn 
towards economic nationalism that would put private foreign investment at risk. As the 
US economic policy towards Latin America was based around encouraging private 
investment in the region, developments in Venezuela took on broad significance. US 
Chargé d’Affaires in Venezuela, Allan Dawson, immediately reported to the State 
Department that the tax would primarily affect oil companies, whose payments to the 
government would be approximately $30,000,000 in addition to regular income tax.
122
 
While US officials acknowledged that the surtax was not technically a violation of the 
1943 law, Corrigan was disturbed by the fact that Venezuelan officials had given no 
impression that such an important decree was imminent. State Department officials told 
Embassy staff that they were ‘disappointed’ by the government’s methods which 
appeared ‘to be contrary to [the] cooperative spirit that characterized the earlier 
statements’.123 
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At the previous year’s Inter-American Conference in Mexico, US officials had 
outlined an economic policy that was based on increasing private foreign investment in 
Latin America rather than expanding US government loans to the region.
124
 Consequently, 
State Department officials were concerned that the Venezuelan surtax would discourage 
new foreign capital investment in the country and they asked the Embassy to inform 
Caracas of ‘the shocked surprise’ with which ‘financial circles’ received the tax and 
‘what a blow it might entail for the Junta’s standing abroad.’ 125 The US government’s 
emphasis on private foreign investment went back to the ‘Clayton Plan’ and ‘Economic 
Charter of the Americas’ that had envisaged Latin America as an outlet for private US 
capital investment in the production of raw materials for export.
126
 In order for this 
strategy to come to fruition in Venezuela, US officials required a ‘cooperative spirit’ 
between the local government and private enterprise that would ensure that the interests 
of foreign capital were secure.  
US officials had initially greeted the Venezuelan revolution with optimism but the 
new tax produced a reactionary response. Chargé d’Affaires Dawson met with members 
of the Junta including President Betancourt but found their justifications for the new tax 
‘completely unconvincing’. Embassy staff felt that the Venezuelan government could 
have financed its proposed projects in agriculture, industry, housing and merchant 
shipping from its ordinary revenues. Indeed, Betancourt had told Dawson that the 
Venezuelan government had no real financial worries and an adequate mounting surplus 
to meet its economic and social objectives providing that oil revenues continued at a high 
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level. This led Dawson to doubt the Venezuelan government’s stated reason for 
introducing the new tax. 
Dawson felt that a more likely explanation for the sudden tax was that ‘some 
bright lad’ in the government realised that the Venezuelan oil industry would soon be 
facing increased competition from the Middle East, which produced oil at lower cost. 
This competition would inevitably lead to a reduction in Venezuelan production and, 
therefore, a corresponding decrease in government revenue. As the major oil companies 
operating in Venezuela had made huge profits in 1945, Dawson surmised that the 
government believed ‘now was the time to get some of the fat off of the geese laying the 
golden eggs, before their weight went down’. He also postulated that the tax has been 
introduced for political reasons as a means of gaining public support. He felt that the 
‘decree was a simple one and soaked the always unpopular “petrolero” without being 
openly discriminatory or violating the Petroleum Law’. 127  
Indeed, Dawson subsequently learned from Betancourt that the tax had been 
specifically designed to draw excess profits from the oil companies but had been given a 
general form to avoid discrimination. The President also assured Dawson that the Junta 
would try to avoid taking any new action affecting the oil companies and insisted that his 
government’s norm was to operate openly after consolation and negotiation. Yet he 
refused to make a formal declaration to that effect. Betancourt said that the Venezuelan 
government would guard against any inflationary effects of the law, and that its intention 
was to use large shares of the funds to purchase US equipment. Dawson informed the 
State Department that the ‘[e]ntire explanation was utterly unconvincing’ and that the tax 
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was based on the ‘idea of a grab of what could be gotten away with rather than any real 
need for additional revenues.’128 
The US government could potentially highlight the possibility of reduced foreign 
investment and capital flight in an attempt to dissuade Venezuelan officials from 
increasing taxation of local industry. However, US officials were not prepared to put this 
argument to the government which might interpret it as a threat and, in addition, they did 
not wish to put particular emphasis on the opinion of the oil industry.
129
 Thus, while the 
State Department sought to secure the interests of multinational oil companies they did 
not want the Venezuelan government to believe that their policy was governed by these 
interests. In fact, in November, the President of SOCNJ’s Venezuelan subsidiary, Arthur 
Proudfit, had admitted that there could be no reasonable objection to the government 
seeking more revenue from an increase in tax rates or surtaxes. Other oil industry officials 
had, in private and confidential conversation, told the US Embassy’s petroleum reporting 
officer, First Secretary Thomas Maleady, that they were inclined to agree.
130
 However, 
this did not alter the views of State Department officials who still felt that the tax was 
unreasonable and a sign of trouble ahead.  
Dawes stated that there was ‘increasing evidence’ that the Venezuelan 
government’s public protestations of good will towards the foreign oil companies were 
insincere and argued that there was ‘every indication’ that the new tax was ‘only the 
beginning of a campaign to milk the companies of everything possible’.131 Such fears 
seemed substantiated when a Venezuelan citizen wrote to the government Finance 
Minister (Ministro de Hacienda) Carlos D´Ascoli asserting that the 1943 oil law was 
unconstitutional and accusing Gulf, SOCNJ and Shell of holding a number of concessions 
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illegally. It was rumoured that Pérez Alfonso had encouraged the letter, which was of 
great concern to oil company officials who felt that the government held menacing and 
dangerous attitudes toward their interests.
132
  
Embassy officials deemed the 1943 law ‘in effect to be a solemn contract’ entered 
into after extensive discussions in which US government officials had intervened as 
‘honest brokers’. Dawson felt that there was a real danger that the Venezuelan authorities 
would rule that the concessions in question were being held illegally, which in itself 
‘would cost the companies involved many millions of dollars, and establish a precedent 
which might cost them and others, many more millions.’ He argued that Pérez Alfonso 
would ‘go to great length to have his own point of view prevail over the law’ and that the 
Junta had shown itself to be ‘capable of sudden announcement of costly decision’.133 
Thus, US officials were not only concerned by the one-time tax itself but feared that the 
Venezuelan government might well take similar action in future. 
The Embassy passed on its views to Finance Minister D’Ascoli who said that the 
1943 law would be respected. However, Embassy officials were not entirely reassured. 
Upon entering office, the Development Minister Pérez Alfonso had stated that: 
We are going to respect the Oil Law of 1943 and the contracts 
made according to it. Concessions, agreements, royalties, holdings, 
exploration and exploitation commitments will remain the same. 
Our purpose will be limited to determining if present federal 
revenues are honestly calculated. The present provisional 
Government does not contemplate any change in the law. 
 
However, the AD party had been critical of the law at the time of its passing. In 1943, 
Pérez Alfonso had contended that the legislations could not ‘convert injustice into right’ 
which would only be achieved ‘by means of a reasonable payment … to the Venezuelan 
nation’ by the oil companies. Dawson told the State Department that US Embassy 
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‘strongly suspects that Minister of Fomento Pérez Alfonso, for one, has not exactly 
changed his spots.’134 
On 21 January, Arthur Proudfit met with Betancourt who reiterated to the SOCNJ 
official that his government intended to uphold the 1943 law.
135
 Proudfit suggested that 
the President make a public declaration to that effect and, on 23 January, the Venezuelan 
government released a statement unambiguously declaring that it would respect and 
enforce the law.
136
 Following this, Dawson wrote to the State Department stating that 
despite earlier fears that Caracas was embarking ‘on policies which would tend to bring 
increasing pressure on American interests established in Venezuela’ he could now report 
‘that events in the past few days have tended to lessen this possibility for the present.’137 
 However, managers of the smaller Texas, Socony-Vacuum, Pantepec and Sinclair 
oil companies were concerned that, if the AD-led government placed further financial 
burdens on the industry, their firms would be unable to recover their financial investments 
in Venezuela. Pantepec asked the State Department to support a formal protest to the 
Venezuelan authorities but it refused, stating that the law did not violate the established 
rights of US companies.
138
 It is important to recognise that the oil companies in 
Venezuela were not a homogenous group that necessarily shared interests. The largest 
wealthiest oil companies of Shell, SOCNJ and Gulf could more easily withstand 
additional financial burdens placed on them by the Venezuelan authorities. They were, 
therefore, more ready to accept increased costs than their smaller competitors. Indeed, if 
additional expenses forced the smaller companies out of the market it would be all the 
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better for Shell, SOCNJ and Gulf. Such variances demonstrate the importance of 
recognising the limitations of any sweeping analysis of private enterprise and its 
relationship to the state.  
The fragmented nature of oil industry opinion came to the fore when, in May 1946, 
the Venezuelan government began to negotiate with the oil companies regarding new 
labour contracts for industry workers. Some company officials felt that communist union 
leaders would not wish to collaborate and instead would seek a showdown with industry 
management. They argued that the best course of action would be to invite confrontation 
by refusing to discuss certain issues. In particular, oil company officials were united in 
their refusal to accept the union demand that no worker be hired or fired without union 
consent. Thomas J. Maleady, First Secretary at the US Embassy in Caracas, felt that a 
strike of oil workers could endanger the government’s position and felt, therefore, that a 
firm stand by the industry would be a safe course of action. Yet, due to the differing 
financial positions of the oil companies in Venezuela, there was a variety of opinion as to 
the extent to which the industry should give in to workers’ pay demands. The larger 
wealthier companies, such as SOCNJ, were more able to afford higher wages than the 
smaller companies such as Socony-Vacuum.
139
  
 Maleady reported that the ‘wide difference in the status of the several companies 
makes full agreement among them difficult.’ He stated that while ‘Creole [the SOCNJ 
subsidiary] and Shell are “fat” with profits, and can afford to give’, some of the smaller 
companies were investing more than they were earning in Venezuela.
140
 As such, the 
smaller companies sought to maintain a harder line in negotiations than SOCNJ and 
Shell.
141
 Gulf’s position was between the two extremes as ‘while it has sizeable 
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production is not nearly as fat as Creole and Shell.’142 Knowing that SOCNJ and Shell 
officials would be more amenable to suggestions, Betancourt spoke to them a number of 
times over the course of negotiations. While SOCNJ and Shell management reported back 
to the other oil companies, Corrigan told Washington that the smaller firms were not 
convinced that their larger competitors ‘had been as firm as the situation warranted.’143 
Some oil company officials who had experience of working in Mexico were concerned 
that the issue could become a repeat of the conflict over pay that had led to expropriation 
of the Mexican oil industry.
 144
 
 When negotiations stalled, Betancourt and his Labour Minister Raul Leoni told 
the oil companies that unless the issue was soon resolved, the government would impose 
a settlement by decree. Wishing to avoid such a development, the companies promptly 
agreed to union demands on 30 May. The only issue on which they stood firm was their 
ability to hire and fire freely while, simultaneously, workers were given wage increases, 
paid holiday and sick leave. Moreover, Shell and SOCNJ agreed to introduce a pension 
scheme within a year.
 
Estimates of the total cost of the settlement to the industry varied 
from Bs 40,000,000 to Bs. 110,000,000 per year while Shell officials projected that their 
company’s costs would amount to Bs. 20,000,000 per year.145 Corrigan informed the 
State Department that ‘several of the oil company managers were exceedingly angry’ and 
some felt that ‘they had been swayed too greatly by their profit-fat colleagues.’146 
 The State Department supported the agreement but Secretary of War Robert 
Patterson felt that the union demands would force the US oil companies in Venezuela out 
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of business.
147
 However, acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Patterson that State 
Department officials believed the agreement to be a reasonable settlement. He contended 
that the Department had ‘long been well aware of the military and economic importance 
of the Venezuelan petroleum industry’ and that its officials appreciated ‘the seriousness 
of any movement which might lead to curtailment of Venezuelan production.’ Acheson 
affirmed that the State Department had ‘over a long period of years maintained a very 
close working liaison with American petroleum companies operating in Venezuela’ and 
that it ‘did not believe that the interests of our Government or the American petroleum 
companies would be best served if the latter were encouraged to resist the reasonable 
demands of labor.’148 Oil was of fundamental importance to the US military and the State 
Department did take military considerations into account when formulating oil policy. 
Nevertheless, State Department officials were tasked with putting policy into practice on 
the ground, which had the potential to cause conflict between the military and political 
wings of the US government. 
 British officials were less trusting of Betancourt and initially more concerned by 
the prospect of a new wave of Venezuelan economic nationalism than their US 
counterparts. In this light, the one-off extra tax did not come as a great surprise and 
appeared relatively mild. On the other hand, US officials had much greater faith in the 
moderate tendencies of AD and the surtax appeared to be a sudden and surprising betrayal. 
The different manner in which the tax was interpreted and reported by embassy officials 
in Venezuela also had an important impact on British and US policy. As FO and State 
Department officials depended on embassy reports to inform their view of events in 
Venezuela, the mechanics of international diplomacy could have concrete outcomes in 
policy formulation.  
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 Moreover, the US government was attempting to instil a liberal economic climate 
throughout Latin America in the hopes of encouraging an influx of private foreign capital 
to the region.
149
 US officials feared that the Venezuelan government’s decision to hastily 
introduce special taxation measures was not only unjust to the oil companies but might 
also discourage foreign investment in the country as a whole. Yet both the tax and pay 
disputes reveal that the Venezuelan government did have the ability to gain significant 
concessions from oil company and State Department officials. Despite its hegemonic 
position in Latin America, the US government was unable to dictate Venezuelan oil 
policy. These episodes also demonstrate that in the immediate years following the end of 
the Second World War, the US government showed a willingness to take a relatively 
nuanced approach to a leftist government in Venezuela. While US officials were 
concerned that the new tax signalled a move towards economic nationalism in Venezuela 
they were not fearful that AD’s reformism was in some way communist inspired. This is 
in contrast to the stark bi-polar perspective that would come to inform US Cold War 
policy in Latin America.
150
 
 
British Concerns and Aspirations 
In March 1945, Perowne’s ‘The Importance of Latin America’ had set out the FO’s 
policy towards Latin America. FO officials were agreed that this policy should be to 
increase British economic and political influence in the region, which would necessitate 
challenging US preponderance.
151
 Throughout 1946, Whitehall officials attempted to 
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apply this aim to their Venezuelan policy but, ultimately, their efforts served to highlight 
the British government’s economic constraints. In February 1946, with the British Labour 
government in the midst of undertaking a range of social security measures, the 
Venezuelan authorities sought to institute their own national insurance system. 
Betancourt informed the British government that he would be grateful if Whitehall could 
provide an expert to help adapt the Beveridge Report to Venezuelan conditions. Crucially, 
from Whitehall’s perspective, Shell officials also supported the proposal.152   
Whitehall officials wished to seize any opportunity to assist the Venezuelan 
government in the hope that this would lead to an increase in British exports to the 
country.
 153  
This attitude was in line with the British government’s general policy to 
encourage export trade as a means of stimulating a domestic economy devastated by the 
Second World War.
154
 The war had cost Britain an estimated £7,300 million and, in 1945, 
its debt to India and the Dominions was £3,567 million. During the war, it had sold 
foreign assets valued at £4,200 million and, following the conflict’s end, was left with a 
labour shortage as well as out-dated industries that suffered from lack of investment. On 
21 August 1945, Lend-Lease support suddenly came to an end and the newly installed 
Labour government had no choice but to accept the onerous conditions attached to a US 
loan of $3.75 billion in July 1946. To make matters worse, Britain’s balance of payments 
deficit amounted to £386 million in 1946.
155
  
After becoming Foreign Secretary in 1945, Ernest Bevin argued that in a ‘world 
dominated by power politics’ Britain was ‘faced with a very difficult economic problem 
over the next two years, during which every effort should be made to release men and 
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materials for the expansion of our export trade.’156 As the British government sought to 
overcome its balance of payments deficit and dollar shortage, Latin America’s ability to 
pay for goods in US dollars led the Treasury to argue that the region constituted a 
particularly important export market.
157
 In addition to being one of the most significant 
oil-producers in the world, Venezuela was also a steady market for British exports and, in 
line with Treasury thinking, it was able to pay for these goods in dollars, or at least in 
currency that was readily exchangeable for dollars.
158
  
The aim of increasing exports was part of the British government’s broader effort 
to maintain its influence in international relations. In March 1946, Bevin argued that 
Britain was ‘the last bastion of social democracy. It may be said that this now represents 
our way of life as against the red tooth and claw of American capitalism and the 
Communist dictatorship of Soviet Russia.’159 This foreign policy perspective paralleled 
the argument outlined in Orme Sargent’s ‘Stocktaking after V.E. Day’ memorandum 
which had called for the formation of a ‘tripartite system’ in international politics.160 
Moreover, FO officials had a similar perception of Britain’s potential role in Latin 
America as outlined in Perowne’s ‘The Importance of Latin America’. Perowne had 
argued in this memorandum that the British government must do everything possible to 
mitigate the threat posed by US and Soviet dominance of international relations.
161
 
 The additional element that Bevin added to this foreign policy approach was the 
Labour government’s social democratic principles which were now of particular 
relevance to British relations with Venezuela as AD was a fellow social democratic party. 
                                                 
156
 NA, CAB 69/7, DO (45) 11th meeting, Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, 29 October 1945. 
157
 Kent, British Imperial Strategy, pp. 124-125. 
158
 NA, FO 371/52206/AS757, Murray to Arton Wilson, Ministry of Labour, 18 February 1946. 
159
 NA, CAB 131/2, DO (46) 40, Bevin memorandum, 13 March 1946. 
160
 NA, FO 371/50912/U5471, Orme Sargent revised memorandum ‘Stocktaking after V.E. Day’, 11 July 
1945. 
161
 NA, FO 371/45012/AS1599, Perowne memorandum ‘The Importance of Latin America’, 17 March 
1945. 
BRITISH AND US INTERVENTION IN THE VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY 
270 
 
The Venezuelan request for assistance setting up a social security scheme was evidence 
that shared political principles could create international ties between social democratic 
governments. The FO were ‘anxious to encourage and assist’ the present ‘moderate 
Socialist’ Venezuelan government. However, their motives for assisting AD were not 
triggered by a sense of social democratic solidarity per se but more the fear that a collapse 
of the present Venezuelan government might lead to serious labour disturbances that 
would disrupt the country’s oil production. 
 On May 1946, Ogilvie-Forbes reported that a ‘labour crisis’ faced the foreign oil 
companies. While he felt that the oil workers were already well paid, improved living 
conditions for the working classes ‘is a certainty which no future Government of 
whatever complexion can afford to ignore.’162 Similarly the Ministry of Fuel and Power 
argued that the British government could not afford to have more labour trouble in the 
Venezuelan oil industry and that it was, therefore, of the utmost importance to provide a 
social security advisor.
163
 The danger of labour disputes was linked to the threat posed to 
British interests by communism in Venezuela. This issue arose in July 1946, when the 
British Information Department in Caracas reported that public opinion in Venezuela had 
not been favourable to Britain due to ‘the “smear” method of propaganda which has been 
and is being used by the U.S.S.R. against the United Kingdom’. Emile P. Lecours, the 
recently appointed Press Attaché, reported that the three local communist parties had 
grown from insignificant numbers in 1943 to ‘impressive groups’ which were ‘extremely 
well organised’ and ‘very active’ with no less than thirty thousand members.164 He wrote 
that Venezuela ‘is in reality a terribly poor country with a very rich Government’ and 
                                                 
162
 NA, FO 371/52207/AS2936, Ogilvie-Forbes to Bevin, 28 May 1946. 
163
 NA, FO 371/52208/AS3574, Murray minute, 27 June 1946; NA, FO 371/52208/AS3759, Murray minute, 
28 June 1946. 
164
 NA, FO 371/52208/AS4257, ‘Proposed Expenditure in the Information Department at Caracas, 
Venezuela’ by Lecours, attached to Ogilvie-Forbes to Bevin, 10 July 1946. 
VENEZUELAN OIL AND THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR 
271 
 
Ogilvie-Forbes felt that communist propaganda attacking the capitalist system had ‘the 
attraction of professing to solve the very real grievances of the poor.’165  
 The Venezuelan poor’s association with Britain and the USA was through oil, 
public utilities and other businesses and Ogilvie-Forbes reported that, consequently, the 
poor ‘imbibe with relish the subtly anti-British communist inspired’ articles criticising 
British imperialism.
166
  Such pro-communist, anti-British sentiments could potentially be 
a grave threat to British oil interests in Venezuela which led Whitehall to become 
preoccupied with the influence of communist ideology and Soviet influence on the AD-
led government. Lecours wrote that ‘[u]ndoubtedly Betancourt would like to nationalise 
the oil industry, but realizes that this is impossible and he frequently has commented on 
the mistake made by Mexico. Venezuela, unlike Mexico, depends exclusively on oil for 
its subsistence.’167  Ogilvie-Forbes argued that ‘in spite of much diplomatic cordiality, it 
must be admitted that the Government has tended to be more nationalistic than its 
predecessor, though jealousy of foreign interests has not as yet taken any extreme 
form.’168 Lecours reported that Betancourt frequently met with the Soviet Ambassador 
who was an expert on the oil industry and that the Soviet Embassy had a large staff and 
spent a ‘very considerable’ amount of money on propaganda. However, he felt it was 
‘very doubtful that in any circumstances would Betancourt side with Russia against the 
U.S.A. and Great Britain.’169  
These anxieties regarding the spread of Soviet propaganda and influence in 
Venezuela must be understood within the broader context of Whitehall’s increasing 
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concerns regarding the Kremlin’s foreign policy. 170  In April 1946, Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin argued that British ‘policy towards Germany should be guided by the 
consideration that Russia is our most likely potential enemy and is a more serious danger 
than a revived Germany.’171 This matched the Chief of Staff’s view that British ‘long-
term policy with regard to Germany must take full account of the fact that Russia is a 
much more dangerous potential enemy than Germany’. 172  US officials shared these 
concerns which were propagated by George F. Kennan’s highly influential ‘long 
telegram’ of 22 February 1946.173 Kennan, who was the US chargé d’affaires in Moscow, 
contended that Soviet officials sought to increase their international influence and weaken 
capitalist societies through ‘an underground operating directorate of world communism, a 
concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow.’ 174  These same 
sentiments were conveyed in a US Central Intelligence Group report of July 1946, which 
claimed that: 
The Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable conflict with the 
capitalist world. It therefore seeks to increase its relative power by 
building up its own strength and undermining that of its assumed 
antagonists. … In Latin America, in particular, Soviet and 
Communist influence will be exerted to the utmost to destroy the 
influence of the United States and to create antagonisms 
disruptive to the Pan American system.
175
 
 
As Leffler argues, US officials, worried by the turmoil and unrest of the post-war world, 
‘placed blame and responsibility on the Kremlin’ and by the middle of 1946 it had 
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become ‘commonplace to charge that Stalin and his comrades sought world 
domination.’176  
Wayne S. Cole and Warren F. Kimball have argued that, from 1941, the perceived 
success of the Good Neighbor policy led US officials to argue that pan-American 
cooperation was a model for effective regional organisation.
177
 By the end of 1946, this 
view had taken on a Cold War context as, on 22 October 1946, Kennan contrasted the 
Soviet government’s ‘essential deceptiveness and divisiveness’ with Washington’s own 
policy towards Latin America. He questioned why the Kremlin did ‘not reconcile itself – 
as our Government has done in relation to the governments of Central and South America 
– to a relationship which allows neighboring countries full expression of political feeling, 
restricting them only when questions of regional security are involved?’178 Subsequently, 
the Truman administration hardened its attitude towards the Soviet Union and began to 
formulate a policy of ‘containment’ designed to limit the Kremlin’s international 
influence and protect US interests around the world.
179
 
In relation to Venezuela, B. M. Beves of the FO argued in December 1946 that the 
local communists were ‘biding their time’ but were ‘no doubt very ready to foment labour 
troubles when good opportunities occur.’180 The potential for communist agitation and 
intense labour upheaval placed further importance in establishing a social security system 
in Venezuela that would mitigate these threats and, therefore, avoid any disruption to the 
country’s oil industry. Ogilvie-Forbes asserted that any disorder in Venezuela could lead 
to attacks on ‘foreigners, especially those connected with the “Imperialist” Oil Companies 
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and Big Business, all of whom are so prosperous while the poor rot and this would 
provide plenty of troubled waters for the Communists to fish in.’181 
 By July 1946, the FO had still been unable to secure the assistance of a social 
insurance expert for the Venezuelan government. In response, Ogilvie-Forbes wrote that 
if Whitehall proved unable to fulfil the Junta’s request, this would: 
only increase the impression that we are so exhausted by the war 
that we are unable not only to send out the exports of goods 
demanded but also even to export useful manpower which would 
not cost the Treasury one panny [sic] of foreign exchange. … The 
President’s comment to me the other day, more in sorrow than in 
wrath, that he realized we could contribute very little in the way 
of exports and services, is rather ominous.  
 
The British Ambassador contrasted this with the Americans who ‘seized upon’ 
opportunities to provide Venezuela with goods and advisers.
182
 Ogilvie-Forbes believed 
that the Venezuelan government ‘do not want to be tied hand and foot to the Americans’ 
but argued that ‘we must never forget that we have the Americans on the doorstep ready 
to offer but not necessarily deliver anything from a row of pins to a battleship.’183 While 
FO officials had repeatedly stated their intention to facilitate British trade with Venezuela, 
it proved difficult to realise this ambition. Starling at the PD argued that ‘the appointment 
seems to us so important on broad grounds of policy’ and contended that the ‘social 
legislation on which the adviser is needed by the Venezuelans is an important factor in 
preserving relations and consequently unimpeded oil development.’184 He was concerned, 
like Ogilvie-Forbes, that the British government would lose Venezuelan good-will if they 
were unable to provide the Junta with an adviser.  
Starling reminded Butler, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that 
Venezuela was the third largest oil-producer in the world, and the largest oil-exporter. 
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Since the British stake in Venezuelan oil was so large, he argued that ‘from our point of 
view the goodwill of the Venezuelans is most valuable since our difficulties in the Middle 
East demand that we should reinsure the oil supplies we have, both in peace and war, in 
other major sources of production.’185 The Palestinian and Iranian crises of 1945 to 1946, 
to which Starling referred, demonstrated that Britain could not rely solely on the Middle 
East for its oil supplies. This placed additional emphasis on Venezuela as a source of oil 
imports and consequently increased the importance of ensuring sound relations between 
the British and Venezuelan governments. Accordingly, this put further pressure on the FO 
to procure the services of a social security advisor for Venezuela. In December 1946, 
following helpful suggestions from Shell, the FO was finally able to suggest two British 
candidates to the Venezuelan government.
186
 
When the opportunity arose, FO officials were keen to ingratiate themselves to the 
Venezuelan government as part of a broader aim to extend British influence in Latin 
America.
 187
 Once again, international, regional and local considerations merged as 
concerns regarding Britain’s international standing, the communist threat and oil supplies 
all informed Whitehall’s policy in Venezuela. When FO officials saw a chance both to 
increase their ties to the Venezuelan government, while simultaneously helping to ensure 
stability of the local oil industry, they strove to take it. Moreover, the issue highlighted the 
interconnected aims of Shell executives and British government officials who both sought 
to mitigate the possibility of disruption to the oil industry by helping to establish a social 
security programme in Venezuela. The important links between domestic and 
international politics were also demonstrated as the Labour government’s social 
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programmes created opportunities for the FO to assist its social democratic counterpart in 
Venezuela.  
The episode also highlights the concerns of British officials regarding their 
inability to compete with US business interests. Indeed, it was Britain’s balance of trade 
deficit which led, in part, to the sterling convertibility crisis of 1947 that highlighted 
British economic weakness.
188
 The British government’s subsequent decision to make 
sterling inconvertible prevented Latin American countries from gaining dollars from 
exports to Britain and this limitation was compounded by Britain’s inability to supply 
goods for purchase in sterling. Moreover, in the immediate post-war period, the Treasury 
prevented any major capital exports to Latin America while British-owned utilities and 
industries in the region were sold to local national governments. As a result of all of these 
restrictions on trade and investment, British capital in Latin America halved between 1939 
and 1949.
189
 Concurrently, the Labour government endeavoured to reduce the cost of its 
international commitments in order to help relieve its financial difficulties.
190
 In stark 
contrast, on 12 March 1947, President Truman extended US interventionism with his 
eponymous Truman Doctrine which committed Washington to the worldwide containment 
of communism and Soviet influence.
191
 
 
The Birth and Death of Venezuelan Democracy 
A year after its seizure of power, the revolutionary Junta fulfilled its promise to introduce 
democracy to Venezuela. In free elections, on 27 October 1946, AD won an 
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overwhelming majority of seats in the National Constituent Assembly and, subsequently, 
on 14 December 1947, the party’s candidate Romulo Gallegos was elected President.192 
During the Venezuelan congressional debates on the new oil law in 1943, Pérez Alfonso, 
who was now Minister of Development, had objected to the legislation on the grounds that 
the government would still not share an equal division of profits with the companies. The 
AD government did not make this an issue until the spring of 1947 when SOCNJ’s 
balance sheets revealed that, during 1946, the government had received $80 million in 
various royalties and taxes while the company had made a profit of $83 million. After 
Pérez Alfonso brought the issue to SOCNJ’s attention, the company informally indicated 
that they were willing to discuss the matter with a view to arriving at an amicable 
settlement. Pérez then approached Shell management in Caracas along the same lines. 
 Subsequently, Shell and SOCNJ officials discussed the matter and came to the 
conclusion that, if the companies were to contest the government’s demand for a fifty-fifty 
share of profits, it was extremely doubtful that they would win their case. Moreover, even 
if they were to prevail, the government would, in all likelihood, change the tax laws in 
such a way as to gain an even greater share of industry earnings. Thus, Shell and SOCNJ 
officials agreed that the realistic and sensible approach was to reach an amicable 
arrangement with the government on the matter. Forster, of Shell’s Venezuelan 
management, felt that although the deal ‘would cost the company some money in the good 
years, [it] would be well worthwhile since it would tend to stabilize and improve our 
relations with the Government’. He felt that the ability of the two parties to ‘publicly 
claim that they are henceforward true partners’ would allow the government to defend 
Shell against any unreasonable demands made by the Venezuelan public.
193
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 British Ambassador Ogilvie-Forbes felt that ‘this step marks the beginning of an 
important era in our relationship with the Venezuelan Government on oil matters which is 
not only in keeping with the spirit of the time but is also on the long view favourable to 
our interests.’ He agreed with Forster that it was much preferable for the oil companies 
and Venezuelan government to be in partnership as it would avoid ‘perpetual struggle’ 
between the two groups.
194
 The US Chargé d’Affaires in Venezuela, Allan Dawson, felt 
that ‘from a broad point of view, there would seem to be no sound economic reason to 
oppose the addition of an excess profits tax’ as the oil companies were making ‘huge 
profits’ due to ‘Venezuela’s constantly increasing oil production’.195 Subsequently, on 12 
November 1948, the Venezuelan government introduced a new income tax that brought 
the fifty-fifty agreement into law. Neither Whitehall nor Washington objected to the new 
tax as the oil companies perceived it as an opportunity to stabilise their relationship with 
the government and, thereby, secure British and US oil supplies.
196
 In fact, the formal 
fifty-fifty split would become a model emulated by other oil-producing countries.
197
 
 A mere twelve days later, a military coup overthrew the AD government in 
Venezuela.
198
 Margaret Joan Anstee of the FO South American Department believed that 
the military leadership put in place was ‘more favourably disposed towards the U.S. and 
ourselves’ and felt it was ‘reassuring that the danger of sabotage in the oilfields, which has 
always been a major preoccupation, is now rather less.’199 John H. Magowan, the new 
British Ambassador to Venezuela, argued that it was:  
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reasonable to speculate that, had the extremist elements of Accion 
Democrática gained control of the party, and were that party in 
power at a time when the United States of America were engaged 
in hostilities with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics there 
would indeed be grave risk of oil fields sabotage, and certainly of 
some degree of malevolence towards the Western powers. 
 
He reported that all the indications were that ‘politically and economically’, the new 
regime wanted ‘to reverse the Betancourt tendency to hostility towards the “capitalists” 
and “colonial” powers.’200 Joseph Robinson at the British Embassy in Caracas stated that 
the ‘larger oil companies, content though they were with the so called 50/50 agreement 
they had reached with the Government of Democratic Action, and happy with the prospect 
of stability achieved by the labour contracts signed a year ago, find the new government 
more civil and amenable.’201 Such statements demonstrate that the British government’s 
prevailing interest in Venezuela remained securing access to the country’s oil and this 
concern dictated their response to the coup.  
Since AD’s rise to power, British officials had been concerned by the potential for 
communist subversion and political turbulence in Venezuela. If actualised, these threats 
would endanger the oil companies’ operations and jeopardise British imports of 
Venezuelan oil. Thus, if the new military leadership was capable of protecting Shell’s 
operations and ensuring the uninterrupted flow of oil from the country, British officials 
were not overly concerned by the end of Venezuelan democracy. The same attitude was 
held by Washington officials who had grown concerned by the danger posed by 
communism to US interests in Latin America.
202
   
While the Soviet Union posed no direct military threat to the Western Hemisphere, 
the CIA was troubled by communist influence within Latin American industries. In 
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November 1947, the CIA reported that ‘Communist under-cover penetration of strategic 
spheres of the various economies is already such as to permit the USSR … to withhold 
from the US at least, for a limited period, its normal peacetime flow of strategic raw 
materials from Latin America’, including oil. The CIA felt that most Latin American 
governments, including the AD administration, would be unable to prevent such 
interruption of trade or Soviet-inspired disruption to the region’s economies. While the US 
Army and Air Force concurred with the CIA’s conclusions, both the State Department and 
Naval Intelligence argued that the report exaggerated the threat posed by communism in 
Latin America.
203
  
 Although CIA officials doubted the capacity of Latin American governments to 
defend against Soviet-inspired sabotage, they argued that AD’s social democratic ideology 
was beneficial to US interests. In January 1948, a CIA report asserted that AD’s 
leadership in Venezuela ‘not only assures a progressive and pro-US government but 
continues in power an active non-Communist party which can be counted on to obstruct 
the development of a strong communist movement.’ It argued that AD had ‘gone out of its 
way to alienate any Communist support’ and that communists in Venezuela ‘will in all 
probability refrain from excessive or militant opposition since they are in agreement with 
many of the AD policies’. Thus, CIA officials were relatively nuanced in their assessment 
of the Cold War role social democratic governments could play in Latin America. From 
their perspective, moderate left-wing parties protected, rather than threatened, US interests 
in the Western Hemisphere by undermining support for more radical communist groups. 
Indeed, the report concluded that ‘in the special conditions of Latin American politics, an 
active non-Communist progressive party constitutes one of the best guarantees against a 
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strong Communist movement.’204 Consequently, the CIA was prepared to accept AD’s 
leadership of Venezuela providing that it continued to uphold the legal position of US oil 
companies and maintained its anti-communist stance.  
 However, the Intelligence Division (ID) of the Department of the Army was not 
convinced of AD’s anti-communist credentials. ID officials felt that AD ‘may cooperate 
with the Communists in the future if it seems expedient’ and reported that ‘the nationalism 
of Acción Democrática represents a potential danger to the United States interests in 
Venezuelan oil and that their present temperate pro-United States policy represents 
expediency.’205 Also of concern to US officials was the question of whether AD had the 
ability to prevent communist interference in Venezuela’s oil industry.206 In September 
1948, the CIA continued to argue that ‘Communist capabilities in Latin America are 
limited essentially to subversion espionage, and sabotage, in which respects they are 
considerable.’ 207  A separate CIA report outlined the specific threat posed to the oil 
facilities of Venezuela, Aruba and Curaçao which were deemed ‘vulnerable to sabotage 
by trained agents’ and constituted ‘one of the most remunerative targets in the Western 
Hemisphere’. The document argued that the ‘[c]rippling of these wells or refineries would 
be a serious blow to US capacity either to prepare for or to wage war’ and, thus, a US-
supported ‘comprehensive protective program’ was needed in both Venezuela and the 
Dutch West Indies to safeguard against Soviet-inspired attack.
208
 The related threats of 
communism and disruption to the oil industry were central to Washington’s decision to 
recognise the Junta which toppled the AD government. 
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 Following the military coup, Walter Donnelly, the US Ambassador to Caracas, 
argued that to deny the Junta diplomatic recognition could lead to political instability 
which would disrupt the country’s oil production. Yet at the same time, he pointed out that 
a military dictatorship might provide a ‘fertile field’ for the growth of oppositional 
communist groups. The Junta assured Donnelly that it would hold free elections, oppose 
national and international communism, follow US policy in the United Nations and 
intensify its relationship with the US military. It also promised to support private 
enterprise, encourage foreign investment, respect existing oil concessions and allow 
companies to begin oil production in new areas. These pledges to defend the principal US 
interests in Venezuela led Donnelly, after some contemplation, to recommend that 
Washington recognise Venezuela’s new government.209  
US military leaders were especially keen to point out that vital national security 
interest in maintaining US access to Venezuela’s rich oil fields. Kenneth C. Royal, the US 
Secretary of the Army wrote that the new leadership ‘may be expected to provide more 
adequate security measures for the oil production area than a reinstated Gallegos 
Government which would depend for a part of its support on unions sympathetic to 
Communistic aims.’ Moreover, Royal argued that, by recognising the Junta, the US 
government could further ‘Venezuelan orientation toward the United States’ and so he 
concluded that the Army believed that recognition ‘is militarily favorable to the United 
Sates.’210 With its interests in Venezuelan oil seemingly assured, Washington was content 
to recognise the country’s new leadership.211 
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The CIA had been unable to produce any concrete evidence that communist 
groups were planning to sabotage installations in Venezuela. Rather, the agency’s fears 
were founded on the assumption that the Soviet Union was actively hostile to US interests 
around the world which would inevitably lead the Kremlin to engineer attacks on the 
Venezuelan oil industry. This adds further weight to Odd Arne Westad’s argument that 
the Cold War had a pervasive impact on international politics as superpower rivalry led 
Washington and the Kremlin to repeatedly intervene in the local politics of the Third 
World.
212
 For Westad, ideological underpinnings are crucial to understanding US foreign 
policy during the Cold War as Washington sought to export globally its own particular 
conceptions of liberty, reform and development in opposition to the conflicting model of 
modernity and progress promoted by the Kremlin.
213
 As we have seen, US efforts to 
establish universal principles governing post-war international relations had their roots in 
a hemispheric policy that first took shape in the Depression and later became globalised 
through the Atlantic Charter. Yet our acknowledgment of the role played by ideology in 
driving the Cold War should not lead us to overlook the importance of national security 
within US foreign policy.
214
 While the US government’s fear of Soviet expansion led it to 
devise an international policy of containment, in Venezuela, fear of communism centred 
on the very local and specific threat posed to the oil industry.
215
 Between 1945 and 1948, 
US policy in Venezuela remained fundamentally unchanged from that formulated during 
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the Second World War as US officials remained committed to safeguarding oil company 
operations from disruption or attack. 
While, at the time of the coup, US officials were concerned by the threat of 
internal communist subversion in Latin America, they did not fear that the Western 
Hemisphere was at risk from direct military attack from the Soviet Union.
216
 Indeed, the 
creation of the Organization of American States on 30 April 1948 reinforced the regional 
security and cooperation that the US government had fostered since Roosevelt’s initial 
election in 1933.
217
 Within the context of the early Cold War, Washington officials no 
longer viewed Latin America as an economic or political priority. Instead the US 
government focused its attention on the reconstruction of Europe and Asia, which were 
deemed to be under immediate threat from Soviet expansionism.
 218
 As Leslie Bethell and 
Ian Roxborough have argued, ‘[f]rom the US point of view Latin America was safe, 
whereas the Eurasian land mass – western Europe and the Near East – was in great 
danger’.219 On 6 May 1947, George Kennan, who had risen to become director of the 
State Department’s newly created Policy Planning Staff, outlined this attitude when he 
argued that there was ‘a great difference in the danger of Communism in areas which are 
contiguous to Soviet military power and the danger of Communism in areas remote from 
it, as for example, in South America.’ Thus, he argued that the US government did not 
‘have to go in with financial support everywhere’ to counter the Kremlin’s international 
influence.
220
 Dean Acheson, who would be appointed Secretary of State in 1949, is 
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reported to have made this same point more bluntly: ‘[s]ince the Latins, he said, were 
going to be with us anyway, why bother to help them?’221 
Indeed, in relation to Latin America’s economic development, Washington 
officials again argued that the region’s governments should look to private enterprise for 
investment, rather than US aid.
222
 This prescription was also favoured by United Nations 
officials who recommended that the region’s governments organise their economies in 
such a way as to attract foreign capital. In addition, United Nations reports estimated that 
the US-funded Marshall Plan would assist the region by enabling European countries to 
purchase an estimated $460 million worth of Latin American goods.
223
 Thus, while the 
US government would not extend aid Marshall Aid directly to Latin America, the Truman 
administration argued that the European Recovery Program indirectly financed 
development of the region.
224
 However, the USA’s own purchases of Latin American 
commodities decreased as Washington promoted the production of raw materials in other 
parts of the world as a means of restoring European economies.
225
 
  
Conclusion 
Events in Venezuela can be seen as a case study of the links between British and US 
experiences of the Second World War and later attitudes to the Cold War. Whitehall’s 
wartime and post-war policy remained committed to securing Britain’s supplies of 
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Venezuelan oil and its decision to recognise successive regimes in Caracas rested on each 
government’s willingness, and ability, to protect oil company operations. Furthermore, 
during the Second World War, Whitehall suspected that Washington endeavoured to 
create a hemispheric bloc that would undermine Britain’s political and economic interests 
in Latin America. In the immediate post-war period, these fears persisted but became 
imbued with a Cold War context as the formation of regional blocs, led by the two 
superpowers, threatened to diminish Britain’s own international influence. Thus, while the 
burgeoning Cold War altered the context of British policy in Latin America, it did not 
alter the substance of its aims as Whitehall’s desire to limit US hegemony in the region 
continued. Yet, while FO officials sought to increase British influence in Venezuela and 
throughout Latin America, they were frustrated by their inability to ably compete with 
Washington.  
Similarly, many of the attitudes held by US policy-makers during the Cold War 
were informed by their experience of the Second World War. Throughout the war, US 
officials encouraged pan-American solidarity as a means of securing the Western 
Hemisphere from Axis attack and, by 1947, US officials sought to ensure that the region 
was equally secure from communist assault. In particular, they were anxious to safeguard 
against sabotage of the region’s industries and, specifically, Soviet-inspired attacks on 
Venezuelan oil production. Subsequently, the US government chose to support the 
military Junta that seized power in 1948 due to its apparent willingness and ability to 
defend against such attacks. US policy towards Venezuela remained focused on protecting 
oil companies’ operations, despite the international transition to the Cold War. 
Washington’s free trade philosophy also survived the Second World War although 
it underwent a clear transition. After the conclusion of hostilities, Latin America was no 
longer a political priority for US officials and their economic plan for the region drifted 
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away from New Deal reform towards an embrace of the free market. This shift was 
exhibited in the Clayton Plan and Economic Charter of the Americas which emphasised 
the importance of guaranteeing an attractive economic climate for foreign investment 
throughout Latin America.
226
 Subsequently, US officials baulked at the 1946 Venezuelan 
surtax and refused to provide a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere. While 
Washington persisted with its free trade policy throughout the Depression, Second World 
War and early Cold War, the programme’s character evolved over time in a manner that 
reflected the US government’s global priorities. 
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Conclusion 
 
On 4 January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin outlined his ‘First Aim of 
British Foreign Policy’. He argued that with the creation of: 
a Western European system … backed by the power and resources 
of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, it should be possible 
to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the 
United States of America and the U.S.S.R. 
 
He contended that such an outcome would ‘show clearly that we are not subservient to 
the United States of America or to the Soviet Union’ and allow the British government to 
play a pivotal role within international relations.
1
 With the benefit of hindsight it is easy 
for us to brand Bevin’s outlook as optimistic at best, as it quickly became apparent that 
the British government would play an ancillary role in a burgeoning Cold War between 
the two superpowers. Nevertheless, his opinions were indicative of the views held by 
Whitehall officials who, throughout the 1940s, sought to maintain and expand Britain’s 
global interests and influence. There existed, therefore, a continuity between the Second 
World War and the Cold War as policy-makers aimed to exercise British power, 
independent of, and potentially at odds with, US foreign policy. However, throughout the 
1940s, British officials struggled to turn these ambitions into successful policy as they 
contended with the conflicting aims of the US government. 
As part of this, FO officials clearly hoped to extend British influence in Latin 
America but were concerned that Washington was deliberately undermining their 
interests in the region. As this thesis has argued, these tensions surfaced when British and 
US policy-makers formulated contrasting strategies in response to the Venezuelan 
government’s efforts to reform the country’s oil industry. This was caused primarily by 
the two governments’ divergent interpretations of the perceived threat of Venezuelan 
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nationalisation. British officials wanted to avoid the immediate disruption to oil 
production that nationalisation would cause, and believed that, in the longer-term, 
Venezuela lacked the expertise and infrastructure to operate the country’s oil industry as 
efficiently as foreign companies. Moreover, Whitehall officials feared that the 
nationalisation of Venezuela’s oil industry would continue the precedent set by the 
Mexican government in 1938. As an imperial power, the British government feared that 
its entire oil policy would be threatened by an international pattern of expropriation. 
While the British Isles lacked any known substantial oil fields, as we have seen, 
the British government had used its position at the centre of a network of international 
trade to maintain its fuel supplies. British reliance on private enterprise to produce, refine 
and transport this vitally important strategic raw material meant a lack of direct 
government control over the country’s oil security. Whitehall officials believed that 
British companies, more so than any other, could be relied upon to act in accord with the 
national interest and it was this belief that formed the basis of their policy. Venezuela and 
its political and economic exploitation loomed large in Whitehall’s calculations as British 
officials sought to ensure that the oil industry operated in a manner most amenable to 
their interests. Consequently, Whitehall was prone to challenge the Venezuelan 
government’s economic reforms when they appeared to risk British access to the 
country’s oil.  
By the onset of the Second World War, the British government had developed 
close cooperative ties with Shell, whose operations in Venezuela were of vital importance 
to the war effort. While their motivations differed, Shell and British officials shared a 
common interest in ensuring that the company’s Venezuelan production continued 
uninterrupted. Thus, as this thesis has demonstrated, Whitehall consistently acted to 
support the company and limit any intervention by the Venezuelan authorities that would 
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damage or constrain its operations. Shell officials became an important source of 
information for the British government as the company passed on internal correspondence 
that detailed and analysed the latest developments in Venezuela. Moreover, by 
collaborating with Shell when formulating policy, Whitehall could ensure that the two 
parties pursued a common goal in concert rather than working at cross-purposes. This 
intimate relationship benefitted British officials as it provided them with an opportunity to 
influence Shell’s actions in accord with their own foreign interests. Yet British officials 
feared that Venezuelan popular nationalism would induce increasing government 
intervention in the oil industry and, ultimately, lead to a repeat of the 1938 Mexican 
expropriation case. Whitehall felt that the only way to prevent such a development was by 
supporting the oil companies’ legal rights through a hard-line Anglo-US united front. 
However, as we have seen, the US government was able to undermine totally British 
policy in Venezuela through its own manipulation of oil companies.  
US officials also sought to prevent nationalisation of the Venezuelan oil industry 
but felt that this would be best achieved through cooperative negotiation and compromise 
rather than an intransigent legalistic response. As chapter one establishes, this strategy 
must be understood within the broader context of the US government’s efforts to improve 
its relationship with Latin America through the Good Neighbor policy. As early as 1933, 
the Roosevelt administration sought to stimulate the US domestic economy by developing 
policies and organisations designed to increase trade with, and US investment in, Latin 
America. As such, Latin America provided a testing-ground for the globalised New Deal 
that Elizabeth Borgwardt and Michael J. Hogan have argued formed the basis of US 
foreign policy in the 1940s.
2
 This approach took on greater significance as US officials 
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sought to promote pan-American solidarity as a defence against possible Axis attack on, 
and infiltration of, the Western Hemisphere.  
Chapter two reveals that the Good Neighbor policy produced successful results as 
the Venezuelan government pro-actively engineered State Department intervention in the 
oil industry. Subsequently, US officials used a combination of pressure and persuasion to 
convince the SOCNJ board to be more amenable to the Venezuelan government’s tax 
reforms. Once SOCNJ had agreed to follow the policy set by Washington, the other oil 
companies felt compelled to do likewise and withdrew their support for the British united 
front. Consequently, US intervention in Venezuela was successful in ensuring that the 
independent actions of oil company executives did not undermine the Good Neighbor 
policy and impair pan-American solidarity. As the actions of oil company officials could 
determine the outcome of Anglo-US discord, the capacity for Whitehall and Washington 
to gain corporate backing was a crucial component of their ability to exercise power. This 
dynamic reveals that state-private networks can play a pivotal, yet often overlooked, role 
in international relations.  
 As we have seen, the Roosevelt administration consistently sought to establish 
universal free trade as a central component of its increasingly interventionist role in 
international affairs. These efforts to dismantle barriers to US exports were initially 
focused on Latin America but, from 1941, Washington officials made an increasingly 
concerted effort to universalise free trade. Chapter three demonstrates that this 
commitment to propagating free trade trumped the Good Neighbor policy’s principle of 
non-interference as, in 1944, the US government felt it necessary to condemn Venezuelan 
attempts to increase domestic oil refining when they appeared to place geographical limits 
on trade. At the same time, its reliance on overseas oilfields prompted the British 
government to intervene in an attempt to prevent the Venezuelan government from 
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placing restrictions on the global flow of oil. Nevertheless, the practical application of 
these aims proved difficult to achieve in Venezuela as the local government retained 
sovereignty over its national trade policies. There were limits to the US and British ability 
to exert their respective authority in Venezuela, despite the two governments’ global 
influence and power. 
 As revealed in chapters three and four, the Venezuelan government could use its 
local authority to delay the pending of new concessions to oil companies in order to 
safeguard its own interests in the industry. This was a strategy used by the Venezuelan 
authorities to successfully limit unwanted diplomatic intervention in the refinery ‘banned 
zone’ issue and gain assurances that Shell would promptly build a refinery on the 
mainland. This local authority forced British and US officials to be cognizant that their 
intervention could provoke countermeasures from the Venezuelan government to the 
detriment of the foreign oil companies. Thus, the oil companies’ links with Whitehall and 
Washington could actually be damaging to their interests and, at times, this led them to 
decline diplomatic intervention. However, it is necessary to qualify Venezuelan agency 
with Max Paul Friedman’s point that ‘agency and independence are not the same thing’ as 
there existed an asymmetrical and hierarchical power structure to international relations 
within which the British, US and Venezuelan governments operated.
3
   
Although successive Venezuelan governments undoubtedly had the ability to 
influence the development of their oil industry, this was a localised power that did not 
stretch beyond their national borders and could not compete with the global influence of 
the British and US governments. Chapter four demonstrates that Whitehall and 
Washington had the capacity to set rules of behaviour to govern international relations 
while their relationships with multinational oil companies allowed them to influence 
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developments on the ground in Venezuela. Conversely, the Venezuelan government did 
not have comparative powers to control events within the USA and British Empire or at 
an international level. As Paul Kramer argues, imperial power is ‘no less real for its 
limits’ and, indeed, dispensing with ‘the illusory association of empire with absolute 
power will allow historians to approach empires as complex circuits of agency’.4 
Throughout the 1940s, the State Department sought to convince Whitehall to 
dismantle the system of imperial preference and open up the British Empire to US goods 
as a central component of its free trade policy. For their part, British officials were 
concerned of the effect of universal free trade on their own national interests and were 
sceptical of the US commitment to an open door policy in Latin America. Therefore, 
British and US intervention in Venezuela should be viewed as a case study of the broader 
wartime Anglo-US tensions regarding the future of international trade. These tensions 
reflected the evolving nature of the British and US world roles as Washington pressured 
Whitehall to accept its plans for post-war reconstruction of international trade and 
economics. Throughout 1944, British and US officials sought to alleviate some of these 
tensions by establishing principles, guidelines and organisations to govern the post-war 
international oil industry. The resulting Anglo-American Oil Agreement was founded on 
corporatist ideas of state-private sector power sharing and prioritised the interests of oil-
importing, rather than exporting, countries.  
By 1945, the US government’s interventionist foreign oil policy had come to 
resemble the British government’s decades-old corporatist strategy. This approach had 
been cultivated by Max Thornburg who, since 1941, had stressed the need for the US 
government to foster a cooperative and collaborative relationship with multinational oil 
companies. At the same time, Washington’s desire to create an international petroleum 
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commission reflected a New Deal attitude to international organisation that also 
underpinned other US-led initiatives such as the United Nations and World Bank. Despite 
these efforts, the Anglo-American Oil Agreement failed to pass through Congress and 
Whitehall officials continued to see the US government as a rival for influence within the 
Venezuelan oil industry. Thus, while the Second World War created a close Anglo-US 
military alliance, it did not prevent Venezuelan oil from bringing to the fore the 
underlying competitive tensions between the two powers. In fact, by highlighting the 
armed forces’ reliance on gasoline, the war propagated Anglo-US rivalry as Whitehall 
and Washington sought to secure their independent access to foreign oil. 
As the Cold War emerged to dominate international relations, British officials 
became concerned that the formation of bipolar blocs dominated by the US and Soviet 
governments would diminish their own international influence. To counteract this threat 
in Venezuela, Whitehall officials sought to limit US hegemony through increased trade 
and diplomatic ties with the South American country. Whitehall’s efforts to increase 
exports were of particular importance in the immediate post-war period as Britain 
suffered from a trade deficit and balance of payments crisis. However, Whitehall officials 
struggled to challenge the dominance of US trade while Washington reinforced its 
political hegemony in Latin America through the Act of Chapultepec and creation of the 
Organization of American States. British fears of increased US domination of the world 
demonstrate that the Cold War fostered intra-bloc rivalries between western powers as 
well as conflict between ‘East’ and ‘West’. 
Despite their conflicting interests in Venezuela, by 1946, British and US officials 
shared a distrust of Soviet foreign policy which they deemed to be aggressive and 
antithetical to their own international interests. Although neither Washington nor 
Whitehall feared a full-scale attack by the Soviet military on the Western Hemisphere, the 
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emergence of a global Cold War led them to believe that the Venezuelan oil industry was 
vulnerable to sabotage by communist agents. While the international context changed 
from World War to Cold War the British and US policies towards Venezuela remained 
focused on ensuring access to the country’s oil. In the minds of British and US officials, 
old wartime concerns became imbued with a Cold War understanding of international 
relations as the threat to Venezuela’s oil industry shifted from the Axis powers to 
communists. As this thesis has demonstrated, the actions of multinational oil companies 
played a pivotal role in determining the success or failure of British and US oil policy. 
Consequently, the British and US attitude towards both the AD government and 
subsequent military junta were largely dictated by their willingness, and ability, to protect 
the oil companies’ operations. 
In presenting this narrative, this thesis has made a series of contributions to the 
existing historiography. A principal aim of this thesis was to contextualise British and US 
oil policy during the 1940s within broader developments in international politics. As a 
result, this thesis has provided a new perspective on the development of US intervention 
in the international oil industry which should not be seen in isolation but, rather, 
perceived as part of US post-war planning during the 1940s. The Roosevelt 
administration’s internationalisation of the New Deal originated in its policy towards 
Latin America as Washington officials took on the responsibility to manage hemispheric 
commerce. This hemispheric New Deal acted as an important stage between the domestic 
and global New Deals by providing US officials with an interventionist model which they 
could apply to the rest of the post-war world. The same interventionism and reformism 
that characterised Washington’s approach to hemispheric economics formed the basis of 
US policy towards the oil industries of Latin America and, later, the world. By 1941, as 
US officials expanded their economic interventionism outside of the Western 
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Hemisphere, they sought to ensure that the international oil industry conformed to their 
plans for post-war international organisation. Throughout the 1940s, US officials 
intervened in the Venezuelan oil industry not only to protect their oil supplies but also to 
secure their wider global interests.  
By analysing Whitehall intervention in the Venezuelan oil industry, this thesis 
also provides new insights into the history of British foreign policy. The British 
government’s efforts to influence events in Venezuela demonstrate its ability and desire 
to exercise influence in Latin America. However, this thesis demonstrates the limitations 
placed on British ambitions by the increasing scope of US power. Throughout the 1940s, 
British officials were unable and often unwilling to pursue an independent foreign policy 
in Venezuela in opposition to US objectives. Within this context, Bevin’s ‘First Aim of 
British Foreign Policy’ reflected Whitehall’s yearning, but ultimately futile struggle, to 
maintain Britain’s global influence in the new post-war world. With regards to the history 
of Anglo-US relations, this thesis adds credence to Thomas Mills’ argument that, in Latin 
America, Whitehall and Washington were involved in a competitive rivalry during the 
1940s. It provides a case study of this competition and builds on Mills’ analysis by 
revealing that disputes over the international oil industry made a particularly significant 
contribution to such conflict.
5
 This thesis, consequently, provides a synthesis of Mills’ 
argument with that of Fiona Venn who has argued that the politics of oil created friction 
within Anglo-US relations throughout the twentieth century.
6
  
With regards to Cold War history, this study expands on Mills’ analysis by 
revealing that Anglo-US rivalry endured into the early Cold War as British officials 
continued to perceive Washington as a competitor in matters relating to Latin America. 
This dynamic challenges the strictly bi-polar view of the Cold War and provides a more 
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nuanced picture of the development of post-war international politics. At the same time, 
this thesis provides further evidence in support of Odd Arne Westad’s argument that the 
Cold War profoundly shaped US foreign policy outside of Europe.
7
 By 1948, both 
Whitehall and Washington officials’ perceptions of the Venezuelan oil industry were 
shaped by fears of communist sabotage which were founded on their general suspicions 
of Soviet intentions. As such, the development of British and US policy towards 
Venezuelan oil during the 1940s is representative of the evolving geopolitical climate of 
the period. 
The second major aim of this thesis was to analyse the relationship between 
multinational oil companies and national governments in order to develop our 
understanding of the mechanics of international relations. This thesis has done more than 
previous studies of the oil industry to reveal the substantial agency of company officials 
to instigate and shape international disputes. This compliments the work done in the 
disciplines of transnational and global history which have emphasised the importance of 
non-state actors in world affairs. Nevertheless, there is a danger that historians go too far 
in dismissing the role played by national governments and imperialism in creating global 
interconnectedness. As this thesis reveals, many of the free trade principles that came to 
dominate international politics and economics in the twentieth century were proposed, 
supported and advanced by national governments. At various points British and US 
policy-makers intervened in the Venezuelan oil industry in order to uphold such liberal 
economic principles and support the interests of multinational corporations. Thus, 
national governments often promoted, rather than restricted, global integration. 
Throughout the 1940s, British and US officials frequently collaborated with oil 
companies to formulate policy and defend their shared interests. In fact, the ability of 
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Washington and Whitehall to gain the support of privately-owned oil companies was an 
essential component of their ability to affect the outcome of events in Venezuela. This 
offers a valuable contribution to imperial and diplomatic history by demonstrating that 
relationships with private enterprise can provide governments with a powerful means to 
exercise power within international relations. This thesis provides an illustration of the 
state-private networks that pervade international relations but remain under-represented 
within the current historiography of British and US foreign policy. 
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